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1Dr. Khalil Hindi:  
Statement of the President of Birzeit University
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Welcome to this international conference at Birzeit University, 
organized by the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies 
entitled ‘Gaza - Palestine: Out of the Margins’.
May I take this opportunity to thank all participants, particularly those 
who have come from abroad to share our concerns. I trust that this 
conference will mark the beginning of a long-lasting collaboration that 
will benefit Birzeit University, as well as your academic research.
The conference aims to encourage reflection on the situation in 
Palestine; more particularly on the status of Gaza, thereby bridging a 
research gap clearly perceived by everyone interested in Palestinian 
public affairs and concerned about the increasing marginalization of 
Gaza.
Birzeit University has always sought to encourage sound scientific 
research on Palestine, as part of its effort to have a leading role 
nationally, regionally and internationally.
Our reflection on Gaza is not thinking about the other, but about 
the self. It is reflecting on the Palestinian identity, though, according 
to our late great poet, Mahmoud Darwish, it is an identity “under 
construction”, for “identity is what we bequeath, not what we inherit; 
what we invent, not what we remember.”
I am looking forward in particular to the opening speech by the 
Commissioner-General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestinian Refugees, Mr. Filippo Grandi, which considers, contrary to 
all expectations, “advancing human development in the Gaza Strip.”
Thank you for accepting the invitation to submit papers or to participate 
in the debate on the important topics under discussion. I wish the 
conference all the success it richly deserves and for which you have, 
no doubt, worked hard.
2Asem Khalil:
Statement of the Director of the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod 
Institute of International Studies
Dr. Khalil Hindi, President of Birzeit University, 
Mr. Filippo Grandi, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, 
Ladies and Gentlemen,
We are honored at the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies to inaugurate the Conference entitled ‘Gaza – Palestine: Out of 
the Margins’.
The title and the theme of this conference may invoke questions for 
some and elicit curiosity on the part of others. In any event, we, the 
organizers of the conference, are its main beneficiaries. You have 
collectively emphasized the importance of the event by your presence 
here, even though it is a Friday morning, and despite the timing of 
the conference which, albeit by coincidence, comes after three 
international conferences held at Birzeit University in the past few 
weeks. 
Among the many communications we received in the run-up to this 
event, I shall always remember a message from someone inquiring 
about the “conference about Hamas which Birzeit is organizing.” As 
most of you in attendance know very well, this conference is neither 
about Hamas nor about Fatah, nor even the Palestinian Authority nor 
the Hamas-led government. It is about Palestine and the Palestinians, 
and about rejecting a situation in which thinking of a part of the nation 
has become a source of suspicion and a reason to question. Gaza is a 
part of the Palestinian nation, and its centrality needs to be recognized. 
Hence the title of this conference.
As for the papers to be presented, they are all by academics who 
responded to the call for proposed research papers sent out by the 
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies more than six 
months ago – with the exception of Mr. Filippo Grandi who will honor 
us with his keynote address today, and I am personally grateful to him 
for having saved some of his time to be with us, despite all his many 
preoccupations, and Professor Sara Roy of Harvard University who will 
3give the second keynote address on ‘A land diminished - Reflections on 
Gaza’s landscape.’
This conference is one in a series of activities that the Forced 
Migration and Refugee Unit (FMRU) at the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod 
Institute is organizing, generously supported by Canada’s International 
Development Research Center (IDRC), the sole external sponsor of this 
conference. On behalf of the Institute and Birzeit University I would 
like to thank the IDRC and particularly Ms. Roula El-Rifai who is present 
with us today.
A word of thanks goes out to all who have contributed their effort and 
time in the development of the foundations of the FMRU, which has 
now culminated in the development of a new concentration in Forced 
Migration and Refugee studies within the MA program in international 
studies. This places Birzeit University in a leading position in terms of 
pedagogy and research specialization, not simply at the Palestinian 
level, but also at that of the Arab world.
The existence of such a concentration – the first of its kind in Palestine – 
is of particular importance with regard to understanding and treatment 
of issues of forced migration, refugees, and displacement which have 
faced and continue to face millions of Palestinians. We thus intend to 
summon up memories and enrich our understanding of the present, 
helping to supply these millions with tools for creating a better future.
Here is a ‘deportation order’ against parliamentarians from Jerusalem; 
here is another order deporting a child, thus separating him from 
his family on the pretext of having thrown stones; here is an Israeli 
High Court decision allowing the demolition of Palestinian houses and 
approving the construction of the separation wall. Here is a military 
order to be added to other thousands making the inhabitants of Gaza 
foreigners in the West Bank and prohibiting the inhabitants of the 
West Bank from entering Gaza Strip, and threatening the inhabitants 
of Jerusalem with a loss of their identity cards, for whatever reason 
and at any time.
This bitter present reminds us of an unforgotten past – I hope that 
we will not forget it, that it will not be forgotten by the governor, the 
negotiator or the opponent. It will most certainly not be forgotten by 
4generations of Palestinian living without a land, or a State for more 
than sixty years, as they nevertheless dream of a state and of their 
return to the soil.
Distinguished guests, I very much look forward to hearing your 
contributions to this conference, and hope that the event will be 
worthy of your continued interest over the next two days. There is not 
the slightest intent here to affirm particular views while suppressing or 
excluding others. 
We are here to put forward ideas and, I hope, to be creative, even 
if some arguments turn out to be controversial. At any rate, we as 
Palestinians believe in the essential humanity of our cause. We will 
not tolerate our – or Gaza’s – marginalization, and we reject the kind 
of serenity and indifference that promote the acceptance of mere half-
solutions.
5Filippo Grandi: 
Against all Odds - Advancing Human Development in Gaza
I thank you, Mr. President, for your warm remarks. I also thank Birzeit 
University, the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies 
and Professor Heacock for inviting UNRWA to give the keynote address 
at this important international conference. The focus is very timely, as 
we are perhaps at a crucial moment when new political horizons may 
well be shaped.
Birzeit University’s reputation for academic excellence is well known 
and well-deserved. As the first institution of higher learning in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, it continues to make truly outstanding 
contributions in socially and politically relevant teaching and research. 
Birzeit serves as a reminder of the heights Palestinians can achieve if 
given the opportunity, the freedom to create, and the liberty to act. 
Its perseverance and commitment to excellence are also a reminder 
of the human desire for normality and progress against all odds – one 
of the key themes of the thoughts I would like to share with you this 
morning.
Opportunity, freedom to create, and the liberty to act – these are 
the diametric opposites of the conditions of enforced deprivation 
that flow from the occupation of Palestinian land. The occupation is 
now entering its forty-third year. It blends with the other injustices 
of exile since 1948 and the effects of decades-long armed conflict to 
give Palestinians and Palestine refugees their unwanted place in the 
modern history of human suffering. 
Within this context, Gaza has its own distinctive character, one that 
is forged from so many years in the eye of the conflict. At the same 
time, Gaza has come to embody the suffering and the yet unfulfilled 
aspirations of the Palestinian people. And as crisis after crisis have 
broken around Gaza, its image as a forlorn and dangerous place has 
been reinforced to a point where, consciously or not, many embrace 
the self-fulfilling rhetoric that seeks to justify its exclusion as a place 
beyond salvation. As the title of our conference puts it, for much of the 
world, Gaza and its people are very much “in the margins”. 
The current situation fits the mould. The recent easing of restrictions 
6on the importation of consumer goods is a welcome development and 
has brought some benefit to the people of Gaza, even if the boost to 
the formal economy is limited to a few sectors and falls far short of 
the free flow of goods and people envisaged in the November 2005 
Agreement on Movement and Access. Most Palestinians, however, 
still face harsh conditions of isolation. Few, if any, can avoid the effects 
of paralyzed public services, a collapsed formal economy, and the 
physical and psychological threats from the conflict. It is self-evident 
that further, bolder measures are needed to open Gaza to the world 
and in particular to the West Bank, with which it is intended, along with 
East Jerusalem, to form a Palestinian state, while reviving its economy 
and placing its people on the road to recovery. 
The closure of Gaza’s borders has been the direct cause of debilitating, 
widespread poverty. Over sixty percent of Gazans live below the 
poverty line, some forty percent are unemployed, and eighty percent 
rely on food handouts. And yet we know that the statistics do not tell 
the whole story of a people whose dreams and hopes seem to have 
been deferred to a later time.
We at UNRWA see the effects of Gaza’s ordeal up close. Just last month 
we measured an abject poverty rate of more than 30% among pupils 
in UNRWA schools. Outrageous as it may seem, it is a fact that these 
children come to their classrooms hungry, relying on our school feeding 
to provide the energy they need to learn and grow. 
So, yes, Gaza is still suffering. But Gaza is complicated in every dimension 
in a region rich in complexities. The question we must ask ourselves – 
given that it will be arduous, indeed, to address Gaza’s problems – is 
whether we can afford to leave Gaza in the margins where it presently 
lies, preferring to direct our attention and resources to other, less 
thorny or intractable issues? Can we afford to look the other way while 
this large Mediterranean community and its 1.5 million people remain 
locked out of the mainstream of normal interaction with the world? To 
put it starkly, will we declare it a lost cause? 
As representative of the UN organization which for 61 years has carried 
out the world’s commitment to stand by millions of Palestine refugees 
I say, “Certainly not!” to each of these questions and firmly believe 
that this is the right response not only for UNRWA but also for the 
international community, in particular at this crucial moment when 
7political developments may affect, hopefully for the better, the reality 
in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Gaza, for refugees 
and other Palestinians. I am sure I am joined in this belief by all who 
share the aspirations of peace and human dignity for everybody. I say 
this from the standpoint and perspective of Palestine refugees, and 
of UNRWA – a specific point of view, but one that fits well with the 
thrust of this conference and has value for contributing insights into 
the situation in Gaza, given that around 70% of Gaza’s population 
are refugees from Mandate Palestine. I also believe that UNRWA’s 
views and experience can provide useful food for thought to your 
deliberations, not least because our focus on human development and 
our delivery of services directly to refugees provide us with a uniquely 
close view that is informed by a relationship of trust and confidence 
with the refugee population. 
Through decades of extensive interaction with refugees on the ground, 
we have drawn on a resource which we recognize as the very foundation 
of our human development work. I refer here to the strength of the 
Palestinian spirit - that human element which emboldens people to 
aspire and achieve, regardless of their circumstances and against 
odds that are seemingly overwhelming. Seen in a different way, it is 
perhaps because of the overwhelming difficulties facing Gaza that its 
people have developed a positive energy, which manifests itself in so 
many constructive ways. I say this not as mere praise: there is a social 
dynamism that is special in Gaza. UNRWA – and I – have encountered 
it, and its potential, time and time again – working with refugees who 
with the minimum of support are able to build their own reserves 
to create better lives for themselves and their families; or inspired 
by the thirst for learning, and maturity of character, that we see in 
the children in our primary schools; or awed by the entrepreneurial 
abilities displayed by our microfinance clients. Such qualities, I say 
with pride, are also demonstrated on a daily basis by the UNRWA staff 
working tirelessly to improve their community. In these and in many 
other ways, we have learned that the human factor remains the driving 
force of development work. In short, it is the resilient people of Gaza 
that make this development possible, against all odds.
If the dynamism of Gaza drives its human development, that same 
dynamism must continue to benefit from the contributions of 
8relief and development organizations. It is important and positive 
that the reconstruction of Gaza is clearly a priority of Palestinian 
state building. However, until the compounded effects of conflict, 
closures and internal political divisions are eliminated, and until 
a Palestinian state is fully established and normal development 
mechanisms restored, international support will remain a critical 
requirement in responding to the enormity of the challenges of Gaza. 
A defining theme of UNRWA’s operational identity is the Agency’s 
focus on creating opportunities for refugees and strengthening their 
ability to seize them. It may be useful, in opening this conference, to 
share a few lessons in this respect. We take the view that at the heart 
of our mandate is the imperative of investing in refugees as people – 
investing in ways that enable them to develop their potential in spite 
of the constraints imposed by exile and conflict. This approach is at the 
core of what “human development” means for UNRWA. It was evident 
at the outset of the Agency’s operations and is exemplified particularly 
by the massive investment in refugee children through primary 
education, our largest programme and one that symbolizes what 
UNRWA represents - and continues to represent - for generations of 
Palestinians. Our education programme aims to recognize the potential 
of individual refugees and nurture them in directions consistent with 
United Nations values: tolerance for diversity and opposing views; 
peaceful resolution of disputes; respect for the human rights and 
dignity for all without any distinction; and respect for the rule of law. 
I believe that in the situation of Gaza – desperate and protracted as 
it may be, and even more so because of that – important lessons can 
be learned from an orientation that puts individuals at the centre of 
interventions and focuses on lending them what assistance we can 
as they strive to improve their lives, their communities; and, through 
them, the region. This is very similar to the paradigm of human 
security; a concept influencing the foreign policy of many States and 
which is relevant to the Middle East. This concept holds that ensuring 
the basic needs of individuals and helping them grow and realize 
their potential can both improve people’s lives and ultimately reduce 
conflict. Education belongs of course to the realm of development. Our 
experience in Gaza – but also in the West Bank, Lebanon and elsewhere 
– has taught us that fulfilling the right to a good quality education is also, 
and fundamentally, a strategic interest of the international community.
9Taken together with our focus on refugees as individuals, the themes of 
quality services and creation of opportunities constitute the leitmotiv 
of an agency which, though fully cognizant of the odds stacked against 
refugees in Gaza and elsewhere, understands from experience that 
a measure of human development is nevertheless attainable, and 
remains firm in the pursuit of that goal. 
UNRWA’s work in Gaza offers many compelling instances of how the 
themes of quality services and opportunities for refugees reinforce 
each other and are demonstrated in practice. The Schools of Excellence 
programme is a prime example. It was borne from a recognition that 
years of underfunding, coupled with the effects of the occupation and 
the impact of border closures, were threatening the very foundations 
of learning for the over 200,000 refugee children in UNRWA schools 
in Gaza. The threat was dramatically reflected in shocking failure rates 
revealed through independent testing in the 2006-2007 school year. 
I have seen these educational initiatives played out in classrooms 
throughout Gaza. They are a revelation, and as proof of their human 
value and of their dedicated teachers, we are seeing student test 
scores begin to rebound. Take into account that these children are 
doing homework by candlelight because of daily electricity cuts, or live 
in homes where armed conflict and poverty and despair have fuelled 
domestic violence and trauma. Many adults are overcome by the same 
hardships that Gaza’s children are struggling bravely to confront. It is 
imperative that we continue to support them.
There are other key examples of the innovation and construction 
of real opportunities for refugees in Gaza. UNRWA’s “Equality in 
Action” programme is designed to improve the capacity of women 
to exercise freedom of choice, to take advantage of opportunities for 
personal professional development and ultimately to address gender 
discrimination and inequality at all levels of social and economic life. 
We are supporting women’s access to the labour market, including 
through leveraging the services offered by the agency’s microfinance 
services. We raise awareness of domestic violence, offering advice and 
counseling to promote women’s capacity to cope with the phenomenon. 
We provide women with spaces for social interaction and recreation 
and foster, through support for a radio station for women, their right 
to freedom of opinion and self expression. 
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And another example is our Summer Games activity, drawing, in 2010, 
almost 250,000 of Gaza’s conflict-scarred children to much needed 
recreational activities. Sports, arts and crafts, and student theatre 
thrive in these Games. They reveal that children in Gaza (contrary to 
perceptions of many on the outside) are just like children in New York, 
Beijing, or Cairo.
These are just a few instances of how the refugees we serve are able 
to look beyond the harshness of the immediate circumstances in Gaza 
and to focus, against all odds, on promoting independent livelihood 
opportunities for refugees, maximizing their learning and self-
improvement, and working to expand the life choices of individuals in 
the face of severe conditions. 
Due to military occupation, outbreaks of violence and over a decade 
of closed borders, Gazans continue to endure significant impediments 
to a normal life. Among the most visible of these is the slow pace of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction – far too slow to address with the 
urgency that it deserves the damage and destruction caused during 
the most recent war in Gaza and years of conflict and closures. The 
United Nations, including UNRWA, have in place extensive plans for 
the reconstruction of Gaza. These plans have been paralyzed for years 
by the prohibition on importation of construction materials. This has 
had multiple negative consequences. Let me just mention here, by 
way of example, one impact that it has had on education: we have 
permission to build only a handful of the 100 new schools needed for 
refugees in Gaza; this year we had to turn away almost 40,000 refugee 
children for lack of space, and the problem will be compounded by 
the average annual increase of 8,000 students among the refugee 
population. We are forced to “double shift” almost all of our Gaza 
schools, administering one school in the morning and a second in the 
afternoon. We shall now have to start triple shifting, or create even 
more schools out of shipping containers. 
It bears repeating here that the recent easing of the blockade is 
welcome. The situation, however, continues to be extremely difficult, 
as most materials needed for reconstruction remain subject to 
cumbersome import procedures and crossing points with facilities that 
are not yet adequate for large flows of goods. With the support of the 
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international community and of the Palestinian Authority, the United 
Nations continue to negotiate approval of reconstruction projects 
with the Israeli authorities. Although several approvals have now 
been granted, and the logistical capacity is being upgraded, overall 
needs are far from being met, in particular for reconstruction and the 
private sector. While recognising Israel’s legitimate security concerns, 
we will continue to urge the Israeli authorities to expand the range 
and quantity of goods for import to Gaza, while also insisting that the 
blockade not just be eased, but be brought to an end. However, as we 
do so, we should not forget that at the root of the problem are complex 
and unresolved political issues. Even the best logistical solution will not 
solve the political problems before us. 
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This leads me to my concluding points. The international community 
bears responsibilities for refugees, who, as persons without the 
protection of a state, require the protection of international law and 
legal norms. It is this aspect of refugee status, and our responsibility to 
act, that remind us that they were never meant to be alone in fending 
for their needs.
In my remarks so far, I have offered UNRWA’s response to the question: 
“can we afford to leave Gaza in the margins?” I have answered “no” to 
this question and shown how – availing themselves of the extraordinary 
Palestinian resilience – UNRWA and other agencies, thanks to the 
support of the international community, take head-on the challenges 
of contributing to the well-being of the population. However, it is 
important to remind ourselves that while these organizations’ mandate 
is comprehensive in the humanitarian, human development and 
protection sphere, they are not the exclusive duty-bearers in relation 
to the people of Gaza.
The international community has contributed significantly to Gaza, and 
much more can (and must) be done as the blockade eases further and 
is hopefully lifted. But it is even more crucial to address the root cause 
of those needs, in particular where the needs and concerns of refugees 
and others intersect with the political realm and impinge on the larger 
questions facing Palestinians and the quest for peace. 
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While UNRWA, clearly, has no political mandate and is not engaged in 
the negotiations which will hopefully resolve both the conflict and the 
dispossession of the refugees, I believe that it is incumbent upon us to 
remind those involved in these important discussions of two important 
issues which, with the remainder of my time today, I would like you to 
consider.
The first is reconciliation among Palestinians. I am fully aware that the 
process of achieving reconciliation is for political actors to undertake 
and support. However, the healing of Palestinian rifts has implications 
for the well-being and future of Palestine refugees and other affected 
civilians in Gaza. It is from that vantage point that I appeal for 
Palestinian unity to be restored. And it is from that vantage point that I 
ask – with a sense of urgency – that the welfare of the people of Gaza is 
not held hostage by politics. I would be remiss, as representative of the 
Palestinian refugee agency, if I did not convey to all those with a stake 
in regional peace this simple but clear message which our teachers, 
doctors and social workers hear every day as they do UNRWA’s work 
among Gaza’s communities – and indeed among all Palestinian refugee 
communities across the region. 
The second is peace, and the refugees whose destiny is bound up in it. 
As refugees emerged from - and exist as a consequence of - the 1948 
conflict, it stands to reason that addressing their plight is a prerequisite 
for resolving the conflict. The extent to which refugee rights and choices 
are addressed in a negotiated settlement will affect the credibility of 
the settlement itself. Refugees are an essential constituency on account 
of the size of the population and its wide geographical distribution and 
significant presence in a volatile region. What is crucial to bear in mind 
is that – in the inevitably difficult discussions which will hopefully lead 
to the end of the conflict and, as part thereof, a just solution to their 
plight – we must ensure that refugees remain a constituency for peace 
and contribute constructively to the efforts to find solutions. Refugees 
hold a substantial stake in the Israeli-Palestinian future. Including them 
will ensure that the process will benefit from the wealth of insights 
they have to offer. This, in turn, will yield substantial advantages in 
enhancing the credibility and sustainability of the peace process. I will 
repeat this because it is important: Palestine refugees are a reality 
whose role and significance genuine peacemaking efforts can no longer 
afford to neglect. 
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So, Palestine refugees must not be ignored, and this goes hand in hand 
with the need to abandon the habit of marginalizing Gaza and keeping 
it in the shadows. We appeal for genuine efforts to help restore 
normalcy to Gaza, fully aware that the challenges are indeed daunting. 
The gloom surrounding Gaza may be formidable, but I ask you to join 
us in insisting that we have at our disposal the means to dispel it. 
My call today is achievable. Let us do everything we can to give 
Palestinians and Palestine refugees opportunities to attain their 
considerable potential; the freedom to create for themselves a future 
of dignity and prosperity, and the liberty to make their own choices as 
further steps are hopefully taken towards the creation of a Palestinian 
state. 
Thank you.
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Sara Roy:
A Land Diminished: Reflections on Gaza’s Landscape
I am going to begin with a story, one I have written about before but it 
bears retelling. I have many stories of my days in Gaza and shall share 
some of them with you but will begin with this one. 
It was the summer of 1985 during my first visit to Gaza. I was taken 
on a tour of the  area by a friend of mine named Alya who has since 
passed away. As we drove along Gaza’s  coastal road I saw an elderly 
Palestinian man standing at the shoreline with some boxes of oranges 
next to him. I was puzzled by this and asked Alya to stop the car. One 
by one, the  elderly Palestinian took an orange and threw it into the 
sea. His was not an action of  playfulness but of pain and regret. His 
movements were slow and labored as if the weight of  each orange 
was more than he could bear. Not understanding what I was seeing, I 
asked Alya why he was doing this and she explained that he had been 
prevented from exporting his oranges to Israel and rather than watch 
them rot in his orchards, the old man chose to cast them into the sea. I 
have never forgotten this scene and the impact it had on me.1 
Over 25 years later, after peace agreements, economic protocols, 
road maps and so called disengagements, Gazans are still casting their 
oranges into the sea. Yet Gaza is no longer where I found it so long ago, 
but is actually someplace far worse and more dangerous. 
Israel’s occupation of the Palestinians, now in its 43rd year, has, without 
question, resulted in the systematic incapacitation of Gaza’s economy, 
and in the slow but consistent decline of its society, a process that I first 
defined as “de-development” in my earliest writings. De-development 
refers to a process that undermines the ability of an economy to 
grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical 
inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural 
level. Unlike underdevelopment, which may distort but not forestall 
development entirely, de-development precludes, over the long term, 
the possibility of any kind of developmental process even a disarticulated 
one, by destroying the economy’s capacity to produce. In Gaza, the de-
development of the economic sector during the first two decades of 
1 See Sara Roy, “The  Gaza Economy ” Palestine Center Information Brief No. 143 (October 2, 
2006).
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Israeli rule transformed that economy into an auxiliary of the state of 
Israel. Today, given the massive destruction of its economic base over 
the last five years in particular, the full effects – both economic and 
social – of the de-development process are painfully visible.
When I began my research I was primarily concerned with the economic 
impact of Israel’s then almost 20-year occupation of the Gaza Strip 
because it was the economy that so starkly and unsparingly illustrated 
the profound inequities that form the structural and philosophical 
core of occupation policy.2 My initial focus on the economy stemmed 
from the profound shock and confusion I felt when I first lived in 
Gaza. The chasm between what I had been taught and what I actually 
encountered in Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians stunned me. As 
an American Jew growing up in the 1960s and 1970s and educated 
in elite schools I was told – often implicitly – to believe in and never 
question Israeli beneficence and morality and Arab incompetence and 
incivility. Although my parents taught me to think critically and often 
provided some much needed balance, the intellectual and political 
weight of the times was difficult to cast aside. There was simply no 
context for speaking critically about Israel or sympathetically about 
Arabs, who were forbidden—as we were—to use the word “Palestine” 
or “Palestinian.”
Although I had visited Israel many times during my childhood, my 
first trip to the West Bank and Gaza occurred in the summer of 1985. 
I traveled there (against the wishes of my Israeli family) to conduct 
fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation at Harvard, which examined an 
American program of bilateral economic assistance to the Palestinians. 
My thesis asked whether economic development was possible under 
conditions of military occupation and my search for an answer 
immersed me in a reality, indeed, a world, I was wholly unaware of 
and unprepared for. As a well-trained graduate student I felt I had 
an understanding of the political complexities of the area, the actors 
involved, their histories, and the many arguments and sides of the 
conflict. I went, I believed, with a critical but open mind, prepared for 
anything. I was wrong. Those first months in Gaza and the West Bank 
changed my life. 
2 Parts of this section are taken from Sara Roy, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 1-7. 
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I distinctly remember the day I first entered Gaza in the summer of 
1985. I had been in the West Bank for some time and had acquired 
some familiarity with the people and the region and felt comfortable 
living there despite the harshness of the occupation. However, the 
thought of living in the Gaza Strip made me nervous, even scared. I 
had heard terrible and frightening stories about Gaza and its people 
especially from my Israeli friends. I remember one UN official telling 
me that there were never more than 35 foreign visitors in Gaza at any 
one time (excluding those who worked for international organizations) 
because it was so unfriendly a place. I have no idea where he got that 
information or really, what it meant, but it did not ease my anxiety. 
Much was weighted against Gaza despite my best efforts to remain 
open-minded. 
I was taken to the Marna House, which was then one of only two 
hotels in the area and, I was told, the best (I read: safest) place for 
foreigners to stay. It was managed by Alya Shawwa who belonged to 
one of Gaza’s oldest and wealthiest families and who would become 
one of my dearest friends. Alya welcomed me but clearly viewed me 
with some suspicion. After all, why would an American be visiting 
Gaza? The implicit answer was obvious. And when she learned I was 
Jewish her concern (and my anxiety) grew. In those days prior to the 
first Palestinian uprising, one of the first questions I was often asked by 
Gazans was “Are you a Christian?” I never lied and told everyone who 
asked that I was a Jew. 
To my surprise, it was not fear or anger I typically encountered when 
people learned I was Jewish but shock, suspicion, some confusion 
and considerable curiosity. I took advantage of their curiosity and my 
somewhat unique status  to begin a discussion of why I was there, 
explaining that I had come to Gaza to learn about its economy, people, 
society, and history, and about military occupation and how it affects 
their lives. I thought it would take a long time to gain their trust but 
again I was wrong.
Within one week of arriving in Gaza, I was immersed in local life in a 
manner I could not possibly have foreseen, taken from one end of the 
Strip to the other by people I barely knew but whom Alya initially vetted. I 
still remember Alya standing in the driveway of the hotel insisting quite 
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forcefully that I be returned to Marna House in time to eat dinner! I 
entered areas seldom (if ever) seen by foreigners, helped by people 
whose support and encouragement would have been unimaginable to 
me just days before. (Many of those same people would later risk their 
lives to help me collect data during the first Palestinian uprising for 
my book on the political economy of de-development). I was invited 
into homes, both rich and poor, where no request was too great or 
question too burdensome. Not only did my being a Jew cease to be 
a source of concern, it actually became an asset. People could not do 
enough to help me.
Although I could not possibly have known it at the time, that summer 
of 1985 set the stage for the next two and a half decades of my life. The 
injustice of the occupation and the inability of Palestinians to defend 
themselves against it affected me deeply. My research among them 
was not only a matter of scholarship – it went to the core of who I was, 
where I came from, the meaning of my Judaism, my identity as a child 
of Holocaust survivors, my relationship with Israel and the nature and 
purpose of my work. 
One of the most troubling and frightening aspects of the occupation 
during my initial encounter with it was its mundane, prosaic nature. 
For Palestinians, occupation was the ordinary – a way of life that had 
to be lived defensively without recourse or appeal, without protection 
or choice, largely absent of accountability, predictability, rationality 
or control. Furthermore, the distortion of Palestinian life remained 
unquestioned by those beyond it for whom the realities of occupation 
were wholly unknown. What was for Palestinians a narrative of crisis, of 
territorial dispossession and displacement, was for others an example 
of benign and legitimate control. It  is this absence of context and its 
continued mystification that my research has always sought to redress.
From my earliest time in Gaza the underlying impulse of my work 
has always been toward society – women, children, families, 
neighborhoods, and communities. I focused not only on the 
occupation’s destructive impact on people but on how they – whether 
as individuals or communities – were able to resist it; the resilience of 
Gaza’s people amazed me and still does, a topic that has received far 
too little attention in the literature on the conflict. My most powerful 
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experiences in Gaza and the most poignant memories I have are not of 
violence or despair but of kindness and generosity, the qualities that 
drew me to the people of Gaza from the very beginning. I shall never 
forget one visit I made to a refugee camp during the first Intifada. On 
this particular day and for one or two days before, all water to the 
camp had been shut off as a form of collective punishment, which 
was a punitive measure used with some regularity at the time. My 
friend Abeer had arranged for me to meet with a family and when 
we arrived we were escorted into a large room where several women 
spanning at least three generations were already seated. Clearly, they 
were expecting us. What followed was an animated discussion about 
life in the camp, the importance of the Intifada and the difficulties it 
imposed, the growing Islamist movement and so forth.
At some point during our discussion the mother of the family whom 
I shall call Um Ali entered with a large pot of tea, which she placed 
in front of me. She poured a cup for me and then for the others. I 
remember how good it tasted and how warmed it made me feel. I 
thanked her and drank my cup of tea, which she kept refilling as I 
continued with my interview, Abeer at my side. When the time came to 
leave I thanked the family for speaking with me and for their gracious 
hospitality. As Abeer and I walked away, I suddenly remembered that 
the water supply to the camp had been cut off. I immediately turned 
to my friend and asked her how had Um Ali gotten the water to make 
us the tea. Abeer told me that when she had asked if I might visit some 
time before, Um Ali began collecting water from a slow drip in her 
kitchen faucet to make certain that I would have enough tea to drink 
while I was in her home. It took her one 24-hour day to collect the 
water for my pot of tea. 
Then, as now, people struggled to remain whole and humane despite 
the terrible pressures imposed upon them. Yet people in Gaza today 
struggle with something far more damaging that did not exist during 
the first intifada: an inability to visualize a future for their children that 
departs from the damaging reality they must currently endure. In so 
many conversations with friends and colleagues in Gaza their fears are 
absolutely consistent. These fears no longer center on the wasting of 
Gaza but on the deepening unwillingness to repair it, on a complacency 
and complicity among many actors – Israeli, American, European and 
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Arab – to relegate Gaza to the status of a dustbin, unworthy of redress 
and rehabilitation. One friend, a trusted observer, expressed it this 
way: “We are not charity cases; we are an animal farm where all kinds 
of products are dumped on us whether we want them or not. We are 
not asked what we need or want. We are not allowed to participate 
in our own lives but must accept our decay. Our horizon is vague. 
There is no vision, no debate, no critique. The critique that does exist 
is for the benefit of the individual, not society. We are not allowed to 
plan, even to think of planning and we are rejected if we try. We are 
denied the right to live as normal people and there is a growing feeling 
among people here – despite the fact that some still resist – that this 
will not change. If there is a plan, we believe it is to insure that our 
abandonment is total.”3 
From the time I started researching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over 
two decades ago, I have consistently encountered two recurring themes 
regarding Gaza. The first theme concerns Israel’s desire to rid itself of 
any responsibility for the territory while maintaining absolute control 
of it. As Tanya Reinhart argued long ago, this is because Israel cannot 
free Gaza if it wants to control the West Bank—its main objective—
since such freedom would enable Gaza to establish direct ties to the 
Western and Arab world, and become a center of resistance to Israeli 
occupation, Avigdor Lieberman’s recent proposal of turning Gaza into 
a European enclave notwithstanding.4 The second theme is Israel’s 
desire to “exchange” Gaza, as it were, for full and internationally (i.e., 
American) sanctioned control of the West Bank, thereby precluding the 
creation of a Palestinian state and safeguarding a Jewish demographic 
majority in an enlarged Israel.5 Israel has now achieved both these 
ends. This points to Gaza’s defining centrality in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, in the conflict’s resolution and in the future configuration of 
the area. 
In November 2003, just before the announcement of the Gaza 
disengagement, Ehud Olmert – then Ariel Sharon’s deputy – in a 
3 Phone conversation, September 2010. 
4 Tanya Reinhart, “Sharon’s Legacy in Action,” Lecture given in a conference on The Dimension 
of the Shared Word – What Future for Palestine/Israel? (Biella, Italy, May 2006).  
5 Elaine Hagopian, “The 1988 Compromise Revisited, It’s Not Hamas Terror Israel Fears,” 
Counterpunch, May 22, 2006. In this regard, see Jonathan Cook, “Israel’s Demographic 
Demon in Court,” Middle East Report On line, June 1, 2006. 
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Ha’aretz  interview, described what he considered to be Israel’s most 
serious problem. He stated that as Palestinians become the majority 
in the region, Israel must prevent them from engaging in a struggle 
similar to the one against South African apartheid especially if that 
struggle turns out to be nonviolent, “popular,” “cleaner,” and ultimately 
more “powerful.” Israel’s response, therefore, must be unilateral: “to 
maximize the number of Jews; to minimize the number of Palestinians…; 
[the] division of the land, with the goal of insuring a Jewish majority, is 
Zionism’s lifeline.”6 Severing and isolating Gaza from the West Bank and 
maintaining that separation was a critical part of the Israeli response. 
Indeed, as Amira Hass has argued, Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza 
represented the end of a 10-year project designed to sever the Gaza 
Strip from the West Bank begun during Oslo, destroying, finally, the 
Palestinian national body. 
Without its disengagement from, and isolation of, Gaza, Israel would 
not have been able to complete, in effect, the implementation of Oslo’s 
1994  Gaza and Jericho First  plan, which similarly aimed to create a 
separate, marginalized entity in the Gaza Strip, freeing Israel to pursue, 
in one form or another, the de facto annexation of the West Bank, which 
it did with stunning success during the seven years of the “peace” 
process. In fact it was the physical changes to the West Bank imposed 
by the Oslo agreements – another albeit more shielded expression of 
Israeli unilateralism – notably its division and segmentation into areas 
A, B, and C, that facilitated Sharon’s usurpation of Palestinian lands and 
their steady incorporation into Israel.
Having “relinquished” responsibility for (but not control over) volatile 
Gaza, Sharon strengthened his argument for maintaining direct control 
over those areas of the West Bank deemed essential for security or 
settlement purposes including the strategic Jordan Valley – thereby 
eliminating any prospect of a Palestinian state that would include 
the entire West Bank. Hence, the disengagement from Gaza, while 
technically a reversal of some of Sharon’s annexationist policies, should 
be understood as part of the same political continuum created by the 
Oslo process (and indeed by Israeli policies since 1967 beginning with 
6 Jonathan Cook, “Israel’s road to ‘convergence’ began with Rabin,” Electronic Intifada, May 
11, 2006; and idem, Blood and Religion: The Unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State 
(London, UK: Pluto Books, 2006). 
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the Allon Plan). The disengagement plan should also be understood as 
serving the same goals: to maintain Israel’s full control – both direct and 
indirect – over Palestinian lands and resources; and consolidate and 
institutionalize direct and permanent (military and political) control 
over a majority of the West Bank and over East Jerusalem, among 
other objectives. Moreover, after the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, 
Israeli policy abandoned diplomacy in favor of military attack, a shift 
also reflected at the economic level with the almost total destruction 
of Gaza’s private sector after 2006 – well before the 2008 assault - 
transforming Gaza’s already fragile economy from one driven in large 
part by private sector productivity to one dependent on public sector 
salaries and humanitarian assistance. Today, approximately 80 percent 
of Gaza’s once productive (and overwhelmingly young) population, 
who want to work, has been made dependent on aid to survive. (Gaza’s 
marginalization, which has been facilitated by the establishment of an 
Islamic regime, has also produced damaging internal fragmentation 
as seen in increasing levels of violence between  and within political 
factions and in growing economic and class divisions.) The change in 
Israeli (and international) policy away from diplomacy was designed, 
among other things, to undermine and debilitate Gaza and further 
remove it from any political equation that might produce a Palestinian 
state. 
Gaza as defining: more recent illustrations
Gaza’s defining role has more recent and tragic illustrations, notably 
Israel’s December 2008 assault on Gaza that killed between 1300 and 
1400 Palestinians – the overwhelming majority civilians. The immediate 
pretext for Israel’s attack was Hamas rocket fire into Israel and Israel’s 
right to defend itself but this does not explain the disproportionality of 
the Israeli attack.7
 The devastating assault on Gaza was not only about destroying Hamas 
as a political force; in fact, Hamas rockets had very little if anything to 
do with Israel’s attack. Furthermore, various human rights reports and 
IDF soldier testimonies make it clear that Israeli forces encountered 
little if any resistance by Hamas fighters. In fact, not a single battle was 
7 Parts of this section are taken from the postscript to my book, Hamas and Civil Society in 
Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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fought either in densely or sparsely populated areas for the 22 days of 
the war. According to Amnesty International, many of the Palestinians 
killed were not caught in crossfire but were killed in their homes while 
they slept or going about their daily routine.8 And these reports were 
clear to point out that although Hamas, like Israel, was guilty of war 
crimes, it was on a far smaller scale. 
The attack on Gaza was an attack against the Palestinian people 
and their continued resistance – be it by Hamas or by the people of 
Gaza – and their consistent refusal to accede to Israeli demands and 
conditions. The Israeli government argued that since all Palestinians 
in Gaza supported Hamas, there were no true civilians in Gaza and all 
attacks against them were therefore justified, including the reduction 
and denial of humanitarian supplies, military incursions and invasions, 
and the continued assassination of the Hamas leadership. 
Unlike the West Bank, which has effectively been subdued by 
Israeli policies of land expropriation, settler expansion, territorial 
cantonization and other forms of military control (now supported by a 
cooperative PNA security structure), Gaza has continued to resist and 
defy. This is a characteristic feature of Israel’s relationship with Gaza 
and has been since 1967. Israel’s attack, which aimed to wreck Gaza’s 
economy, destroyed or partially destroyed 6,300  Palestinian homes 
(compared with the near destruction of one Israeli home) and 30 
mosques; and destroyed or damaged 280 schools and kindergartens, 
and nearly half of Gaza’s 122 health facilities, including 15 hospitals 
and 1500 factories and workshops.9 (And here it should be noted that 
between June 2005 and September 2008 the number of operating 
factories in the Gaza Strip had already declined from 3,900 to 23 due 
to Israel’s siege.)10 The attack against Gaza was also about pacification 
and sending a clear message to Palestinians in the West Bank that says 
Israel will not withdraw from settlements or return any lands already 
taken. This linkage, illustrating yet again Gaza’s crucial role in securing 
Israeli control of the West Bank, is critically important, yet seldom 
acknowledged. 
8 Norman G. Finkelstein, ‘This Time We Went Too Far’: Truth & Consequences of the Gaza 
Invasion (New York: OR Books, 2010), 87.
9   Ibid, 60-61, 63, 70.  
10 The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 22 September 2008), 7 & 22. 
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There were other reasons for the war on Gaza. One was to enhance 
Israel’s deterrence capacity, particularly after its defeat in Lebanon in 
July 2006, and to rehabilitate Israel’s image as an effective ally in the 
American-led war against terror.11 Furthermore, during the 6-month 
period of the truce (June-December 2008) consensus was beginning 
to emerge, both among the international community and within 
certain sectors in Israel, for restarting a political process; engaging 
Hamas directly or indirectly, particularly given a clear indication by 
its leadership, both in Damascus and in Gaza, that it was seeking a 
settlement of the conflict along June 4, 1967 borders; freezing Israeli 
settlement expansion; and boycotting Israeli settlement products. 
There were also efforts, albeit troubled, by the Egyptian government 
to mediate internal divisions between Hamas and Fatah and reunify 
the Palestinian government, a critical prerequisite to achieving any 
kind of workable political agreement. In fact, Israel’s attack occurred 
just before a scheduled  meeting between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo 
that had been aimed at political reconciliation and unification.12 
Furthermore, it should be noted that a rocket has never been fired at 
Israel from the West Bank. Yet, during the period of the 2008 truce, Israel 
continued and indeed intensified its policies of extrajudicial killings, 
settler expansion, territorial cantonization, movement restrictions, 
home demolitions, and other measures against Palestinians  in the 
West Bank, the control of which remains uppermost on Israel’s political 
agenda. 
It is difficult to imagine that these measures, among others, are about 
peace or security. This leads to my second main point: the subjection 
of Gaza (and the West Bank) is not a discrete event without history 
or context, despite the fact that it has been portrayed that way. The 
December 2008 attack did not emerge in a vacuum, but is a tragic 
though inevitable part of a far larger context  of prolonged Israeli 
military occupation and colonization that preceded Hamas by several 
11 See Finkelstein, ‘This Time. For a different interpretation, see Jim Zanotti et al., ‘Israel and 
Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009), CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, 15 January 2009, http://opencrs.com/document/R40101/.
12 See the piece I co-authored with Augustus Richard Norton, End Game in the Gaza War, Parts 
I, II & III, http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/01/end-game-in-gaza-war.html. 
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decades and would undeniably continue should Hamas disappear 
from the map tomorrow. This occupation, which is the fundamental 
reason underlying Palestinian  resistance, has been all but forgotten, 
but its impact is felt daily. In fact, the word  “occupation” has largely 
disappeared from the lexicon. 
Gaza’s central status in Israel’s West Bank policy was again seen in 
August 2010 when Israel’s foreign minister Lieberman surprisingly 
proposed that Israel end its status as an occupying power in Gaza 
and allow Hamas to establish an independent Palestinian state on the 
territory. He called for establishing a border regime that would end 
Israel’s effective control over Gaza’s economy as a way to address 
Israel’s security needs. With this proposal Lieberman expected Hamas 
to end its resistance in exchange for an arrangement that would allow 
Israel to deepen its colonization of the West Bank.13 
Henry Siegman further states, “Lieberman has advanced this proposal 
because he favors any measure he believes would relieve U.S.  and 
international pressure on Israel to withdraw from much more than 
about half of the West Bank, the rest of which he and Netanyahu want 
to annex to the Jewish state – and for all practical purposes have already 
done so. He and Netanyahu are desperately in search of strategies that 
would distract the outside world long enough to enable them to anchor 
the settlement enterprise even more deeply and more irreversibly 
than they already have; and what better way of doing that than by 
getting the international community (i.e., George Mitchell, Denis Ross, 
the Quartet) to busy itself for the next five years with arrangements 
for Gaza’s independence and statehood that satisfy “Israel’s legitimate 
security requirements” – as Israel completes its  “Judaization” of East 
Jerusalem and of much, if not all, of the West Bank.”14 
A concluding thought
In the continued absence of a political resolution to the conflict, why 
must occupation be the default position? Why must Gaza be pauperized 
13 Henry Siegman, “An immodest – and dangerous  – proposal,” The Middle East Channel, 9 
August 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/ 
14 Ibid. 
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and the West Bank cantonized and annexed, and Palestinians treated 
as a humanitarian problem rather than as a people with political and 
national rights entitled to self-determination? Why should Palestinians 
be forced to accept their own decay, as my friend said? And why must 
they be punished for resisting?
We are living through one of the most severe periods of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The challenges are formidable and are not 
restricted to re-defining and addressing Palestine’s relationship with 
Israel but include overcoming and healing intra-Palestinian  divisions, 
which is absolutely crucial, perhaps most crucial of all to a sustainable 
resolution of the conflict. As I have argued, the isolation and diminution 
of Gaza has been a key factor facilitating Israel’s dismemberment and 
deepened control of the West Bank and preclusion of a Palestinian 
state. If Gaza is to be brought back from the margins into the center 
– a center I define as a politically and economically coherent Palestine 
– Gaza’s diplomatic, political, and economic isolation must end and its 
future must be seen as part of, and central to, Palestine’s own. For this 
to happen political reconciliation and unification among Palestinians 
must proceed, and all attempts by external and internal actors to thwart 
such unity will consign both Palestinians and Israelis to continued and 
worsening conflict. 
The imperative, as I see it, is not only to reclaim Gaza as part of a future 
Palestinian state – whatever form it may assume – but to reclaim the 
West Bank as well, which arguably also exists in the margin. And one 
cannot be reclaimed without the other, in much the same way that 
Israelis and Palestinians cannot truly be separated, nor can Gazans 
and West Bankers. Of course, the task is enormous and fraught with 
difficulty, but if recent history is any indication, the alternative, in the 
form of a deteriorating status quo, will prove far worse. 
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Helga Tawil-Souri: 
The Hi-Tech Enclosure of Gaza
Introduction
 When we speak about the Israeli regime’s spatial control of Palestinians 
we usually focus on the stark realities on the ground: checkpoints, 
closures, terminals, walls, soldiers and border guards, razed houses, 
demolished buildings, uprooted trees (and with respect to the West 
Bank we can add settlements and by-pass roads). As Christian Salmon 
notes, “what is most striking in Palestine now is the violence wrought 
against the land” (quoted in Graham 2003, 64). There is grounded 
reason for such statements and important basis to focus on these as 
they are indeed the concrete formations that define the contemporary 
landscape, whose combined effect has been to deepen the splintering 
and isolation of Palestinians and keep the possibility of national unity, 
and national flows, a distant dream. 
But Gaza is also sealed by the use of remote-control operated cameras 
and weapons (wo)manned by female soldiers safely tucked in a control 
booth outside of Tel Aviv, by unmanned aerial drones, by databases 
that ID cards are issued by and cross-checked with, and a range of 
other hi-tech surveillance mechanisms. Similarly, the limitations 
imposed on the realm of hi-tech within the Gaza Strip, also function to 
contain and border Gazans: such as a constrained telecommunications 
infrastructure and the permission of only lower-speed internet routers. 
The ‘sealing’ of Gaza and Gazans is as much technological as it is in 
the physical form of the wall around the Strip, control of its shores, 
or coded (and more recently bio-metric) ID cards. The materiality of 
borders is not simply in the way the physical landscape is reconfigured, 
but through various other technologies that bound Gazans into place. 
Hi-tech is the means through which, as Israel’s Ministry of Defense 
has argued, the occupation will result in “minimize[d] human friction” 
(quoted in Weizman 2007, 150; ‘frictionless’ is a term also used by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to denote post-disengagement control: 
Israel MFA, 2005;).1 The Israeli regime is increasingly relying on hi-tech 
1 For example, in reference to the unilateral decision to pull settlers out of the Gaza Strip 
in summer 2005, the Disengagement Plan states “the relocation from the Gaza Strip… 
will reduce friction with the Palestinian population… The process of disengagement will 
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methods to surveil and control Palestinians, but, my argument here, 
is that the infrastructure of hi-tech in the Gaza Strip – that which is 
used by Palestinians as opposed to Israeli soldiers – is also an arena of 
control, and one that has received very little, if any, scholarly focus. As 
has been argued elsewhere, Israeli controls over Palestinian life have 
not subsided with the Oslo Accords, nor specifically in the case of the 
Gaza Strip with Israel’s 2005 ‘disengagement’ (see Ophir et al, 2009). 
I take that premise as a (on-going) fait accompli: it is the forms and 
materialities of Israeli control that change, not the fact that they have 
ended or do not exist.2 
There seems to exist a paradox in our age that is particularly salient 
as concerns spatial control in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict writ large 
and in the sealing of Gaza specifically. On the one hand are issues 
having to do with the physical landscape. First, land is a finite resource. 
Second, the power, sovereignty, autonomy, and jurisdiction attached 
to (territorial) space are also perceived as finite. To speak of control 
over space is usually to assume a zero-sum game in which one side is 
excluded and/or separated from the means of control. On the other 
serve to dispel claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip… Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will 
continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise 
security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip” (Israel MFA 2004, 1, 2). While 
Israel would remain in control, forms of control would become more abstract and remote, 
and in essence absolve Israel of being labeled an ‘occupying power’ and absolve it of any 
responsibility for Gaza. Moreover, Israel is pursuing a hi-tech ‘securitization’ of its ‘border’ 
with the Gaza Strip, and the border between Gaza and Egypt (along the ‘Philadephi Route’): 
for example installing “black lights; power tools and a compressor for the tools; technology 
to be agreed, possibly including sonic imagery, gamma detection (full vehicle or hand held), 
and/or millimeter wave imagery; mirrors and bore scope equipment [… and] cameras will 
be installed to monitor the search process” (Israel MFA 2005, 3). Against the background 
of an increasingly globalized security-military-hi-tech industry is the transformation of the 
mechanics of Israeli occupation, rooted in specific political changes at home, continuously 
framed under the rubric of ‘security’ (see Gordon 2008). The realm of the technological 
becomes the means by which the ‘problem’ of the Gazans (their existence, responsibility 
over them, any violence and terror they exert on Israel, their economic dependence, future 
political solutions, and so on) is rendered more manageable, cleaner, cheaper, and where 
‘friction’ and direct contact between Gazans and the state of Israel (and of course its 
military) is abstracted.
2 There are both territorial and hi-tech differences in Israel’s strategy of bordering the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is largely marginalized, isolated and excluded; 
whereas the West Bank is infiltrated, fragmented and cantonized. Often however, similar 
hi-tech mechanisms are used in both context. I focus primarily on the Gaza Strip in this 
essay. 
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hand, the realm of hi-tech, is presumed in our collective imagination to 
be territory-less, placeless, boundless, and exclusionary-less. Without 
the problem of scarcity of land (and thus of access and control over 
land), hi-tech is often imagined to be a ‘win-win’ playing field. This is 
a tension that I challenge here, by posing rather simple questions at 
the on-set: Are new spatialities and control over these rearranged in 
this age of ‘infinite’ and ‘placeless’ communications? Can we speak 
of a territorially-sealed Gaza and a virtually boundless one? Does the 
liberatory, exclusionary-less and boundless ‘place’ of hi-tech hold 
in the context of Gaza? There seems to be no shortage of scholars, 
politicians, investors, and pundits who suggest precisely that: Gazans 
may be territorially locked up, but with satellite television, mobile 
phones and the internet, they’re not just plugged in to the global (and 
globalized) world, they can overcome their territorial ‘imprisonment.’ 
As a consequence of this liberatory logic, it is also presumed that hi-
tech can positively contribute to economic growth and state-building.3
My objective here is to unpack this tension in the specific context 
of Gaza, and show that both physical and hi-tech spaces are subject 
to control, and both imperative to Israel’s strategies of containing 
and bordering Gaza. What I will demonstrate below, in focusing on 
telecommunications, is the following: first, hi-tech infrastructure is 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in built-form. Second, in the global 
network age of hi-tech, there are new forms of borders and bounding 
mechanisms. Thus there is nothing placeless or indeed limitless, 
infinite, or exclusionary-less about hi-tech. The manifestation of new 
kinds of borders are not simply metaphoric. Hi-tech networks have 
their own forms of controls, their own ‘checkpoints’ and nodes that 
serve to limit, bind, and contain flows (see Galloway 2004, Lessig 
1999). In other words, Gaza is sealed through both real and virtual 
‘walls’. Closure – that favorite policy of the Israeli military apparatus, as 
a strategy of separation, control, and confinement, which crafts spaces 
in which a particular form of power is wielded – is not simply in the 
form of physical walls and checkpoints (see Hass 2002, Peteet 2009, 
Fields 2010) and bureaucratic measures (see Zureik 2001), but the 
3 This line of argument is by no means exclusive to Gaza and/or Palestinians, but fairly evident 
in discussions about the importance of media and IT development, access, and use across 
the entire world, and not simply in ‘developing’ nations. For a critique specific to the 
development of IT in the Palestinian Territories see Tawil-Souri 2007.
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more abstract ones of hi-tech. In fact, we can think of Gaza as the place 
– both real and virtual – in which conceptions of territory and hi-tech, 
of borders and flows, of access and (property and communication) 
‘rights’ and differing conceptions of and controls over space, come into 
stark question.
Of course the hi-tech ‘sealing’ of Gaza should not be thought of as a 
completely a priori strategy, nor ever complete. The actions of Gazans 
influence Israeli policies and vice versa, just as one must consider the 
dynamics of what Gazans do in the hi-tech realm: whether in their 
telephone calls, text messages, internet chatting, web production, or 
hacking. But my focus here is not on what Gazans do, and not on hi-tech 
and media content. Because I want to address the space of control and 
of flows, I am analyzing the infrastructure itself. In the broadest sense 
my analysis is about the politicization of technology and the formations 
of new kinds of controls in the age of networked globalization. More 
specifically, I am seeking to understand the spatial landscape of control 
by (re)applying of the concept of ‘enclosure’ onto the hi-tech realm. 
How we can use the concept and practice of enclosure in comparative 
terms? What are the different ways in which ‘property rights’ are 
imagined in this new landscape? What are the similarities, differences, 
and contradictions between territorial enclosure and hi-tech enclosure 
in the case of Gaza? 
From Territorial to Digital to Hi-Tech Enclosure
Numerous scholars have analyzed physical, geographic and architectural 
manifestations of Israeli power and its resulting fragmentation and 
containment of Palestinians. A growing body of scholarship critically 
looks at ‘traditional’ bordering mechanisms – such as walls and 
checkpoints, to name but two – from the framework of comparative or 
theoretical concepts such as mobility, frontiers and ghettos, apartheid/
Bantustanization, space and non-place, global inequality, surveillance, 
among others. Many who take a critical stance on the on-going ‘spacio-
cid-izing’ of Palestine (to bastardize Sari Hanafi’s term (Hanafi 2009, 
111) – which emphasizes the deliberate exterminatory logic employed 
against livability that has underpinned the Israel assault on Palestinian 
space) – analyze how the Israeli regime has bureaucratically, politically, 
economically, legally, geographically and historically subjugated 
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and attempted to erase – although obviously not completely – the 
Palestinians. Israel’s mechanisms of fragmenting, surveilling, and 
bounding Palestinians (particularly inside the Territories, and even 
more harshly in the Gaza Strip) are increasingly documented. But the 
hi-tech barely factors in. This is the point at which I am intervening, by 
drawing specifically on the concept of ‘enclosure’, from the traditional 
disciplines of geography and history and the newer area of digital 
media studies. 
Enclosure is a historically, geographically and economically specific 
process that evolved out of and within the industrial revolution in 18th 
century Great Britain. Enclosure was the process and product of active 
landscaping aimed at transforming the social economy, demography, 
and culture of a territorial space. In its remaking of land, it was a product 
transformed by processes of socioeconomic power creating a territory 
with unique attributes. Enclosure stemmed from the desire to separate 
and exclude, resulting in a landscape of mutual exclusivity that was 
highly uneven. Powerful and hegemonic groups with territorial and 
economic ambitions recast the systems of ownership of the landscape 
through two overlapping mechanisms: one was economic through 
capitalist industrialization, and the second was political through 
nationalist state-building (Fields 2010, 64). In other words, enclosure 
was used by dominant groups to consolidate systems of control over 
subalterns by reshaping the landscape itself. The practice of taking 
control consisted of two elements: one, a legal element that redefined 
‘property rights’ and imposed different structures of sovereignty and 
access on territory by reorganizing systems of ownership, use, and 
circulation; second, an architectural element that reinforced the new 
legalities of property and recast the land’s physical contours – such 
as in the building of fences, gates, low-lying walls, etc. As Gary Fields 
explains, “enclosure is thus the application of force to land by groups 
with territorial ambitions who mobilize the institutional power of law 
and the material power of architecture to reorder patterns of land 
ownership, use, and circulation and reorganize socioeconomic life and 
demography in a place” (Fields 2010, 66). 
Enclosure resulted in a series of ‘enclosed spaces’, marked with 
barriers of different kinds, limiting free (meaning both sovereign 
and not to be paid for) mobility and movement. The combination of 
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legal and architectural ‘signs’ served to then communicate the new 
territorial meaning of property rights and assumed an equally crucial 
and important function as instruments enforcing a different system 
of circulation, flow, and trespass on the landscape. This redefinition 
and re-landscaping of ‘property rights’ essentially fenced off ‘common 
land’ and turned it into private property – allowing greater control 
over exploitation, and in general, ensured that resources could be 
put to their most ‘efficient’ and ‘productive’ use (as defined by the 
new industrial capitalist logic). Enclosure then is a process that shrinks 
the possibility of ‘commonness’ and increases privatization, and with 
it, incentivizes large-scale (and usually private) investments. As a 
historical point of encounter between hegemonic and subaltern blocs, 
enclosure created new forms of exclusion, deeply tied to economic, 
political, demographic transformations and goals of the dominant and 
hegemonic interests of society. 
As some scholars have suggested, the construction of the wall in the 
West Bank is an example of a similar land enclosure process (Fields 2010). 
Taken in combination with other spatial mechanisms – settlements, 
by-pass roads, checkpoints, etc. – this has resulted in what Julie Peteet 
(2009) and Alessandro Petti (undated) have both called ‘enclaves.’ Petti 
describes the (West Bank) enclaves as a spaces of exception, neither 
connected to the outside nor to each other, but “isolated by some kind 
of power that may be internal or external to them, a power they submit 
to.” In other words, they are enclaves because they are disconnected 
from a network. At the risk of stating the obvious, the disconnection is 
not voluntary neither in the Palestinian nor Gazan case, it is instituted 
by the Israeli regime through numerous, inter-laced mechanisms. 
Let me now make a leap to the hi-tech network of the internet. While 
the architecture of the internet functions on a balance between flow 
and control (and not, as is popularly believed, complete free-flow), 
there is nothing in its inherent design that determines a commercial, 
private (in the economic meaning), or exclusionary structure (both in 
theory, and in the sense that we are not going to ‘run out of space’ 
on the internet). That the building of its backbone, that access to it, 
that it has become a largely commercialized and commercial ‘space’ 
is due to legal, political, economic, and social decisions to have made 
it so. What began as a network that could theoretically be ‘common’ 
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and public has become a leading edge in trans-national capitalism (see 
Schiller 1999). But it is not just the network (or parts of it / access 
to it) that has become increasingly privatized, and thus shrunk the 
possibility of ‘commonness.’ As information commodities become 
more valuable resources, the construction of privately-owned and 
operated interactive ‘enclosures’ serve to separate users from the 
means of interaction, transaction, communication, and expression. 
This process has been called ‘digital enclosure’ by scholars such as Dan 
Schiller (1999, 2007), James Boyle (2003), and Mark Andrejevic (2007). 
Thus the model of digital enclosure traces the relationship between a 
material, spatial process— the construction of networked, interactive 
environments—and the private expropriation of information. Digital 
enclosure literalizes the physical metaphor of what legal scholar James 
Boyle has described as a “second enclosure” movement devoted to 
the “enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind” (Boyle 2003, 
37), a kind of metaphorical process of information enclosure. In more 
concrete terms, digital enclosure refers to a variety of strategies for 
privatizing, controlling, and commodifying information and intellectual 
property, highlighting the importance of structures of ownership and 
control over productive resources in determining the role they play in 
what Schiller (2007) has described as “the struggle against continuing 
enclosures of non-proprietary information.” As in the case of land 
enclosure, digital enclosure facilitates control over resources so as 
to structure the terms of ownership and access. The model of digital 
enclosure further suggests that interactivity also has the potential to 
facilitate unprecedented commodification of previously nonproprietary 
information and an aggressive clamp-down of centralized control over 
information resources. 
Digital enclosure is primarily drawing from the economic aspects of 
land enclosure. The land enclosure movement, for example, served as 
a palpably spatial strategy for shaping relations of production in an 
emerging capitalist economy. Separating workers from the land they 
cultivated was a necessary precondition for restructuring the terms 
of their access to productive resources. Against the background of 
restructured property relations, workers had little choice but to enter 
“freely” into exploitative wage labor agreements. Free acquiescence to 
the surrender of control over one’s own productive activity was secured 
by depriving workers of any other option for sustenance— this is after all 
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the version of freedom that underlies capitalist exchange relations. It is 
a form of freedom that is, in turn, reliant upon a spatial reconfiguration: 
workers must be separated from the land so that their access to it 
can be contractually regulated. The same is argued in the realm of 
the digital. Digital enclosures limit access to interactive networks and 
services to those who “freely” submit to increasingly comprehensive 
forms of monitoring. If land enclosure helped produce the spatial 
conditions for the exploitation of wage labor, digital enclosure enables 
the exploitation of information generated by users as they go about 
their daily lives (Andrejevic 2007). Digital enclosure describes then the 
economic logic at the heart of digital capitalism: increasing privatization 
(of access, of information, of knowledge), shrinking ‘commonness,’ the 
commodification of information, networks, and intellectual property, 
structures of ownership which ‘prefer’ large-scale investments, and the 
restructuring of users’ interactions. Whether land or digital enclosure, 
the process is omnivorous in its drive for total assimilation, in that all 
spaces become inscribed and appropriated within its logic. To put it 
another way, enclosure (land or digital) ‘grounds’ a previously open 
subjectivity in a newly fabricated colonized space. 
In the case of Gaza, as everywhere else, we witness the increasing 
privatization of networks and information, the fact that it is large 
corporations who manage the network and structure the terms of 
access (although here, with clear Israeli ‘oversight’), and a redefinition 
of (digital) property rights. But, similarly to the process of land 
enclosure, there is an active process of landscaping in the ‘virtual’ 
realm, of demographic control, of transforming the social economy and 
cultural of a space, and of exclusion. New kinds of spaces are actively 
structured by motivations not only by the capitalist logic, but also by 
political concerns of the Israeli regime that have everything to do with 
containing and bordering and surveilling Palestinians across a range of 
physical and virtual spaces. I am using the term ‘hi-tech enclosure’ to 
refer to this multi-faceted process: it is not simply territorial like ‘land 
enclosure’ nor driven by the economic dynamics of ‘digital enclosure.’ 
This combination is what makes the Gazan case unique. 
Connected, But With Boundaries
In the realm of hi-tech, Palestinians have historically been excluded 
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or marginalized with respect to Israeli advances. Like the political 
and economic relationship between them, their technological 
relationship is one of control and restrictions on the part of Israel, and 
dependence on the part of the Palestinians. During the formal years 
of occupation, Israeli restrictions on Palestinian hi-tech were either 
imposed through the fact that telecommunications in the Occupied 
Territories was controlled and maintained by Israel or through the 
implementation of legal and military restrictions. The occupation did 
very little to develop telecommunications in Palestinian areas, if at 
all, rendering the network subservient to Israeli infrastructure and 
controls. For example, all of the switching nodes for telephony systems 
were built outside the areas that might possibly be handed over to 
a ‘sovereign’ Palestinian state, so as to make it possible for Israel to 
control, surveil, and limit all telephone traffic within, out of, or into the 
Territories. For the few Palestinians who did have telephones, a call 
from Gaza City to Khan Younis, or even within Gaza City, was routed 
through Ashkelon, for example. Under formal occupation, the Israeli 
government, and after 1985 the state telecommunications provider 
Bezeq, was in charge of telecommunications across Palestine/Israel. 
Despite the fact that Palestinians paid income, Value Added and 
other taxes to the Israeli government, Bezeq was neither quick nor 
efficient in servicing Palestinian users in the Territories (the same was 
largely true of Palestinian communities inside Israel). Residents of the 
Palestinian Territories had to wait on average ten years to obtain a 
telephone line, requesting official permission from the Israeli military 
apparatus governing the Territories, and many never got one. After 
the outbreak of the First Intifada, the Israeli military passed a law in 
1989 that prohibited the use of telephone lines for the sending of any 
faxes, emails, or “any form of electronic posting” from the Territories 
(Israeli military order no. 1279, quoted in Parry 1997). Not that making 
telephone calls or using telecommunications for other purposes was 
either easy or common before then. Before the signing of Oslo, a little 
more than 2% of all Palestinian households had fixed phone lines, 
compared to almost 30% of Israeli households (PalTel 2001; Israel MoC, 
2008; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). In a similar way to how 
Palestinians were forbidden or limited in their geographic mobility, 
they lived under a regime which restricted their technical mobility 
and restricted access to the outside world. Telephonically, Palestinians 
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were enclavized, largely disconnected from the network.
Oslo II, signed in September 1995, reversed many of these restrictions. 
In the wake of the ‘peace talks’ Palestinians found themselves with the 
promise of direct and international phone, fax, email and internet access. 
The Accords stated: “Israel recognizes that the Palestinian side has the 
right to build and operate a separate and independent communication 
systems and infrastructures including telecommunication networks” 
(Oslo 2, Annex III, Article 36). However Palestinians have still not 
obtained sovereignty: over the allocation of frequencies, where to 
build parts of the infrastructure, where to install equipment, and much 
else. As is the case with other infrastructures (broadcasting, sewage, 
population registries, water, transportation, etc.), Palestinians were 
promised, not guaranteed, to be able to build their own independent 
infrastructures. The founding principle of the Oslo Accords is one of 
Israeli imposed controls, limitations, and bordering, not of Palestinian 
sovereignty and freedom. 
In the realm of telecommunications,4 the Oslo Accords specified all the 
conditions within which an ‘independent system’ would be constrained 
and bordered. The Accords stipulated: “the Palestinian side shall 
be permitted to import and use any and all kinds of telephones, fax 
machines, answering machines, modems and data terminals[…] 
Israel recognizes and understands that for the purpose of building a 
separate network, the Palestinian side has the right to adopt its own 
standards and to import equipment which meets these standards[…] 
The equipment will be used only when the independent Palestinian 
network is operational” (Oslo 2, Annex III, Article 36, D.2; emphasis 
added ). The point that independence would only happen when the 
system is operational is crucial, because until today, the Palestinian 
network is not independently operational and continues to rely on 
Israel’s. 
Israel handed over the responsibility of the telecommunications 
4 By telecommunications I am including land-lines, cellular telephony, and the internet; 
although I focus throughout on the land-lines and by consequence the internet backbone. 
There are extremely important and contentious issues in the realm of cellular telephony today, 
in the interest of space, I will not include these here. For an analysis that deals specifically 
with the internet, see Tawil-Souri (2007); for the entire realm of telecommunications and 
broadcasting, see Tawil-Souri (2010). 
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infrastructure in the Territories to the PA in 1995. Infrastructure-
building is a capital intensive affair, and the PA approached the 
challenge in one of two ways: by relying on assistance from the 
outside (in the form of foreign government assistance, international 
aid institutions such as the World Bank, NGOs, or parts of the wealthy 
Palestinian diaspora) or pushing for a home-grown private sector.5 
Reflective of the neo-liberal agenda of both the PA and foreign donors, 
private sector growth, liberalization and privatization were posited 
as the only options of a successful ‘state.’ Accordingly, the PA passed 
the responsibility of the telecommunications systems to the private 
sector. Sixty-six institutional investors came together to form the 
Palestine Telecommunications Company, known as PalTel. With an 
initial investment of $600million, PalTel’s largest institutional investors 
were the economic powerhouses of Palestine (such as PADICO, by far 
PalTel’s largest investor and shareholder, itself the largest Palestinian 
for-profit organization).6 In the interest of space, suffice it to say 
that the economic hegemonic interests among Palestine would be 
over-represented in telecommunications, and would continue to 
benefit from it – for example, in 2009, PalTel’s market capitalization 
represented more than half of the entire Palestinian stock exchange, 
and its revenues represented close to 10% of the Palestinian GDP. But 
there would, until now, remain other level of controls and enclosures 
determined by Israeli limitations. 
I will provide a few examples. Article 36 had stipulated that 
“Israel recognizes the right of the Palestinian side to establish 
telecommunications links (microwave and physical) to connect the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip through Israel. The modalities of establishing 
such telecommunications connections, and their maintenance, shall be 
agreed upon by the two sides. The protection of the said connections 
5 Pushing a neo-liberal agenda did not preclude PA corruption and nepotism nor the 
establishment of a rentier-regime. The economic landscape of the ‘state-building years’ can 
be defined by the spread of both neo-liberalism and nepotism.
6 PalTel, PADICO and other large corporations and institutions operating in the Territories all 
have close ties to one particular family (most notably in the figure of Munib Al-Masri) who 
variably function as CEOs, Presidents, Chiefs of the Board of Directors, etc. My objective 
here is not to point a finger in blame at PalTel, PADICO, or the Masri family, but to highlight 
that – like in much of the rest of the world – investment in and profit from large-scale 
infrastructure projects, such as telecommunications, most often benefit those who already 
wield substantial economic power. 
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shall be under the responsibility of Israel” (Oslo 2, Annex III, Article 
36, D.3d ). A microwave link was installed in 1995 to connect the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip so as to bypass reliance on Bezeq, but was 
quickly saturated so that the majority of traffic had to be re-routed 
back through Bezeq’s network. PalTel was forbidden from importing 
equipment – whether telephone exchanges, broadcasting towers, or 
otherwise – that could have allowed it to build an actual independent 
network, and one that could connect across all Palestinian territories. 
After years of negotiation, in Summer 2001 PalTel was granted 
authorization to install a fiber optic link between Gaza and the West 
Bank. The Second Intifada broke out a month later and permission to 
dig under Israeli territory became out of the question. It has yet to 
happen. This means that to call in or out of Gaza (to/from anywhere: 
the West Bank, Israel, Egypt, or farther afield), calls must still be routed 
through Israeli providers.
PalTel’s and telephony’s growth have been remarkable given the 
barriers against them – too many to enumerate here, from the 
forbidding and confiscation of equipment, the release of less frequency 
and bandwidth than was necessary, unfair competition by Israeli 
providers, not being permitted to install equipment in many places, the 
purposeful destruction of machinery and infrastructure at the hands of 
the IDF, delaying approval, etc. By the end of 2009, more than 10% of 
Palestinian households had fixed line service, with approximately one-
third of the lines in Gaza and two-thirds in the West Bank.7 What this 
growth symbolizes however is how local Palestinian flows have been 
allowed to flourish since the ‘peace process,’ against the background of 
the continued impossibility of independent national and international 
flows. Much of inter-Palestinian Territory telecommunications traffic 
today takes place on PalTel’s infrastructure, but it is constrained by 
territorial boundaries imposed by Israel – such as a clear separation 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in the case of the West 
Bank having to circumvent settlements, all of Area C and much of Area 
B and A. 
The infrastructure needed to connect to the internet is much the 
7  Fixed-line capacity refers to the number of individual telephone lines installed and capable 
of being used, not to be confused with the number of actual subscribers (PalTel 2005; PalTel 
2009).
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same as that for telephony, as such the possibility and limitations of 
‘independent’ internet connection parallel that of telecommunications. 
Before Palestinians were promised the possibility of ‘direct’ internet 
access in 1995, as per Annex III in the Oslo Accords, various ISPs existed 
all relying on the Israeli backbone at one point or another in the network. 
Israel would only provide limited bandwidth for Palestinian internet 
use, making it invariably slower to surf the internet in the Territories 
than in Israel. Israeli providers also sold bundled bandwidth rates to 
Palestinian providers at substantially higher rates, making internet 
access exponentially more expensive – and slower – for those in the 
Territories than for users within Israel. Moreover, Israel has enforced 
strict limitations on the kinds of equipment permitted, and in the case 
of the Gaza Strip, all switching routers for internet traffic are located 
inside Israel. This kind of ‘bondage of bandwidth’ essentially means that 
Palestinian internet flows are limited, thus also limiting Palestinians’ 
integration into the ‘network.’ As WJT Mitchell argues, “if you cannot 
get bits on and off in sufficient quantity, you cannot directly benefit 
from the Net […] Tapping directly into a broadband data highway is 
like being on Main Street, but a low baud-rate connection puts you in 
the boonies, where the flow of information reduces to a trickle, where 
you cannot make so many connections, and were interactions are less 
intense” (Mitchell 1995, 17). Moreover, in January 2005, PalTel began 
to gobble up Palestinian ISPs. Hadara, PalTel’s internet subsidiary, 
was created after PalTel purchased the major Palestinian ISPs. By the 
Summer of 2005, Hadara had a complete monopoly on the ISP market, 
further demonstrating the privatization of access.
As was the case before the ‘peace process’, all international 
telecommunications traffic (telephony and internet), at one point 
or another, must go through the Israeli backbone. Israel controls 
Palestinians’ international connections, their access to the global 
network. In order to connect across the nation, Palestinians also 
still largely rely on Israel: the enforced ‘disconnection’ between 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has meant that Palestinian 
telecommunications flows are not national. Even on more local levels, 
much telecommunications flow is dependent on the Israeli backbone, 
and if not, then at least constrained by Israeli limitations – whether 
in speed, price, or otherwise. While Israel no longer fully controls the 
hi-tech infrastructure as it did previous to the Oslo Accords, it hasn’t 
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permitted Palestinians to fully control it either. In other words, hi-tech 
flows are constrained, contained, limited, resulting in a largely enclosed 
hi-tech ‘space.’ But Israel’s containment of hi-tech doesn’t simply stop 
in this abstract realm of imposing limitations. 
When Israel ‘disengaged’ from the Gaza Strip, it made sure to 
destroy the entirety of its built telecommunications infrastructure 
in the settlements and along by-pass roads. Although Sharon’s 
disengagement plan had clearly stated that Israel would hand over 
the infrastructure to the Palestinians, the IDF severed – as in literally 
cut – the main connection line between the north and the south of 
the Strip, and even went so far as burying parts of that line under the 
rubble of what was the Kfar Darom settlement (Personal interview, 
MTIT Minister 2006). Both purposeful destruction and prevention of 
equipment limit the development of the hi-tech infrastructure. In some 
cases, the destruction waged against infrastructure is wide-spread and 
debilitating, most obviously during the 2008-09 assault on Gaza. PalTel’s 
Gaza network was destroyed to such an extent that the estimated cost 
to rebuild it is US$10 million (Global Telecoms Business 2009). The 
prevention of a ‘normal’ infrastructure does not only happen during 
times of heightened violence or during military ‘operations,’ as is clear 
in the case of all kinds of other infrastructural limitations imposed on 
Gaza from electricity and gasoline to water treatment and sewage. 
There is no denying that without Israeli controls, Palestinian and Gazan 
hi-tech infrastructure would look different. But we must remain in the 
realm of speculation. This is important however, for ‘Palestine’ – as a 
present and future nation-state – also remains in a state of perpetual 
speculation. This is precisely the point of continued Israeli controls. In 
this way, the realm of hi-tech makes for a microcosm of the Palestinian/
Israeli conflict: there are Palestinian advances, but there are also 
‘retardations’ set by Israel; there is room to maneuver, sometimes 
room to grow, to invent, to develop, to ‘modernize,’ but only if Israeli-
imposed limitations allow for this room to exist. Palestinians push the 
boundary of these controls, but controls do not disappear, they simply 
shift to a different spectrum. Palestinian spatiality and its borders 
become more multi-faceted, polyvalent, contradictory. The borders, 
moreover, are largely there to impede or prevent Palestinian flows, not 
Israeli ones (most exemplary in the hi-tech realm is the reach of cellular 
signals, about twelve times stronger for Israeli firms than Palestinian 
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ones, even within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). These invariably 
prevent the full (and independent) ‘development’ of hi-tech sectors, 
but also serve as hi-tech bordering mechanisms that prevent not 
only sector or economic growth, but territorial, communicative and 
symbolic connections of Palestinians. The nation remains ‘contained,’ 
Gaza remains marginalized. 
It is thus extremely ironic that in its 2008 Annual Report, PalTel chose 
the phrase “expanding everywhere in Palestine… without boundaries” 
as a means to showcase its growth (formidable growth for sure, given 
the limitations against it). The phrase is repeated throughout the 
report. In one instance, where PalTel lists its 2008 subscriber numbers, 
it is even more disparaging as the background image on the page is of 
two boys on a skiff in ‘the Sea of Gaza’ – a body of water which in 2008 
was already completely off-limits to Gazans (see Fig. 1). To suggest 
that telecommunications could expand everywhere in Palestine 
is a tremendous fallacy, even more so that it could do so without 
boundaries. For not only are the boundaries that Gazans – and PalTel 
for that matter – face territorial, as well as naval and in airspace, but 
also within the technological realm itself. These may not be the kinds 
of borders that we are used to seeing or speaking of, but they serve to 
limit Gazan flows.
Conclusion
As society shifts into a modern or post-modern era, states have 
gradually shifted to smoother and more comprehensive regimes of 
control, often more ubiquitous and pervasive. Of course technology, 
and especially telecommunications and computer systems, is an 
integral part of this process today: changes in state power and changes 
in technology parallel each other. It is the work of Michel Foucault 
(1977, 2009) that immediately comes to mind here: that government 
is inevitably a technical matter whose practices rely on an array of 
formalized and specialized technical devices.
Foucault located disciplinary societies in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
which reached their heights in the 20th century. They initiated the 
organization of vast spaces of enclosure. Foucault’s notion of the 
relationship between technology and government(ality) operates with 
two images of discipline: first is the enclosed institution on the edges 
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of society, turned inwards towards negative functions (such as the 
prison); and second, a dispositif that improves the exercise of power 
by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective. A dispositif is a flexible 
method of control, or, in his words, “a whole margin of lateral controls.” 
It is the dispositif that Gilles Deleuze (1992, 1995) will employ 
to analyze the emergence of “societies of control,” whereby 
contemporary technologies constitute a new social topology, in which 
the geographical and institutional delimitation of discipline (that is, the 
distinction between inside/outside, or local/global) becomes obsolete. 
Deleuze draws on Foucault’s argument that power moves and is no 
longer an image of discipline as persistent, but rather a technique 
that endeavors to ‘fix’ mobilities. In control societies, a ‘subject’ no 
longer moves between one closed site to another (prison, barrack, 
family, school) but is subjected to free-floating, nomadic forms of 
control. Inclusion and exclusion take place through continuous, 
mobile forms of surveillance such as electronic tagging, networks, 
cross-border regulation, regulation over flows of subjects and objects. 
Deleuze explains that while enclosures are molds and distinct castings, 
controls are a modulation, like a sieve whose mesh will transmute and 
continuously change from point to point (1992). 
For Deleuze control is digital (or perhaps digitizing), translating 
everything into the logic of codes and passwords. Individuals become 
‘dividuals’ and masses become samples, data, markets or banks. Others 
have taken this argument and suggest that we live in a post-panoptic 
world (and yes, largely post-disciplinary), where forms of power target 
the conduct of mobile subjects, so that the (individual) body itself is 
transformed into a password. In the age of databases, biometric ID 
cards, remote-controlled surveillance cameras, ‘naked’ body scans at 
airports (originally invented by an Israeli firm), software cookies, data 
mining, and the like, control is discipline without walls. If discipline 
established sovereignty and power by creating zones of exception by 
means of confinement, control reverses this. Control society in some 
ways becomes a virtual order, a simulacrum, echoing the ‘fantasy’ 
(or nightmare, as it stands) of Baudrillard (1991), Virilio (2000, 2007), 
and Zizek (2001). Control society comes to be described as a physical 
geography cancelled by networks. 
Some suggest that this changes not only the structure of the state but 
also its exercise and scope of power. Manuel Castells for example posits 
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that “the fundamental dilemma in the network society is that political 
institutions are not the site of power any longer. The real power is the 
power of instrumental flows” (Castells 2000, 23). Thus in the ‘space’ 
hi-tech what we have is a diversification, multiplication, specialization 
and digitization of ‘borders’ and controls, and consequently new forms 
of enclosure and exclusions. As Etienne Balibar suggests borders “are 
dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, 
people, and things is happening and is controlled.” Unlike the promises 
of a liberatory, exclusionary-less and free-flow space, the technological 
is (also) a form of bordering mechanism itself – or can certainly be 
used as such. 
What we see in Gaza however is a kaleidoscope of bordering mechanisms 
and containment devices, in which ‘borders’ are multiple points and 
overlapping zones of control that are juxtaposed – some diffused, some 
centralized, some contradictory. The containment of Gaza is not one 
that has simply witnessed a shift from a form of disciplinary enclosure 
to a society of control, but a simultaneous existence and reinforcement 
of the two. Gaza’s borders are both conventional and new, abstract 
and real, physical and cyber. In other words, Israel exercises different 
forms of enclosure: digital and ‘analog,’ low-tech and hi-tech, directed 
both at discipline and control. Bounding, bordering and containing 
Gaza is necessarily tied to both processes. Discipline (à la Foucault) 
and control (à la Deleuze) coexist, containing within them elements of 
one another. Their topologies overlap. It is in fact increasingly difficult 
to distinguish one form of power from another in the Gazan landscape, 
for the Israeli space and practice of power has become one of in-
distinction. There is a wall, there are unmanned drones flying around, 
there is a limited telecommunications infrastructure, internet traffic 
must pass through the Israeli backbone... Gaza is for all intents and 
purposes a ‘real’ territorial penitentiary (a term the Israeli apparatus 
uses to describe Gaza as well, see Israel MFA 2005), but it is also a hi-
tech one. The containment of Gaza(ns) is not simply manifested on the 
level of individual bodies and territory, but also over both individual 
and collective flows. 
As being plugged into the global network becomes more pervasive 
and necessary (for whatever reason – economic growth, political 
mobilization, social connectedness, etc.), it is access to the network 
and the flows this network affords that are important, not necessarily 
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the network itself. What matters is the points of contact, the junctures, 
the on-ramps and off-ramps, the lines and cables underneath it, and 
particularly the control (and ownership) of access to these. Here, it is 
the Israeli state and its apparatus (the government, the police force, 
the military, the hi-tech industry, all with incestuous ties to each other) 
that is the ‘site’ of power – and to a lesser extent PalTel. Power may 
be exercised at the level of technological infrastructure (access, flow, 
speed, etc.), but it is the state apparatus that decides whether PalTel 
may install, manage, maintain infrastructure, just as it is the Israeli 
apparatus that conversely limits and destroys that infrastructure for 
particular ends. What this further suggests, is that it is both control 
over land and hi-tech that defines Israel’s spatial containment of Gaza, 
thus unlike the implicit argument in Deleuze’s conception of a society 
of control (and others who follow him such as Castells), the power of 
the state has not at all withered; certainly not the Israeli one. 
As with territorial borders, power is manifested in defining what qualifies 
as legitimate movement, or movement at all. The electromagnetic 
spectrum, internet routers, land lines, cellular towers, broadcasting 
signals – the ‘stuff’ that hi-tech infrastructure is ‘made of’ – function 
politically and spatially in Palestine-Israel. Israel’s lockdown of Gaza 
is not only a geo-political and ‘territorial’ issue, but a technological 
one too. There are increasing kinds of ‘hard’ conventional borders 
erected on the land, but bordering Gazans is also at once diffused and 
concentrated very clearly in the ethereal and ‘soft’ realm of hi-tech 
infrastructure. 
Everywhere, the technological is a deeply political struggle to bring 
about a certain social or political order. As I have tried to demonstrate, 
what makes the case of Gaza mostly unique and certainly problematic, 
is that hi-tech infrastructures are bordering mechanisms that aim to 
limit – and often negate – certain kinds of Palestinian living spaces 
and flows. This is a kind of remote-control form of occupation, a 
‘frictionless’ techno-bordering, both a disguise to ongoing (territorial) 
bordering practices and a new form of containment. Hi-tech enclosure 
is the limitation, control, bordering and containment of Palestinian hi-
tech flows, and by extension other kinds of flows: political, economic, 
financial, of ideas, etc. 
However, hi-tech infrastructures are bordering mechanisms that limit 
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Gazan flows in contradictory ways: while they are used to limit and 
surveil, they also permit and are capable of connecting Gazans to 
wider networks – of telephony, of digital networks, of global capital, 
etc. Hi-tech enclosure then exposes contradictions at the heart of 
‘globalization’: on the one hand transforming the way in which Israel 
directly and indirectly subjugates Gazans, yet, on the other hand, how 
Gazans are part of the new global techno-revolution (even if it serves 
mostly to constrain them). Moreover, hi-tech infrastructures are 
discursively used as symbols of democratization and modernization 
on the part of Israel towards Palestinians, and more generally in the 
rhetoric that posits technology as liberatory – and this is especially 
manifested in the rhetoric and practice employed by the slew of foreign 
funders and powerful local corporations (such as PalTel) that drive 
technology (and particularly telecommunications and IT) development 
in the Territories (see Tawil-Souri 2007). 
Hi-tech infrastructure is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in built 
form. It is not a metaphor, it is the conflict. It is the ‘space’ in which 
Gazans are both subsumed and marginalized in the larger networked 
world, economically, technologically, and otherwise. To speak of the 
possibility then of a placeless, boundless, exclusionary-less hi-tech 
realm is to fail to see that, just like on the territorial scale, the Israeli 
regime continuously produces, reproduces, shifts, and tunes territorial 
and hi-tech margins and borders to dynamically enclose Gaza. Hi-
tech too is ‘grounded’ and in the case of Gaza largely bordered and 
contained itself. Similarly then to suggest that Gazans can overcome 
their territorial containment through the realm of hi-tech, fails to 
recognize that changes on the ground also need to happen. Gaza 
remains marginalized: on the margin of a colonial regime (Israel), on 
the margin of a fragmented and disconnected ‘proto-state’ (Palestine), 
and on the margin of global technological networks. 
But a margin leaves wiggle room. Although limited, controlled and 
surveilled by Israel, the hi-tech infrastructure in place in the Gaza Strip 
does provide some (virtual) connectivity and mobility to Gazans. And 
it is here, in the realm of content – but arguably, and unfortunately, 
only in the realm of content – in the realm of what Gazans actually do 
with technology, that their containment can be loosened, that they 
can push open those margins bit by bit, byte by byte. 
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Julie Peteet: 
A Fortress Country and a Gated Enclave: Locating the 
Palestinian Margin
Introduction
To posit Gaza as on the margins begs the question: where is the center? 
Margins exist in relation to centers and this relationship has temporal 
and spatial scope as well as a power differential. In other words, both 
concepts are relational and historically contingent. When the margin 
is invoked, its meaning, as well as the presence of state, is assumed 
to be given. The center/margin or core/periphery formulation of a 
state’s geo-spatial and economic, political and cultural contours, once 
a critical subject of inquiry in the social sciences, has rarely appeared in 
the literature on Palestine. The margins/periphery paradigm is rooted 
in 1960s and 1970s dependency theory scholarship when it was critical 
to understanding underdevelopment in a historical fashion arising from 
colonial relations where the margins provided raw materials and labor 
and the core profited. The margins made possible the development 
of metropolitan centers. In other words, the two spaces worked in 
asymmetrical tandem. Events in Gaza over the past four-five years 
compel a questioning of this formulation. Conceptual formations from 
past scholarship will necessarily have to be reconfigured in light of 
the specificity of the Palestinian case, with its absence of state and 
sovereignty and a history of colonial occupation. The emergence of a 
multi-polar world further complicates this formulation.
With Gaza, questions immediately arise: On which margin is Gaza 
positioned: a colonial entity to which it is geographically contiguous or 
a putative, but fragmented, non-contiguous Palestinian society/state? 
Das and Poole (2004, 3) claim the idea of the state as “weakened or 
less fully articulated” in the margins can be superseded by approaching 
margins as “places from which we seek to understand what counts as 
the study of the state.” Gaza certainly challenges the notion that state 
practices are somehow diluted at the margins. In a globalized world of 
states, where do spaces outside the boundaries of a state, with their 
stateless and, in this case besieged, population, fit in a center/margin 
formulation? We should be less interested in debunking a center/
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margins formulation and more focused on problematizing it, locating 
the specific external and internal dynamics driving it, its geo-political 
complexity, and examining the effects of its invocation.
This chapter tentatively explores some of these questions by detailing 
the process of marginalization by Israeli practices such as siege, closure, 
and techniques of bio-power. Events, what Lisa Wedeen (2008) calls 
“units of analysis” in Gaza over the past several years, from continuing 
occupation and a devastating siege, to intermittent military assault, 
are, as those in marginal spaces usually are, rarely newsworthy for 
long. More recently, the 2008-09 Israeli war on Gaza and the 2010 
attack on a humanitarian flotilla briefly rendered Gaza front page news 
and brought to the fore questions about margins and cores. Yet these 
events and the continuing blockade of Gaza, as well as the attack on 
the Mavi Marmara in the early morning of 31 May, 2010, do mark a 
discernible, although short-lived, shift in Gaza’s socio-political spatial 
location in conceptualizations of Palestine and Israel.1
Contemporary Gaza, once a crossroads connecting Africa and Asia, 
can be situated historically in colonial projects to fragment Palestine 
spatially and the continuing impulse to miniaturize and separate its 
remnants, as well as derail a sense of shared Palestinian identity. The 
goals of Israel’s closure and blockade of Gaza are multi-pronged. First, 
Israel is trying to compel Egypt, or exert international pressure on Egypt, 
to take control of the area. A second goal is to decimate Palestinian 
political life and voice such that they become a humanitarian issue 
rather a political one, echoing the 1950s when a similar strategy was 
pursued. Third, Israel’s acts of abandonment and blockade engender 
a space of dis-order on its margins against which it can define and 
defend its own sense of order and homogeneity. It can hold at bay that 
which threatens its claims to place and social homogeneity.
Gaza should not be extracted from the collective Palestinian historical 
drama. In the Palestinian narrative, Gaza’s location is often that of 
a footnote. Journalist and cartoonist Joe Sacco’s seminal graphic 
text Footnotes in Gaza (2009) attempts to rectify this positioning by 
exploring the monumental but often overlooked events in Gaza in 
1  In the wake of the Gaza flotilla incident, two books appeared on Gaza: Bayoumi (2010) and 
Finkelstein (2010).
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1956.2 A broader historical and spatio-temporal approach avoids 
extracting Gaza from analyses of Palestine and instead seeks its double 
marginality: marginal to a colonial center to which it is geographically 
contiguous and to a Palestinian center to which it is geographically 
non-contiguous. I argue Gaza is not actually marginal but is often 
understood as such. 
In a regional colonial context, geo-spatial fragmentation and an ethnic-
sectarian ordering of society and polity, known in anthropology as the 
social mosaic, harkens back to Orientalist and early anthropological 
imaginings of peoples and cultures of the region. The mosaic has been 
a prominent feature of Zionist conceptualizations of the region. In their 
varied ways, invasions, occupations and internal meddling in Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Palestine have given concrete and often violent expression 
to a vision of the region as a series of sectarian and ethnic pieces of 
a mosaic. This regional imaginary, epitomized by Iraq’s fragmentation 
and the continuing dismemberment of Palestine, suggests a terrain 
open to re-visiting center/margins formulations.
Elaborating on the category of the margin draws attention to the 
specificity of Gaza’s position. To proceed in the endeavor to locate the 
margin, its constitutive features must be identified, as must also their 
social effects. Palestine is now constituted by multiple geographically 
non-contiguous pieces, yet each piece or social formation, including 
refugee camps, considers itself an experiential piece of Palestine.3 All 
individuals carry a piece of Palestine wherever they are in exile. On a 
political level, headquartering of the Palestinian resistance movement 
in Amman, Beirut, Tunis, and Ramallah has clearly been a constitutive 
element of a Palestinian center. 
As with many regions formerly or now dubbed “margins,” a look at Gaza 
suggests that center/margin formulations are shifting, contingent, and 
2 The 1956 Israeli, British, and French assault on Gaza and subsequent Israeli massacres in 
Rafah and Khan Yunis are not often included in the litany of violent punctuations beginning 
with Deir Yassin and Kfar Kibya, continuing through Sabra-Chatila and more recently Jenin.
3 “Palestine is here in this camp.” This pithy little phrase embodies more than its short, 
straightforward prose might suggest. It refers to Palestine as mobile, as something refugees 
carry with them and deploy to organize in exile. It refers to a way of being in the world and 
an organization of space. It is akin to Little Havana in Miami, or Tehrangles in Los Angeles, 
and Little Saigon in Orange Country, California. Identity and place are reconstituted outside 
of geographical space (see Peteet 2005).
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historically embedded. Indeed, the title of the conference is suggestive 
of shifting margins. How are evaluations of place determined and 
hierarchized? Is Gaza evaluated as culturally inferior to, or somehow 
as less than, a putative core or center? Is this a political assessment as 
well, with Hamas-led Gaza positioned as marginal to a West Bank core? 
What features of this space might constitute it as on the margins? In 
the hierarchy of spatial valence, the margin/center is usually drawn 
along a line of difference arrayed along an urban/rural divide with 
the former usually associated with modernity, an industrial economy 
versus an agriculturally based one and with rural areas associated with 
backwardness or the folk quaintness of distant regions. 
 In a fragmented Palestine, where are the center and periphery located, 
and how are they identified as such? Formerly marginal locations such 
as Ramallah can become central Palestinian locales. Does Ramallah, 
headquarters of the PA and unofficial capital of Palestine, currently 
occupy center stage? Gaza’s status as the launching site of some of 
the first guerilla actions against Israel and the first intifada, birthplace 
of Hamas, and its recent place in headline news for war and the flotilla 
destination have located it center stage for brief fleeting moments of 
time. It certainly has more resonance in the west than does the West 
Bank as a site of human rights violations and a site for humanitarian 
assistance. What does this mean for formulations of a Palestinian 
center/margin? Palestinian political divisions and the positioning of 
the PA as the representative of the Palestinians in negotiations and 
an alternative, although marginalized, leadership ensconced in Gaza 
certainly bring to the fore the state, or quasi-state, determination of 
center and margins. Can there be multiple centers and margins? What 
confluence of events prompts shifts in center/margin determinations? 
What is the role of the state in making determinations of margins and 
cores through divisions of districts and administrative headquarters? 
In locating margins and centers we must pay attention to regional 
concepts of selfhood and how they articulate with the national 
identities promoted by the state, a problematic not unique to Palestine 
but that Palestinian certainly complicates. The burgeoning body of 
scholarship on Palestine has been more focused on the West Bank. 
Part of the problem is access and part is the sense of its marginality – 
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that the important things happen in the West Bank.4 
Shifting focus to the colonial dimension positions Israel as center and 
Gaza as its margin in a relation of asymmetrical dependence. The 
colonial dimension brings into focus the mutually-constitutive relations 
between the quarantined and stateless and the fully franchised, highly 
mobile citizen. The latter derives his mobility, and sense of security, 
from the immobilized, abandoned Palestinian; in other words, the 
Palestinian, the ever-present threat, is immobilized while Israeli 
mobility is unimpeded. Israel has crafted a doubled or twinned project 
of order and disorder, or what I call calibrated chaos, to ensure both 
order and domination. In other words, crafting of spaces of disorder 
and immobility produces and reproduces a space of order in the core 
of the state. In short, state and margins are mutually constitutive. 
Separation, closure, incarceration, and immobility are spatial devices 
and technologies of rule that draw a tangible classificatory impulse of 
order/disorder and inclusion/exclusion. These fault lines take shape 
around ethnic, religious and national difference. On the margins are 
that which disturbs the order and homogeneity of the state. Israeli 
practices in Gaza invoke threat and security to produce both order 
and disorder. The invoking of an ever-present threat by Palestinians 
serves to call forth and justify techniques of siege, blockade and 
immobilization. An analysis of the state from the margins may indeed 
provide a remarkably different view of the state (Das and Poole 2004, 
4). It may be as Talal Asad contends, that margins are “places where 
state law and order continually have to be reestablished” (2004, 279). 
Thus what we think of as margins may actually be central to the project 
of state. Conditions of disorder then function to decimate daily life. 
The relation of dependency, as in the classic formulation of core/
periphery, worked when Gaza was on the periphery of a colonial state 
exploiting its cheap and unprotected labor. But this is no longer the 
case. As history often makes clear, once central locations can, and 
often do, transition to the margins as a result of changes in colonial 
priorities, shifts in the trade of goods and their routes or the demand 
for labor, and centralizing political projects. As trade patterns and the 
locales for the production of goods shift over time, once vibrant centers 
4 For exceptions see Sara Roy (1995) and Ilana Feldman (2010). In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
dozens of graduate students pursed research and wrote dissertations on the West Bank; 
few chose Gaza as a site for generating knowledge about Palestine.
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of commerce, trade, and culture can quickly morph into backwaters. 
With the 2005 Israeli redeployment, the occupation entered a new 
era: enclavization through a combination of high and low tech means 
such as walls and fences and the collection, storage, and encryption of 
identity cards with bio-metric data.
On an ideological note, we should be reminded that the initial PLO 
conception of a democratic, secular state appeared more modern and 
cosmopolitan than Zionist conceptions of a religious/ethnic based 
state, part of the larger regional mosaic. Being excluded from a state, 
consigned to the geographical margins, engendered the idea of an 
inclusive state. 
By its very marginalization, Gaza epitomizes the Palestinian condition 
of both fragmentation and unity. This is one of the profound 
contradictions of the Zionist project to obstruct the emergence of a 
contiguous Palestinian entity and national consciousness. For it is the 
prolonged, shared experience of this project, with its massive human 
rights violation associated with dispossession and displacement in the 
quest for resource control and an exclusivist sovereignty, whether in 
Gaza, the West Bank, inside Israel, or in the refugee camps scattered 
across the border states, that continues to be central to Palestinian 
identity and a sense of belonging. 
Fortress State and Gated/Walled Enclaves: Closure and Separation
Contemporary accounts of violence and warfare often focus on the 
displaced, those traumatized by warfare, victims of massacres and 
mass rapes. Seldom are the immobilized, those locked in and besieged, 
subjects of research. The origins of Gaza’s closure can be tracked on 
a regional, as well as global, scale to a politics of (im)mobility and 
the deployment of siege and blockade as weapons of war, and to an 
economy where peace is no longer a pre-condition of economic growth. 
Zionism’s ability to implement its separatist impulse was captured by 
Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, when he declared in 1994, “We have 
to decide on separation as a philosophy” (Makovsky 2004, 52). This 
move coincided with the rise of Israel’s high tech communications 
and security industry. Separation certainly was feasible economically 
and could be marketed as a prophylactic measure to ensure security. 
Indeed, the global politics of securitization, while growing in the 
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1990s, forcefully took off in the post-9/11 period. Israel was presented 
with a golden opportunity to expand its export capacity, and thus its 
economic prosperity, around the development of, and trade in, new 
security technologies. Klein (2007a, 422) noted that the “conventional 
wisdom” had long been that conflict and political turmoil impeded 
economic development and that peace was foundational to economic 
growth. Israel recognized that it could sustain an unending war with 
the Palestinians and enjoy economic growth. Global instability that 
“generates huge profits for the high-tech security sector” was the new 
conventional wisdom (424). In other words, conflict and the politics 
of threat and fear have propelled the high-tech security industry now 
vital to Israel’s economic health. Indeed, Klein contends that “Israel 
has crafted an economy that expands markedly in direct response to 
escalating violence” (428). Israel has over 350 corporations devoted to 
security products and expertise. She also notes that “the rapid expansion 
of the high-tech security economy created a powerful appetite inside 
Israel’s wealthy and most powerful sectors for abandoning peace 
in favor of fighting a continual, and continuously expanding, War 
on Terror” (430). Captive populations on the margins provided a 
laboratory setting and test subjects where security technologies, such 
as checkpoints, the wall, and identity cards encrypted with biometric 
information are designed, tested, advertised, and then marketed 
globally. Israel markets security and weapons products and know-how 
by advertising their lengthy experience in dealing with Arab and Muslim 
‘terrorists.’ In this arrangement, Israel has become a “kind of twenty-
four-hour-a-day showroom,” integral to its status as the “fourth-largest 
arms dealer in the world” (Klein 2007b). Gaza’s status as a bio-tech 
laboratory suggests that the parameters of core and periphery need to 
be re-articulated and new criteria appended.
Closure joins other forms of structural management of inequality 
and punishment. The literature on gated communities is relevant to 
understanding Palestine/Israel yet we must remain cognizant of the 
uniqueness of the project in Palestine in terms of level and scope of 
violence and differences in geo-political scale. Anthropologist Teresa 
Caldeira (2001) and Mike Davis (2006) wrote seminal works on gated 
communities and fortressing in Los Angeles and Brazil. Yet rather than 
simply erecting gated communities for the elite, a sort of voluntary 
self-segregation, Israel has constructed a gated, or fortressed, country. 
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The gated communities described by Caldeira were designed to keep 
out certain people, basically the poor, except for those selectively 
allowed in to service the lifestyles of the wealthy and to enhance the 
physical security of those residing behind the gates. Those outside the 
gated communities did not have their movement hindered in the urban 
areas outside the gated communities; they simply were not allowed 
unmonitored access to the gated enclaves. Israel is both distinct and 
similar. In other words, there is what Wittgenstein called “family 
resemblances.” In the fortressed state, and its surrounding occupied 
territories, the parameters of (im)mobility are based on ethnicity, 
religion and nationality. Agier’s description of gated communities as 
“an elementary system of bio-segregation anterior to any thought of 
the other, compatible only with thinking of oneself, to the point of self-
obsession and fear of the least physical contact” (2004, 60) echoes with 
the closure. Palestinian circulation halts at the gates of the fortress, yet 
Palestinian circulation is also severely hindered within and between 
areas in Palestine. Beyond the fortress, space is carved into multiple, 
non-contiguous enclaves where people are simultaneously locked in 
and out, further complicating margin/center formulations. 
Closure of Gaza
In Palestine in general, the circulation of goods and humans is selectively 
mediated by fences/walls, a multitude of checkpoints and terminals, 
and the permit system. Closure and siege obstruct circulation in and out 
of Gaza and within the West Bank. Are fences, walls, and checkpoints, 
which craft fortressed spaces, becoming the nomos of the new century 
as they appear in Palestine and Baghdad and along the US-Mexico 
border? Most significantly, they create the conditions of disorder and 
calibrated chaos as a form of collective punishment, as a means of 
inducing emigration and compelling humanitarian intervention to de-
politicize the Palestine issue. Closure, and its structural mechanisms, 
indicate a lack of interest in settling grievances, reference a desire 
to transform the demographic landscape and ultimately, through 
extreme forms of containment and incarceration, engender ethnically 
homogenous and exclusivist spaces of rights and privileges. 
Spaces of confinement assume multiple forms: reservations to contain 
the dispossessed Native Americans, gated communities where the 
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power ratio is inverted by elites locking themselves in and dangerous 
others out, European ghettos that incarcerated the Jewish population, 
Bantustans in South Africa, besieged cities, and asylums, among others. 
Building fences and walls disrupts the intimate relationship between 
landscape and human mobility, the way landscape is produced, 
reproduced, imagined, and endowed with meaning through mobility. 
They give rise to spatial enclaves and immobile bodies. Enclaves are 
spatial zones where populations are contained, isolated from others, 
and surrounded by a dominant state; in other words, marginal spaces. 
Enclaves, like reservations, ghettos, and Bantustans, are unilateral 
moves and as such reflect the power of one party to act in its interests 
and the weaker party’s inability to halt such moves. Fenced/walled 
Gaza resembles a holding pen while the West Bank is more akin 
to an archipelago. Palestinian enclaves are distinguished by their 
physical mechanisms of incarceration: the fence/wall and terminals/
checkpoints, and the bureaucratic controls, the permits, necessary to 
move beyond them. These enclaves facilitate the unhindered mobility 
of a dominant, privileged group. 
Most importantly, while states are not the only force involved in 
producing margins; margins, like place and region, are not inert, 
simply acted upon arenas; they play a role in producing themselves, 
highlighting the internal dimension. These are more than simply zones 
of incarceration. They can also be creative arenas. The internal dynamic 
in Gaza is evident in the mundane as well as the spectacular, from 
simply proceeding with daily life to tunneling under the wall and, more 
recently, breaching Egypt’s underground steel wall, to networks of 
trade carried on though the tunnels and the garnering of international 
support as evidenced by the summer 2010 flotilla. Israel closes an eye 
to some smuggling in order to reinforce an economic tie with Egypt 
and to prevent a total humanitarian catastrophe. When space is re-
ordered, whether through colonial or urban designs to put out of sight 
undesirable people that disrupt social homogeneity, those cast out 
do respond with voice and action. In short, the banished, confined, or 
quarantined are active subjects creating social worlds. 
Gaza (and the West Bank) presents a comparative and semantic 
challenge. Extant concepts for describing confinement such as ghetto, 
gated community, reservation, prison, bantustan, gulag, or enclave do 
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not quite capture the novel reality of confinement in a blockaded and 
besieged Gaza. As a geo-spatial term, in English, enclave can embody 
a more neutral cast, unlike Bantustan or ghetto, whose meanings are 
freighted with negative connotations. Yet enclave can also refer to socio-
spatial formations with grounding in particular social arrangements 
of inequality. Gulags capture the element of imprisonment that is 
so prevalent when Palestinians describe the blockade, closure, and 
the wall. So what should Gaza and the isolated spaces in the West 
Bank be called? “Open-air prisons” is used frequently to reference 
siege and closure; it captures the incarcerating effects of closure and 
enclavization. 
Comparisons with the ghetto are limited because the economic factor 
is not applicable. The economic integration, however unequally, 
of African-Americans, Jews, and Blacks in the ghettoes of the US, 
pre-World War II Europe, and the Bantustans, is not paralleled in 
Palestinian enclaves, for these groups, however spatially confined and 
marginalized, occupied a pivotal position in local economies. Palestinian 
confinement is novel in that their circulation outside and between 
their confines is severely circumscribed. “Stigma, constraint, spatial 
confinement, and institutional containment” are defining elements of 
the ghetto (Wacquant 2004, 2). Institutional containment is where Gaza 
departs from the comparison; Gazan institutions are being strangled, 
rather than contained, by their inability to receive goods from outside, 
or to coordinate with institutions in the West Bank, as well as by Israeli 
military attacks on their physical structures and personnel. Oddly, 
Wacquant focuses little on (im)mobility. Jews were allowed mobility 
outside the ghetto, albeit temporally circumscribed, for they played 
a critical economic role. In addition, ghetto has been used to refer to 
urban concentrations of African-Americans in northern cities when 
their labor was central to US industry; these ghettoes were not physical 
constructions but rather were maintained by widely observed social 
patterns of segregation. Wacquant argues that the ghetto is a “Janus-
faced institution as it serves opposite functions for the two collectives 
that it binds in a relation of asymmetric dependency. For the dominant 
category, its rationale is to confine and control…”; for the dominated 
sector “it is an integrative and protective device insofar as it relieves 
its members from constant contact with the dominant and fosters 
consociation and community building” (2004, 3). 
60
Under siege, we need to be asking on-the-ground questions: is 
community building or the sense of unity that arises from confinement 
maintained? How severely stretched and compromised are networks 
of solidarity such as kin, or have they been newly re-invigorated, or 
re-formulated? What new sorts of networks are emerging? What 
sorts of cultural expression? With this extreme level of punitive 
incarceration and continued destruction, can Gazans claim pride in 
community building and cultural florescence as did some pre-1960s 
African-American urban communities (Wacquant 2004, 5) and pre-
war European ghettoes? Whereas the ghetto can serve to enhance 
group identity and cohesion, especially in relation to the dominant 
external community, it remains to be seen how Gazan identity and 
social cohesion are currently being contoured. Most any state contains 
regional diversity and a consequent diversity of identities; in Palestine 
this question takes on heightened significance in the wake of extreme 
forms of fragmentation and obstructed social interaction. Is Gaza 
marginal to the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Palestinians outside? 
For Wacquant, the ghetto is both weapon and shield, but when it loses 
its economic function for the dominant group, the enclosed group runs 
the risk of warehousing and ostracism, and it can be a precursor to 
annihilation. Native American reservations, a by-product of ethnically 
driven forced removals and dispossession, may be a more appropriate 
spatial analogy. Their resources, but not their labor, were coveted by 
the settlers. The reservations are semi-autonomous zones within a 
larger state and Native Americans were eventually incorporated as US 
citizens.
Thus comparisons can be fraught with the perils of over-simplification 
and inaccuracy. Elsewhere I have critiqued the South African Bantustan-
Gaza analogy, particularly in the area of labor (Peteet 2009); the global 
traffic in labor has weakened this particular point of comparison. 
When Israel depended on Palestinian workers from Gaza (1967-
1993), which functioned as a dormitory for a reserve pool of labor, 
comparisons with Bantustans worked fairly well. Unlike the white 
dependency on a black labor force in South Africa, from mine workers 
to nannies, Palestinians became expendable. Now, however, it might 
be more fruitful to search for different analytical terms. I suggest we 
shift the paradigm from Apartheid comparisons and begin to probe 
the Israeli plan for separation using terms that resonate locally. How 
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is hafrada (Hebrew for separation) conceptualized and enacted and 
what are its consequences? What we are witnessing in Gaza is the shift 
to spatial forms that not only contain, monitor, and discipline but now 
incarcerate a surplus, abandoned population that is no longer of much 
value to the colonial project. 
When and why did the Palestinians under occupation become surplus 
bodies to be disciplined and controlled, but also subjects of technologies 
of bio-power? After the first intifada, which overlapped with the influx of 
Soviet Jews, the rise of neo-liberalism, and the increasing privatization 
of the Israeli economy, Israel found it possible to implement a policy 
of separation. They were able to wean themselves from Palestinian 
labor by importing workers from South Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, Oslo signaled Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli plans 
and a surge in colony building. What is the place in the world for those 
whose resources are coveted and expropriated with impunity and who 
provide less and less profit? Prolonged siege, bio-power, or the way a 
state acts on the body as an aggregate, and a politics of abandonment 
and the spaces they bring into play, operate together. Anthropologist 
Joao Biehl writes of “ex-human” and the “social death” that precedes 
“biological death” (2005, 52). When Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni 
declared there is no “humanitarian crisis” in Gaza, she underscored 
that the siege maintained Palestinians above the level of disaster and 
that Palestinians are not civilians because combatant distress and 
casualties are not referred to in humanitarian terms. 
Under Israel’s blockade of Gaza, the items banned entry are capricious 
and arbitrary and signal the un-human or the ex-human. The list of 
permitted and banned items suggests punishment and the imposition 
of uncertainty. Why cinnamon but no coriander? Why no plastic toys 
or wood or textiles? The items allowed or disallowed change over 
time, an arbitrariness that imposes severe constraints on the work of 
humanitarian organizations. An Israeli group, Gisha, that brought a 
court case seeking documents related to the blockade, acquired four 
documents, one of which spelled out the blockade’s rationale: “The 
limitation on the transfer of goods is a central pillar in the means at 
the disposal of the State of Israel in the armed conflict between it 
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and Hamas.”5 One document, “Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip 
– Red Lines,” details the minimum caloric intake by sex and age in 
Gaza. Wars on Gaza, and the siege of Gaza, are not just about spatial 
tactics to produce a particular type of disciplinary space, but also 
about particular bodies, about pursuing subjugation through bodily 
regulation and punishment. Israeli spokesman Dov Weisglass’ ominous, 
and now widely quoted, statement: “We are putting the Palestinians 
on a diet” is highly suggestive of intent and the sorts of results it 
expects to produce from a siege and mass destruction: capitulation 
by a hungry population and the subsequent overthrow of the Hamas 
government. It aims to accomplish these goals through seemingly 
arbitrary regulations governing food, shelter, medicine/medical care, 
electricity, water/sanitation, and items for education. 
Anthropologist Darryl Li (2008, 4) referred to Gaza as an animal pen 
where lives are controlled through the “leash and diet”. With the 
elements to ensure an economic livelihood and basic components of 
human life severely compromised, Palestinians are seemingly reduced 
to bare life. Bio-techniques of caloric determination aim to shape the 
living individual as well as the political body. The Palestinian body 
is a designated target of a deprivation that will compel submission. 
Recourse to the language of “humanitarian essentials” is designed to 
ward off international criticism and keep Gazans just above malnutrition 
but not able to thrive. Thus the targeting of Gaza’s last working flour 
mill, the attacks on educational and medical facilities, homes (58,000 
destroyed), factories, electrical station, mosques, and so on aimed to 
destroy the infrastructure of the area. 
(Im)mobility is also a technique of bio-power. Mobility, crucial to 
human life for hundreds of thousands of years, is a fundamental 
component of human social life. Indeed, taking the long historical view, 
sedentarization is a new phenomenon. Palestinian mobility is severely 
constrained, in part as punishment, but more to ensure unfettered 
mobility for Israelis, maintain an absence of contact, and push forward 
the colonization project.
The Goldstone Report noted that the destruction in Gaza was planned 
5 “The List of Goods allowed into Gaza Strip (April 2010)” May 3, 2010, www.
alzaytouna.net/arabic/. 
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and deliberate. With their high casualties, Israeli military assaults on 
Gaza beg the question: are there civilian Palestinian bodies? In any 
form of existence, this body poses an inherent potential threat to 
the Zionists’ project and ideology, for it is an ever-present reminder 
of their position as interlopers among the indigenous population. Like 
most colonists, Israelis fear the wrath of the native indigenous, a fear 
that underwrites their brutality.6 Palestinians in general, whether in 
Palestine or outside, have only rarely been allowed to be framed as 
what Butler refers to as “grieveable bodies” (2004, 19-49). The silence 
over Palestinian deaths is a “refusal of discourse” that dehumanizes 
(Butler 2004, 36).
In this scenario, Palestinians are neither a political issue nor a 
humanitarian one. The skewed death toll, about 1400:10, reflects 
Israel’s absence of risk-taking and infliction of mass destruction, 
through massive air power which pulverized Gaza’s built environment 
and infra-structure and killed hundreds of civilians. Soldiers were to 
consider the area “devoid of civilians” (quoted in Finkelstein 2010, 
60). To reassert deterrence and remind the region of their power of 
destruction, in other words, to terrorize the region, they “intentionally 
raised the level of destruction to a degree that was unpredictable, 
even insane”7 (Finkelstein 2010, 79). The assault on Gaza was designed 
to impose maximum destruction and suffering, make a point to the 
region about deterrence, and reduce the Palestinians to quiescent 
subordination. 
Abandonment 
It is significant that during the 2008-09 Israeli assault on Gaza, there 
was no escape route, no way out. The concept of abandonment may 
be suited descriptively and analytically for Palestinians in Gaza (and to 
some extent the West Bank). The term raises a number of questions for 
future research: How is Palestinian abandonment constituted and what 
are its features? Who has abandoned them – the world community, the 
international system of law, the Arab states, Palestinians elsewhere, 
6 See Norman Finkelstein (2010) for an astute analysis of the invasion of Gaza and the 
rhetoric of destruction.
7 Precedents and parallels with Israel’s infliction of severe bodily punishment have precedents 
in, and analogies with the British assault on the Mau Mau movement in Kenya in the 1950s 
(see Elkins 2005).
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or the colonial occupier? What is the relation between the margins 
and abandonment? Are punishment and abandonment constitutive 
components giving shape to a margin? 
With the 2005 redeployment of Israeli troops, the evacuation of bases, 
and the dismantling of the colonies, Israel claims it is no longer an 
occupying power and thus bears no responsibility for Gaza’s population 
(they never did recognize their responsibilities as occupiers under the 
Geneva Convention). With the outsourcing of control to the PA, Israel 
could absolve itself of responsibility while retaining near complete 
control of Gaza’s borders and air and sea space. Redeployment, along 
with the blockade, marked a new phase in colonial rule and relations of 
dependency. Gazans were dependent on Israel for basic resources such 
as electricity, water, communications, for the import/export of goods, 
and for permits to enable travel, but Israel was no longer dependent 
on their labor. Relations of dependency have become so skewed 
that Gazans are essentially captives in a perilous state of calibrated 
abandonment. Most importantly, Palestinian attempts to develop 
structural or developmental alternatives are obstructed at every turn 
under the guise of preventing “terrorism.” Agamben (1998, 109-10) 
writes insightfully of the paradoxical relations of abandonment: 
The relation of abandonment is so ambiguous that nothing 
could be harder than breaking from it. The ban is essentially 
the power of delivering something over to itself, which is to 
say, the power of maintaining itself in relation to something 
presupposed as nonrelational. What has been banned is 
delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time, 
consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it – at once 
excluded and included, removed and at the same time captured. 
Yet there is an aspect of this relationship to which Agamben does not 
pay much attention, and that is the internal dynamic of the abandoned. 
The one banning and excluding lives in a continuous relation with 
the banned; the former must be vigilant and continuously deny the 
existence and the rights of the banned. Abandonment must be vigilantly 
monitored because the abandoned, “delivered” over to themselves, 
do resist their exclusion and dispossession. This is the internal dynamic 
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that Agamben, in his often unelaborated and ungrounded philosophy, is 
unable to appreciate. In other words, abandonment must be vigilantly 
monitored, patrolled, and maintained by force, because those in states 
of abandonment are not quiescent. In still other words, these margins 
have to be continuously produced. Thus those enacting abandoning 
must make use of the abandoned to justify violence against them. 
In the Palestinian case, abandonment has been mediated by the 
international community in the form of donor funds and humanitarian 
assistance. Thus abandonment is rarely total and the internal dynamic 
is never completely destroyed. Amid the suffering, destruction, and 
trauma, Gaza maintains a dynamic rhythm; political life has not given 
way to bare life even in the midst of severe forms of incarceration. The 
task is to identify the elements of this dynamic and its contour as they 
are played out in Gaza. 
Both Deleuze (1995) and Packer (2008) have noted the emergence of 
new forms of control in late capitalism, identifying a shift from discipline 
to control societies. The siege of Gaza compels a turn to abandonment. 
In Gaza, control and discipline are accompanied by abandonment and 
calibrated attempts to obstruct internal structures and relations of 
development. What happens when neo-liberalism (or late capitalism) 
is combined with a form of colonialism that no longer requires the 
laboring native, whose resources are still being expropriated and 
whose mobility is conceptualized as a threat? I conceptualize discipline, 
control, and abandonment as triangulated rather than points on a 
spectrum of more of one and less of the other. Controls over Gazan 
spaces and the populations’ mobility are draconian. Israel is a walled 
fortress, what A. Burg described as a “fortified haven” (2008, 16) 
accompanied by military power to contain any possible threats. The 
impulse to compare across the globe must be tempered by recognition 
of specificity and openness to exploring always mutating forms of 
domination. 
Surplus populations, or disposable, discardable people, are of 
little use to those who once exploited them and now have little 
investment in either their presence or well-being. Contemporary 
zones of abandonment occur at the intersection of several forces. With 
disparities in access to power, resources, and citizenship, bolstered 
by practices and an ideology of privilege on the one hand, and acute 
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demonization on the other, abandonment crystallizes as a sort of 
collateral damage of the neo-liberal model of the market, and in this 
colonial case, the impulse to extreme forms of segregation and the 
dispossession of the indigenous population. The abandoned have 
often been forcibly confined to designated spaces (as lepers and the 
mentally ill once were). The existence of such zones is illustrative and, 
perhaps diagnostic of, the very social processes that puts people in 
them. Joao Biehl penned a stunning and poignant ethnography of 
Vita, a Brazilian site of abandonment, housing the mentally ill, drug 
addicts, and sufferers of AIDs, among others. One informant described 
Vita as a “‘dump site of human beings’” and Biehl cast it as “the end-
station… where people go when they are no longer considered people” 
(Biehl 2005, 1). Such sites are not unusual in the neoliberal world – 
shanty towns, squatter settlements, poverty belts, displacement and 
detention centers, and refugee camps.8
What are Israel’s long-term plans for Gaza? Is Egypt to take administrative 
control as it did after the war of 1948-49? In the West Bank, the intent 
of closure over the long term is to propel emigration and to thin the 
population. Gazans are not easily allowed to leave, and Egypt, while 
complicit with the blockade, has little inclination to take in the displaced 
or to be saddled with administrative responsibility for Gaza. This leads 
to the question: what is the goal of prolonged immiseration? It may 
be that this particular space of abandonment is to be retained as a 
testing ground and a spot for conveying the message of deterrence. 
And indeed, Gaza, particularly the rocket issue, is always available to 
be mobilized as a threat to the Jewish state for both international and 
domestic consumption. Gaza has generated its own vocabulary. Israeli 
discourse on Gaza has some unique features. For example, the verb 
“to rain” is used consistently in the media in the US, to the point of 
predictability, to describe rocket fire from Gaza. Rain implies the fall 
of boundless, innumerable, and unlimited things, hardly relevant to 
these particular rockets. 
The use of the term “abandoned” is freighted with meaning on multiple 
levels. Abandonment can be large scale – of aggregate populations or 
communities, or individuals as described by Biehl. Indeed, the historical 
8  Warehousing is a term common in immigration and refugee studies. Palestinians in refugee 
camps in neighboring Arab states can be said to be “warehoused.”
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record is chock full of such spaces: asylums, refugee camps, leprosy 
colonies, prisons, detention centers, safe havens, and concentration 
camps, to name a few, as well as practices such as banishment. Even 
streets can be spaces of abandonment. Scheper-Hughes writes about 
the murder, with impunity, of street children in Brazil who are considered 
little more than “rubbish people” in a sort of “symbolic apartheid as 
urban space becomes increasingly ‘privitized’” (2004, 372). There are 
discernible lines of distinction among these spaces. Refugee camps and 
reservations occupy a middle ground between spaces of confinement 
and abandonment (the asylum or leprosy colonies, for example) and 
places where populations can be reconstituted. Refugee camps were 
initially conceptualized as transit spaces mediating between former 
citizenship, sentiments of belonging, and attachment to place and 
national reconstitution through resettlement or repatriation. 
Spaces of abandonment are quite different – they are places where 
people will find minimal recognition and protection and are, by 
and large, left to their own devices. Like refugee camps, they are 
characterized by a high level of dependency on outside sources, 
in this case the international donor community which provides 
what Agier calls an international “’transfusion’” to keep alive the 
population (2008, 47). Donor aid has facilitated Israel’s abandonment 
of its responsibilities under international law to a population under 
occupation and participates in the bio-segregation of human life that 
excludes some behind walls and fences and privileges the other whose 
voluntary segregation has few effects on the pace of daily life. While the 
humanitarian impulse is a necessity in an era of warfare that produces 
unprecedented levels of civilian displacement and casualties, it also 
now a part of the apparatus of war, picking up the human debris and 
enabling the war machine to proceed. In the case of refugees, or those 
excluded from the state, humanitarian activities tend to the excluded, 
keeping them spatially contained in camps or safe havens which 
enables exclusivist entities to keep dis-order and the excluded outside 
the bounds of sight and interaction. Agier aptly describes refugee 
camps as “on the margins of the world” (62). Palestinians under the 
regime of closure are neither largely bio-life nor political life, but an 
ambiguous category in between. 
The potential expansiveness of the concept of abandonment 
68
crystallized when I recalled the summer of 1982 and Israel’s invasion 
of Lebanon when the refugee camps became what their residents 
described as “mustabah” (Peteet 1991). Most refugee camps are under 
UN/and or host state protection, however minimal, except Palestinian 
camps. In Lebanon, the PLO filled this void for well over a decade, 
providing services and protection. With their evacuation in the wake 
of the invasion, the camps were left exposed and highly vulnerable, 
and indeed an Israeli-sponsored massacre ensued. The term mustabah 
meant an absence of protection, vulnerability, and exposure to extreme 
violence with no recourse or accountability. Palestinians understood 
that it was not only the international community and host countries 
that had abandoned them but also their own leadership. That is why 
women could exclaim that the resistance “took their milk and blood” 
and left them vulnerable to being killed at will (Peteet 1995). West Bank 
villagers have referred to abandonment by the Palestinian leadership. 
And, indeed, the construction of the wall was minimally addressed by 
the PA. At village protests, local and de-centralized affairs by villagers 
whose lands and livelihoods were and are being threatened by the wall 
and settlements, the urban-based PA leadership have rarely made an 
appearance. By and large, villagers have been left to their own devices 
in confronting the wall and encroachments on their lands.
What are the warning signs of impending abandonment? What policies, 
actions, and ideologies of the other are precursors of abandonment? 
Is there a discernible set of socio-economic, political and ideological 
conditions that foster possible abandonment? Creeping closure, 
physical separation and its mechanism, walls and checkpoints, denial 
of employment and eventually a siege, along with a racialized and 
demonized conceptualization of the other, are the warning signs in 
Palestine. The increasing bureaucratic nature of the checkpoints, 
their gradual transformation into border-like terminals with the latest 
technology in biometrics, where physical distance between military-
functionaries and Palestinians grows, suggests extreme forms of 
separation. Soldiers can avoid physical contact with Palestinians by 
speaking to them through plexiglass and taking or handing back 
identity cards through trays. This de-humanizing behavior is an early 
warning sign of abandonment and non-recognition of a fully human 
being. Paradoxically, as Israel attempts non-recognition of a Palestinian 
presence, it simultaneously engages in hyper-vigilant surveillance 
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and control over their movements. Where do signs of abandonment 
and a discourse of dehumanization ultimately lead? Narrative, claims 
de Certeau, precedes “social practices in order to open a field for 
them” (1984, 125, quoted in Caldeira 2000, 19 Caldeira says “talk of 
crime is not only expressive but productive” (2000, 19). What sort of 
narrative and discourse accompanies and legitimizes abandonment? 
The rhetoric of Israeli security, Palestinian threat, and security offer 
both a justification for Palestinian confinement and abandonment and 
simultaneously blames them for their own incarceration.
In these zones of marginality and abandonment, questions abound 
about human rights. Victims must conform to certain parameters 
of suffering established and validated by the international human 
rights community. Having consistently responded to subordination 
and dispossession with militancy, Palestinians do not conform to the 
parameters of “good” victims. That kind of agency cannot easily be 
squared with victimhood as it has been constituted in the West. In 
these marginal zones, outside the purview of law, the subject of human 
rights, the universal body, itself a problematic concept, fades from sight. 
No one is accountable for the violations of their human rights. Indeed, 
according to the dominant Israeli narrative, Palestinians are punished 
because of their own actions and thus cannot be victims of human 
rights abuses. Zionist colonialism lacks the notion of a civilizing mission 
that, however nefarious, assumes some sort of common humanity to 
which the native can, with the proper guidance and subsequent cultural 
elevation, aspire and join. Without a civilizing imperative and in the 
absence of a need for native labor, the Palestinian, with his militant 
response, falls outside the bounds of humanity. 
The category of “humanity” poses the problem of other universal 
categories: who is excluded and how? Indeed, Israel’s actions suggest 
a pre-modern conception of humanity’s lines of inclusion and 
exclusion. Just as natives, slaves, and women were often excluded 
from an Enlightenment conception of humanity that marked rights and 
protection, Palestinians, relegated to pathological category analogous 
to the “savages” of earlier colonialisms, are thus excluded from the 
ostensibly universal category of humanity. Palestinians under Israeli 
rule find themselves on the margins of humanity and thus continue to 
be vulnerable targets. 
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Biehl writes:
The concept I worked with most hesitantly was that of the ex-
human. I use this term neither to posit an abstract condition 
nor to upset and generate a response coded in our now 
familiar language of human rights. One of the main problems 
in human rights discourse is the a priori assertion of an 
irreducible common humanity that should provide the basis 
of our interactions and our social organizations. In the face 
of that assertion, the term “ex-human” helped me to make 
relative the claims of a generic humanness and to think about 
the contingency and pervasiveness of the forms of human life 
I found in Vita. (Biehl 2007, 317)
His ethnography makes clear that there are “places in the present… 
where …rights no longer exist, where the living subjects of marginal 
institutions are constituted as something other, between life and 
death” (Biehl 2005, 317). Palestinian abandonment clearly differs from 
abandonment of the poor and the ill, or of the destitute in ghettoes 
and shanty towns. In the Palestinian enclaves, there are rich and poor, 
the well and unwell. What people in these zones have in common is 
that they are Palestinians and they inhabit spaces and own resources 
coveted by an occupying and expansionist entity. Most significantly, 
the prefix “ex-” points to the temporal and contingent dimension of 
the human. 
The suppression of voice is integral to, and constitutive of, 
abandonment. Along with silencing, there are concerted attempts to 
prevent witnessing. Journalists’ mobility is obstructed, press reports 
are censored, and when voice or images do slip out, they are roundly 
decried as exaggerations or justified by the all-encompassing and 
justifying “security concerns.” In elaborating on Vita, Biehl writes that 
“one is faced with a human condition in which voice can no longer 
become action. No objective conditions exist for that to happen. The 
human being is left all by herself, knowing that no one will respond, 
that nothing will crack open the future” (2005, 11). Yet Palestinians 
have managed to retain a voice, however marginalized. What does ring 
true with Biehl’s description is that little will “crack open the future.” 
Legal cases air grievances and may rule on their behalf, the academy is 
full of articles and papers on Palestine, supporters come from around 
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the world to express solidarity, US presidents call for a Palestinian state 
and yet do not condemn, let alone impose sanctions as a result of, 
military assaults, blockades, and the expropriation of Palestinian land 
for colonies and their confinement in shrinking enclaved spaces.
Spaces of abandonment are indicative of socio-political systems 
where forms of human life are ranked and assigned rights and 
spaces according to location on a scale of inclusion, exclusion, and 
belonging, based on ethnicity, religion, and nationality. Some lives 
are highly authorized with a full complement of rights deriving from 
citizenship and ethnic or national identity, while others are excised to 
the margins of statelessness and now incarceration, producing a social 
order composed of the disenfranchised and the super-franchised. 
The abandoned may be located on the margins, but through their 
every excision to the margins, they remain a constitutive element of 
the center. Exclusions are built-in components of the core state. This 
argument works when we configure Gaza as on the margins of Israel, 
but what about its position on the margins of Palestine?
Is the immobilized and confined Gazan, bearer of no citizenship, akin 
to Agamben’s homo sacer who can be killed at will and with impunity 
or with Biehl’s abandoned people? How do these articulate with the 
margins? Gazans are outside the Israeli polity and on the geographical 
margins of a state that has assumed control over the population, with 
the power of life and death. Agamben argued (1998, 6) that analyses 
of power cannot separate bare life (zoe) from bio, or the political life. 
“It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the 
original activity of sovereign power”[Italics in the original]. Yet what 
are we to make of a state that has not officially extended sovereignty 
over a territory, but in every other way acts as a sovereign with almost 
total control over the bio-political life of the subject Palestinian? 
Palestinians are homo sacer – human beings who can be killed at will, 
with impunity; homo sacer is included in the political order by virtue 
of his exclusion. The Palestinian is part of the political order, but only 
through his exclusion and, as Agamben argues, the political system 
rests on this exclusion. “Bare life remains included in politics in the form 
of the exception, that is, something that is included solely through an 
exclusion (1998, 11). “He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply 
set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned 
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by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life 
and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable” (28). Is Gaza, 
as a margin, a holding pen for homo sacer who has been abandoned, 
yet is still included in the politico-judicial system precisely by its very 
exclusion?
Conclusion 
Closure, siege and enclavization mark the continuing fragmentation of 
Palestine and challenge the formulation of either center or margins. 
When Israel withdrew its military presence and colonists from Gaza, 
it continued the occupation and renounced any sort of obligation 
incumbent upon an occupying power. Israel is crafting spaces that 
are neither here nor there: they are not completely incorporated yet 
neither are they completely destroyed or marginalized. Gaza continues 
to be a site for a show of deterrence and also a readily available 
laboratory for the testing of new military technologies and strategies. 
In short, Gaza might be a harbinger of things to come elsewhere in the 
region.
The world briefly turned its attention to the Gaza siege when the Mavi 
Marmara, traveling with foreigners, was attacked in international 
waters and nine Turkish citizens were murdered.9 Interestingly, the 
unprovoked assault on the margins might begin to widen the extremely 
thin crack in the US support for Israel (See also Beinart 2010). 
Israel has crafted a regime of (im)mobility organized around the lack 
of circulation of selected people and the hyper-circulation of others. In 
this it is not alone, and I would argue for a comparative perspective on 
the Gaza siege, enclavization and abandonment, and for a re-thinking of 
the margins/center formulation. There is a global strategy of fortressing 
space to demarcate and protect privilege and the unequal distribution 
of rights. In Mexico, the wall is an attempt to regulate labor and drug 
trade and pacify US anti-immigration forces, often racially motivated. 
9 The Israeli assault on the flotilla ship Mavi Marmara conveyed a message about international 
support for Palestinian rights and the provisioning of humanitarian aid: those who engage 
in it are at risk of death or serious injury. In a sort of update to the murder of US activist 
Rachel Corrie, the attack at the beginning of the summer was undoubtedly also aimed 
intentionally at activists who travel to Palestine to show support for Palestinian rights and 
witness the violations of human rights law.
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In Palestine, fences and walls accomplish the crucial task of preventing 
Palestinian circulation and enforce separation as punishment and 
to maintain homogenous, exclusivist space. In the process, they are 
engendering a body of surplus and abandoned people. The enclaves 
may be lines of an imagined and actual border between Israel and 
Palestine, laying out their future social and political relationship.
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Maha Samman Mansour:
Israeli Colonial Contraction: The cases of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip
The case of the Sinai Peninsula
As a result of the Israeli-instigated 1967 war, the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights came under Israeli 
control. The Israeli government began building settlements in these 
newly conquered areas to create new realities on ground. The Sinai 
Desert had its share of Israeli settlement construction, based on the 
‘Galili document’, named after Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili, 
and adopted as part of Labour’s programme in 1973. The document, 
which “affirmed the annexation of north-eastern Sinai,” paved the way 
for the construction of several dozen settlements after Ariel Sharon, 
then head of the Southern Command of the Israeli army, expelled the 
region’s Bedouin inhabitants.1 They were expelled because the spaces 
they inhabited were seen to be the most strategic locations. Israel also 
invested in a network of roads and fortifications linking the Sinai with 
other parts of Israel. It aimed to attract settlers to a calm place with 
access to cheap labor, seeking to transform the Sinai desert into an 
Israeli populated area and to create a new border with Egypt. As the 
area offered various kinds of potential, the motive behind building 
settlements was not only ideological but also strategic and economic. 
Two major goals were important to Israel: the control of the Tiran 
Straits and the provision of a belt that would cut off the Gaza Strip 
from Egypt.2 The economic goal was exploitation of the geographical 
strengths of the area. The territory was rich in resources, with oil fields 
in the western coastal area, and good land for agriculture. It also had 
a potential for attracting tourism, and a strategic geographical location 
facing the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. New streets, 
buildings, and other economic, social, cultural, and touristic amenities 
were constructed, creating infrastructure well suited for implementing 
all the plans proposed for the area under Israeli sovereignty. 
1 Adam Keller, Terrible Days: Social Divisions and Political Paradoxes in Israel (Holland: 
'Uitgeverij Cypres', 1987), 118.
2 Shmuel Sandler, The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational 
Dimension of Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 188.
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Although the area was annexed by a Knesset decision in 1973, 
construction of Israeli settlements had already begun in 1968. The 18 
settlements which were built, mostly on Bedouin lands, were Yamit, 
Talmei Yosef, Pri’el, Merkaz Avshalom, Netiv Ha’asara, Ogda, Sufa 
(Succot), Holit, Sadot, Nir Avraham, Dikla, Haruvit, Sinai, Yam, Kadesch 
Barnea, Neviot, Di-Zahav, and Ophira3 (Fig. 1). Construction of the 
largest settlement, Yamit, started in May 1974; it was often described 
as a town, and 13 of the other settlements were located around it in 
the northeastern part of Sinai and south of Rafah town. Most of them 
were cooperative settlements, particularly moshavim. Most of the 
settlers there worked in agriculture, while others worked in fishing, in 
small services, and in tourism and beach resorts, in addition to military 
activities (Fig. 2).4 
The extent of thinking and planning that preceded the approval of the 
building of the Yamit settlement complex was vast. A few individuals 
were key actors in the effort to populate the Sinai area with settlers. 
Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili from the Labour party were the architects 
of building Yamit. Dayan was the Defence Minister in the government 
of Golda Meir between the years of 1969 and 1974. Galili was Minister 
without Portfolio in both the Meir and Rabin governments. They 
viewed building settlements in Sinai as establishing an important line of 
defence that would strategically separate Gaza from Sinai. The building 
of Yamit developed after they took initiatives on several levels. To get 
approval from the government to build, Dayan requested a study in 
1971 for developing a city in northeastern Sinai. He worked to convince 
the government that it was important to populate the area with Israeli 
settlers. The Galili document actually emerged from a cabinet meeting 
in which Dayan suggested the building of Yamit. The document, which 
basically aimed for the annexation of northeastern Sinai, was approved 
on September 4, 1973 and adopted as part of Labour’s programme.5 
Another method to pressure the government into approving the 
3  Compiled from Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Volume II: From the Aftermath of 
the Yom Kippur War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 56, and Ann Lesch, “Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories: 1967-1977,” Journal of Palestine Studies 7 (1977): 
26-47, 31-32.
4  Fig. 2 is a table listing all Sinai settlements with basic information on each of them, 19.
5 Liane Sue Rosenblatt, Building Yamit: Relationships between Officials and Settler 
Representatives in Israel (PhD diss., University of Rochester, 1984), 45.
79
construction was to find a settler group that would want to settle in 
Yamit. Dayan thought that finding a settler group would pressure the 
government, and improve the chances of getting Yamit approved. 
First, a Russian immigrant tried to gather some Russians and convince 
them of the idea.6 Then Americans Dina and Frank Wrightman7 worked 
on gathering Americans, and convincing them about the future of a 
settlement named Yamit. To implement his settlement policy Galili 
worked together with the representatives of Yamit on building projects 
in it, seeking, for example, to get them to agree with the Minister of 
Tourism on building tourism services there.8 Thus, enormous efforts 
preceded approval of the building of Yamit and the other settlements 
even before they were inhabited. These settlements represented a 
security buffer first and foremost; the motivations or needs of potential 
settlers were not the primary factor for building settlements in Sinai. 
Likewise, as we shall see, the decision to evacuate the settlement was 
based on state aspirations, overriding settlers’ opinions and desires.
Colonial contraction from Sinai
At first after the 1967 war, Israel regarded the possibility of peace 
with Egypt as distant. Normalization of relations with Egypt and the 
exchange of diplomatic missions seemed inconceivable at the time. 
While there were discussions on a unilateral withdrawal from Sinai 
and the Golan Heights, “the overwhelming majority of the Jewish 
public, and accordingly of its Knesset electees, ha[d] been determined 
since 1967 not to relinquish any territory except if forced to do so.”9 
Israeli colonial contraction from Sinai took place only after the peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978 was signed. It came after 
Israel‘s power weakened as it became more dependent on the U.S. 
superpower. On this front, diplomacy replaced war after the 1973 war. 
There was international pressure on both Israel and Egypt through 
the UN and the U.S.10 As part of the peace treaty between Egypt and 
6  Ibid., 54.
7  Ibid., 55.
8  Ibid. For details on building a motel, 270-272.
9  Israel Shahak, “Israel will withdraw only under Pressure,” Washington Report on Middle 
East Affairs (July 1991): 20.
10  Sadat viewed it as in Egypt's interest, on the other hand, to shift Egypt's strategic alliance 
from the Soviet Union to the United States, as the Soviet Union had decreased its supply of 
weapons. Sadat's major concern was to normalize the relations with the powerful U.S. as a 
new link with the superpowers. 
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Israel, several restrictions were imposed on Egyptian sovereignty over 
the evacuated territory. These restrictions included details about the 
stationing of Egyptian forces in the whole area according to subdivided 
zones. United Nations forces were also to be stationed in some of these 
divided zones, and the use of airfields was limited to civilian purposes 
for all nations.11 On the Israeli side, the process began with complete 
uncertainty12 among actors within the state. Decisions were therefore 
made as an outcome of the dynamics of interaction on different levels 
between mainly the Israeli government, influential individuals, and the 
Israeli settlers who had inhabited the area. 
The Israeli government wanted to neutralize the southern border and 
to develop diplomatic relations with Egypt. The party in power was 
the right-wing nationalistic Likud Party headed by Menachem Begin. 
As part of its strategic planning, it adopted a bilateral approach to 
agreements, in contrast with the multilateral agreements in the Arab 
region, aiming for relations which could guarantee Israel’s existence 
in the region. With the peace agreement with Egypt, the largest Arab 
country bordering Israel, the Israeli government pressured Egypt to 
persuade other countries in the Arab world to normalize relations with 
it. It sliced potential relations with the Arab world into separate bilateral 
ones so that the various territories it had occupied would become 
separately negotiable. The other goal was to exclude from the bilateral 
negotiations any discussion on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If 
peace was not reached with Egypt, Israel would face a continuous 
threat from all the surrounding Arab states. The government saw peace 
as a necessary condition for its external survival (with the Arab world) 
and internal survival (continued occupation of the West Bank). This 
is also illustrated in Israel’s insistence on discussing security. During 
the negotiation process with Egypt, Israel based its discussion on the 
protection of its security, constantly raising this as the most important 
theme. The demilitarization of the larger part of Sinai, the persistence 
of settlements, the retention of two airports in Sinai, the installation 
of Israeli warning stations, and the limitations on the Egyptian forces, 
11 Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle-East War and World Politics (Abacus, London: 
Wildwood House, 1974), 614-615.
12 The issue of uncertainty is discussed in Baruch Kimmerling, “Exchanging Territories for 
Peace: A Macrosociological Approach,” Journal of Applied and Behavioural Science 23 (1): 
13-33 (NTL Institute).
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were all part of its security. It was therefore “a policy, a strategy, a 
means, and an end.”13 
The key individuals associated with demolishing Yamit were Menachem 
Begin and Ariel Sharon from the Likud party, who played a leading 
role in the evacuation and demolition. They were military men, and 
often known to change their positions according to the political 
context. Before starting with the peace negotiations Begin met the 
representatives of the Sinai settlements and promised that if “signing 
a peace agreement depended upon returning the settlements, he 
would pack up his bags and return home.”14 But he went back on his 
word, deciding in the end to approve the return of the settlements. As 
a tactic he was ready to give up the Sinai area, in exchange for closing 
the discussion on the West Bank, which in his view was the important 
territory. Sharon was appointed as Defence Minister by Prime Minister 
Begin to implement the mission of evicting the settlers from Yamit. 
It was strange that Sharon accepted this mission, because he was 
the one who evacuated the Bedouins from the Sinai and had been 
committed to the development of the settlements there. “On April 
25, 1982, Sharon proceeded to raze Yamit to the ground, as ruthlessly 
as he had destroyed the Bedouin dwellings which stood in the same 
place ten years before.”15 His strategy towards the settlers could be 
summarized by “wearing them down and then suddenly collapsing 
them in a surprise attack.”16 At the time it was evacuated, the settlers 
had used it for nearly seven years. It was the last to be demolished 
among the surrounding settlements. The settler population then was 
around 6,000: around 500 settler families in Yamit and another 600 
families in the dozen or so farm villages that surrounded it.17 The 
context and the evacuation itself were considered unprecedented by 
the Israeli public, causing much tension during the process. The settlers 
protested against the decision to evacuate them, but eventually gave 
in and accepted compensation.
13 Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War (Egypt: The American University in 
Cairo Press, 1989), 379.
14  Rosenblatt, Building Yamit, 13, cited in H. Wall, Jerusalem Post, October 17, 1987.
15  Keller, Terrible Days, 143. 
16  “Sharon’s Outpost Strategy.” www.freeman.org/m_online/jul03/sones.htm, 6.
17  “Sinai – Slow march from Yamit,” Economist, January 9, 1982.
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Sharon’s acceptance of this task implies that the benefit from this 
action was huge. Begin and Sharon mutually benefited from their 
collaboration on the evacuation. For Begin, Sharon was the ideal person 
to implement the eviction as he was familiar with the settlements and 
settlers, and had the necessary skill. Sharon had puzzled the settlers; 
on the one hand, they trusted him and could not think he could ever 
betray them by supporting the evacuation; on the other, he urged 
them to try to benefit as much as possible from compensation. For 
Sharon it was rewarding to occupy the post of Defence Minister and 
to work closely with Prime Minister Begin. Sharon, in fact, seems 
to have positioned himself well enough with Begin to influence the 
objectives of the 1982 war in Lebanon which began a few weeks after 
the demolition.
The settlers were the third main actor in the process of evacuation. 
There were large protests by the settlers, and the issue dominated the 
attention of the Israeli public. “The Sinai settlements, after all, were 
evacuated and ploughed under ... even though the process brought 
Israel, according to several scholars, almost to the brink of civil war.”18 
For the settlers, who were composed of the Russian group, the American 
group, and others from older Israeli settlements, the dismantling of 
Yamit was considered a disaster, as it could become a precedent that 
could be repeated in the West Bank. All their attempts to prevent 
the dismantling of Yamit failed. In the end they adopted a strategy to 
gain the maximum compensation possible by increasing their actions 
against the evacuation.19 In their struggle against the government’s 
decision, the settlers were represented by four groups;20 each had a 
different strategy and attitude in dealing with the media and the Israeli 
government. The first were the farmers, who were the first to protest 
against the withdrawal, but gradually changed their strategy to opt for 
the maximum compensation possible and a good resettlement deal. 
The second group, organized out of frustration with the government 
18  Ian Black, “Middle East Extra: The children of the Six Day War,” The Guardian, June 4, 1987.
19 Gadi Wolfsfeld, “Collective Political Action and Media Strategy: The Case of Yamit,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984): 363-381, 363. See also Anthony Oberschall, The 
Establishment of Empirical Sociology (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), and Charles Tilly, 
From Mobilization to Revolution (UK: Longman Higher Education, 1978), 99.
20 The classification of the settlers is compiled from Wolfsfeld, “Collective Political Action,” 
368-369, and “Sinai- Slow March from Yamit.”
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decision, considered it part of a business, and aimed specifically for 
the maximum compensation. The third group, consisting of three of 
the villages, was a quiet group that gave up peacefully and agreed to 
relocate in a new region within Israel. The fourth group was a coalition 
between religious and secular Israelis who rejected the whole idea of 
the evacuation. This ideologically motivated group was composed of 
members from outside the Yamit area, and was the largest group of the 
four. It was the group which protested the most and used violent tactics 
so that the media would depict a ‘tragic trauma’ that the government 
would be reluctant to repeat. But in the end, like the other groups, they 
accepted the decision. The Israeli government was able to go ahead 
with its decision to evacuate despite settler discontent. While there 
had been disagreement in the cabinet between the Israeli Ministers, 
“the agriculture minister, Mr. Simha Erlich, worked out an agreement 
to hand over compensation to the settlers worth more than $270m.”21 
Purpose of demolition 
During the period of negotiations between the Egyptians and the 
Israelis, selling the settlements to the Egyptians was one item put 
on the table in which suggestions of prices were discussed.22 Israel’s 
final decision was to demolish the settlements and to deliver this as 
a fait accompli to Egypt. The reasons behind the demolition of the 
Yamit settlement complex could be grouped into three: strategic state 
security considerations, psychological considerations of the settlers, 
and the desire to gain international sympathy for the pains of peace. 
Overall, it seems that the first aspect of state policy was the decisive 
one. The Israeli government, and specifically Sharon, feared that the 
Egyptians would move to settle in areas near the borders. Israelis were 
confident they had made peace with the Egyptian government, but 
not that they had done so with ordinary Egyptians, whose presence 
in the Sinai area was therefore considered a threat. There was a fear 
that settlers could secretly go back to the settlements if they were 
not demolished so they wanted to get them eventually to accept the 
21  “Sinai - Slow march from Yamit.”
22 Israel asked for $125 million for the installations; Egypt agreed to pay only $57 million. 
However, it was expected that Egypt would finally compromise on $80-90 million. Yaacov 
Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982: In search of Legitimacy for Peace 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 320, originally cited from 
Maariv, April 30, 1982.
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move.23 A scorched earth approach was also adopted24, that is, not 
toleave anything for the Egyptians. Another motive for this approach 
was to prevent settlers from seeing the “painful” scene of Egyptians 
residing in their previous homes. Israel also sought to portray itself as 
making a traumatic sacrifice to achieve peace.25
The Egyptian side, represented by Sadat, aimed at shifting its strategic 
alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States, as the Soviet 
Union decreased its supply of weapons. Sadat’s major concern was 
to normalize relations with the U.S. superpower. By signing the peace 
treaty with Israel, Egypt had achieved a restricted sovereignty. It could 
not achieve the power to fully control the territory of Sinai. Strategically, 
restrictions imposed by the peace treaty limited Egyptian plans for the 
Sinai. Military activity was restricted and thus the Egyptian military 
could not fully control the area, as Egypt bound by the Camp David 
agreement to keep its forces within a range of 50 kilometers east of the 
Gulf of Suez. This in turn affected, and still affects, Egyptian sovereignty 
over the area. However, the territorial spaces could be used for other 
purposes; the Sharm el-Sheikh area, for example, became an important 
and thriving tourist site. Each evacuated territory had a different post-
evacuation function, but these functions were mostly of a public, not a 
private, character. “Neviot, a small cooperative agricultural settlement 
of the Moshav type, has become home to Egyptian police personnel 
and their families. The evacuated Moshav settlement and desert 
retreat of Di Zahav provided the infrastructure for the expansion of the 
tourist Bedouin village of Dahab.”26
The situation in Egypt following the Israeli-colonial contraction can be 
understood as neo-colonial in character because the area is subject 
to regulation by a peace treaty rather than fully under Egyptian 
sovereignty. Years after the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, 
its neo-colonial content clearly appears in the position of Egypt 
on the borders with Gaza after the developments in Gaza after the 
Disengagement Plan. Egypt’s lack of ability to control the borders, and 
23  Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 2003), 22-23.
24  “Israel sees a loophole in Taba beach arbitration.” The Times, September 30, 1988.
25  There had been enormous coverage of the evacuation of Yamit and its destruction by the 
Israeli television.
26  Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, (London and New York: 
Verso, 2007), 233.
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the interference from Israel and the U.S. are obvious. The closure of 
the Rafah Gate by the Egyptian government and the destruction of the 
Rafah/Egypt and Rafah/Gaza tunnels, and recently the construction of 
the underground wall to destroy any access to the tunnels, all show the 
pressure on Egypt to implement Israeli and American objectives. This 
all shows the inability of Egypt to fully control its borders and territory.
The process of peacemaking and settlement evacuation in the Sinai 
Peninsula had a direct impact on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Gradually, both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were excluded from 
the discussion. It turned out that the ‘precedent’ of Yamit had a 
negative impact on both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is 
clear in the settlement construction that followed. On September 5, 
1982, a ministerial committee approved the establishment of five new 
settlements in the West Bank and one settlement in the Gaza Strip 
for the Yamit evacuees. The cabinet further decided to continue a 
vigorous program of Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories – 
the first move in what became a clear pattern of action following every 
new peace initiative.27
The Gush Emunim settler group took advantage of the story of Yamit to 
implement their plan to set up new settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. They felt that the Israeli government’s emphasis on peace 
over settlements threatened their settlement programs in the West 
Bank. Their idea was to implement a broad scheme of annexation of 
territories and settlement building as a way of incorporating these lands 
into Israel. They aimed to construct settlements in strategic locations 
which would form an important and natural continuity with Israel. 
These construction activities were also accompanied by educating 
settlers about the ideological importance of what they call Judea and 
Samaria to the idea of historic Israel. The trauma image the media had 
created during the eviction of the settlers and the demolition of the 
settlements carried a clear message that this should not happen again. 
“Having seen that the IDF eviction of 17 Yamit yishuvim ‘traumatized 
the nation,’ steps had to be taken to create additional capabilities for 
possible future major evictions without having the IDF brutalize Israelis 
on television.”28 
27 Ziva Flamhaft, Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable (Oxford, UK: 
Westview Press, 1996), 38.
28 “Sharon’s Outpost Strategy,” 3.
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The Israeli government’s rational political decision to give up the Sinai 
is quite distinct from what happened in the other territories occupied 
in 1967: a drive for settlement construction after the Camp David 
Accords, powered by the settlers’ ideological motives. The Sinai was 
a territory which could be given up, and was eventually given up, 
to achieve a peace deal; in contrast, the other territories occupied 
in 1967 were gradually seen as being incorporated into the Israeli 
‘motherland’ as part of the Israeli state-building project. The prospect 
of evicting settlers from the West Bank and Gaza was and is seen to 
be more complicated because the settlers are more aware and more 
politically organized, and could be mobilized against eviction proposals 
or against eviction itself. Also, in some areas, a generation of settlers 
has been born and raised in these settlements. The Gush Emunim 
settler movement founded many of the settlements in the West Bank, 
claiming it as part of historic Israel. In contrast, the Yamit settlers were 
driven by the search for a better quality of life as much as by ideological 
motives. 
In assessing the benefits and losses of a peace treaty that included 
territorial evacuation, the Israelis made a decision based on the long-
term interests, aims, and benefits of the Israeli government and state as 
a whole. General Dan Shomron (then the outgoing Israeli chief of staff) 
explained this: “Certainly, territory is important in wartime, he said. 
But if there is peace, territory is less important, and demilitarisation, 
arms control and advance warning systems are higher on the list.”29
The Israeli government and the group of individuals who gave up the 
settlements and demolished them were from the Israeli right wing, 
showing that political concerns had superseded ideological ones. The 
evacuation demonstrated that Israel would do anything, even oppose 
its people – even Israeli settlers – if the plans of those settlers posed 
a security threat to the state. Yamit was expendable when a profound 
strategic advantage was to be gained by abandoning it, one that made 
it possible to achieve other strategic objectives. 
One can conclude that, at one time, the survival and security of a state 
of Israel in the region – on any size territory – was more important than 
control over a specific piece of territory, even if that piece was larger 
29  John Bulloch, “US ‘Land for Peace’ deal splits Israel,” The Independent, March 24, 1991.
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than the total area of 1948 Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the 
Golan Heights combined. But later on, was Israel still able voluntarily 
to evacuate territory in order to achieve other goals? After Yamit, 
prospects of any other settlement evacuation had seemed for a long 
time to be diminishing; and yet in Gaza in 2005, clearly the answer was 
yes.
The case of the Gaza Strip
The case of colonial contraction from the Gaza Strip affects the 
core of the Israeli presence on the Palestinian land. The evacuation 
and demolition of the Israeli settlements in Gaza was a result of the 
implementation of Sharon’s unilateral Disengagement Plan. The 
Israeli government realized the importance of evacuating Gaza and 
demolishing the settlements, with the involvement and backing of the 
Israeli High Court. The fact that this was a unilateral move, without a 
peace process from which anything appeared likely to be gained, sets 
a precedent regarding the future of the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank. This is because it reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Israeli colonial state. For more than thirty years after 1967, all Israeli 
governments, supported by Zionist organizations worldwide, worked 
extensively to build and develop settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. 
However, in 2004-2005 the right-wing government changed this policy 
in Gaza, and proceeded to evacuate and demolish the settlements. 
This created, went against the grain of the Zionist ideological motive 
within Israeli society and made many question the path taken. 
The Gaza Strip has an area of 365 km², 45 km long and 5-12 km in 
width. It is divided into five main districts: Jabalya, Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, 
Khan Younis, and Rafah. The building of settlements in the Gaza Strip 
started in 1970 and continued till 2001. By 2004, there were 21 Israeli 
settlements with a population of 8,692 settlers. The biggest settlement 
was Neve Dekalim, built in 1983 and located with most of the other 
settlements in the area of Khan Younis. The second biggest settlement, 
Nisanit, was established a year later in 1984, and was located in the 
northern Gaza Strip in the district of Jabalya. Table 1 lists settlements 
in the Gaza Strip as of the end of 2004.
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Table 1: Gaza Settlements Population
Settlement Year 
Established
Population 
(end of 
2004)
Settlement Year 
Established
Population 
(end of 
2004)
1
Kfar 
Darom
1970 491 12 Nisanit 1984 1,064
2 Netzarim 1972 496 13
Rafiah 
Yam
1984 143
3 Morag 1972 221 14 Katif 1985 404
4
Netzar 
Hazani
1973 461 15 Bedolah 1986 219
5 Ganei Tal 1979 400 16 Pe’at 
Sade
1989 104
6 Atzmona 1979/82 646 17 Dugit 1990 79
7 Gadid 1982 351 18 Tel Katifa 1992 60
8 Gan Or 1983 351 19 Shirat 
Hayam
2000 40
9 Kfar Yam 1983 10 20 Slav 2001 50
10
Neve 
Dekalim
1983 2,671 21
Kerem 
Atzmona
2001 24
11 Elei Sinai 1983 407 Total 8,692
Source: Peace Now, www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peaceasp?pi= 62& 
docid=1369, mostly compiled from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
for December 31, 2004. See The Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel) 
website, www1.cbs.gov.il.
The Israeli settlements built in Gaza were a clear example of the 
Israeli colonial spirit. There was a clear dissimilarity between the 
Palestinian community of Gaza and the Israeli settlers residing there. 
The relationship between Palestinians and settlers, and between 
89
Palestinian built-up areas and Israeli settlements, was characterized by 
domination and separation. There was clear political, social, economic, 
and territorial control by Israeli settlers. Before evacuation, the settlers 
formed less than 1% of the population of Gaza with a population 
density of 665 settlers per km², yet occupied one third of the land in the 
Strip, and enjoyed the best of conditions and the best quality facilities. 
These included wide security strips of land for roads for settler use. 
The confiscated lands and checkpoints, which narrowed and reduced 
land available to Palestinians, fragmented the Gaza Strip and isolated 
main Palestinian population centres from each other. In contrast, the 
Palestinians were about 1.5 million, with more than 99% living in the 
worst of conditions, with the highest population density in the world;30 
and more than two thirds were refugees. The following is a list of the 
UNRWA registered refugees in camps in Gaza:
Table 2: Distribution of UNRWA registered refugees in Gaza.
Refugee Camp Population
Jabalia (1948/1949) 192,258
Rimal 170,118
Zeitun 135,281
Nuseirat 123,838
Deir El-Balah 88,048
Khan Younis 179,199
Rafah 170,842
Total 1,059,584
SOURCE: UNRWA, “Total registered refugees per country and Area,” 
accessed 30 June, 2008, www.unrwa.org/userfiles/rr_countryandarea.
pdf.
Thus more than one million of the 1.5 million people are refugees. 
Since 1967, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been under Israeli 
military rule, with an Israeli military commander empowered to make 
and renew military rules. The continual issuance of new military laws 
30  UNRWA Gaza, http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=64.
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gave rise to 1,000 military orders which damaged the economic and 
social structure of the daily life of the Palestinian people of Gaza.31 The 
more than 70% of the population of Gaza under 25 years old were born 
into a region already under colonial domination, and they have seen 
the suffering their families and society have faced. This has affected 
them psychologically, so that Gaza has become a “society devoid of 
childhood”.32 With Palestinians’ concentration on trying to overcome 
the consequences of their damaged everyday life, little possibility 
remained to strengthen Palestinian planning to improve economic and 
social conditions. 
Furthermore, successive political events led to further deterioration in 
Palestinian daily life in Gaza. During the first Intifada in 1987, despite 
the social cohesiveness of the society which strengthened Palestinian 
unity and visions of the future, the economic situation started to 
deteriorate as trade with Israel fell and Gazan workers became 
increasingly unable to work inside Israel.33 After the Oslo Accords, 
Israel held in its hands complete control of all Gaza entry-gates to the 
outside world. This made Gaza a big prison with little movement by 
Israeli exit permits. Colonial control of the Gaza Strip became tighter, 
and its spaces became more enclosed and divided by fences and 
military paths. In the Taba negotiations of 1993, the Israeli proposal for 
the Gaza Strip was to have the settlements grouped into three blocks 
under full Israeli control. This included all lands and bypass roads 
between the settlements, altogether forming one third of the Gaza 
Strip.34 Israel implemented this as facts on the ground, and officially 
legalised it with the signing of the Oslo II agreement. By the time of the 
Camp David negotiations in 2000, the Israeli settlements in the Gaza 
31 Sara Roy, “Black Milk: The Desperate Lives of Women in the Gaza Strip.” In Failing Peace: 
Gaza and the Palestine-Israeli Conflict (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 54-60, 55-56. Originally 
published in The Women's Review of Books (Special Summer Issue on "Writing Out of 
Crises") (July 1993): 13-15.
32 Sara Roy, “Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration,” in Failing Peace, 61-75, 71. 
Originally published in the Journal of Palestine Studies 22 (4) (Summer 1993): 20-31.
33 Sara Roy, “The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities 
in the Gaza Strip,” in Failing Peace, 40-53, 43-46. Originally published in the Journal of 
Palestine Studies 20 (3) (Spring 1991): 58-69.
34 Tanya Reinhart, The Road Map To Nowhere: Israel/Palestine since 2003 (UK: Verso, 2006), 
50. See also Sarah Roy, “Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy” in Failing Peace, 233-249, 238-
239. Originally published in Current History (January 2002): 8-16. 
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Strip had expanded, and settler and military existence and control 
had increased. No agreement was reached at Camp David to halt this 
trend. Surveillance, segregation, and boundary construction between 
Palestinian areas increased the cantonization of Palestinian spaces and 
thus intensified the deterioration of the Palestinian ability to live in 
appropriate conditions. This diminished any quality of the occupation 
of space, and the economic and social status declined. Thus it became 
more and more difficult for Palestinians to control their own spaces. 
The result was that Palestinian resistance intensified, especially in the 
second intifada, which started two months after the failure of the Camp 
David negotiations in July 2000. The Israeli spatial control of Palestinian 
areas enabled them to further block areas and roads, dividing them 
into smaller units that were surrounded by tanks or easily bombarded 
from the air. Israeli forces also restricted or cut off the supply of food, 
electricity, and fuel.35 Palestinians have suffered loss of life (with 
leaders often especially targeted), injury, and imprisonment, as well as 
damage to infrastructure and buildings, and destruction of agriculture. 
The Palestinian resistance, on the other hand, has fired locally made 
rockets onto the surrounding Israeli populated areas. The continuation 
of rocket-firing provoked Israel to increase collective punishment by 
killing more Palestinians and demolishing more houses. Between 
2000 and 2005, Israel increased the territory around the settlements 
in the Gaza Strip and their security zones. By the end of 2004, 1,710 
Palestinian houses had been razed, and another 1,474 partially 
demolished. Consequently, 18,000 Palestinians became homeless, 
most of them already refugees and thus homeless for a second time.36 
By 2005, the well-being of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip 
was destroyed as they have suffered from severe urban, social, and 
economic de-development.37 
35  Reinhart, Road Map, 53.
36  Reinhart, Road Map, 54. See also Amnesty International, House Demolition and Destruction 
of Land and Property. Al index: MDE 15/033/2004, 2004.
37 The concept of de-development is developed by Sara Roy. In her book, The Gaza Strip: 
the Political Economy of De-development (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 
1995), 4, de-development is … "the deliberate, systematic deconstruction of an indigenous 
economy by a dominant power. It is qualitatively different from underdevelopment, 
which by contrast allows for some form, albeit distorted, of economic development. De-
development is an economic policy designed to ensure that there will be no economic 
base, even one that is malformed, to support an independent indigenous existence.” 
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The Disengagement Plan
Because conditions became less favourable for Israelis within the 
Gaza Strip with the rise of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza and 
the high costs of protecting the settlers, the Israeli state increasingly 
turned to strategic political planning rather than relying simply on 
Zionist ideological motivation. A new strategic plan was announced in 
December 2003. In his speech, Sharon, then prime minister, proposed 
his own unilateral view of the future of the “peace process”. Known 
for his military mentality, he was the architect and implementer of the 
new strategy, the Disengagement Plan. He viewed this step as a crucial 
one for Israel. The plan envisioned removing settler families from the 
Gaza Strip, and then withdrawing from the whole area. The decision 
to withdraw unilaterally came about because the settlements in Gaza 
had become a financial burden on the Israeli Government, especially 
because of the high cost of providing security to the settlers, but also 
because the settlements had not fulfilled the goals for which they 
were built. The demography of the Palestinian people in Gaza was also 
perceived as a threat since the settlers could not compete with the 
increasing density of the Palestinian population. The Unilateral Plan 
opted for a situation that not only was better politically, economically, 
and demographically, but also fulfilled other goals, decreasing the 
potential for violence, and relocating settlers to safer places since 
Palestinian resistance and the firing of rockets on settlements could 
not be stopped. Apparently Israel also needed to close the Southern 
Front so that it could focus on preparing for war on the Northern Front 
(the Lebanon war of 2006). “According to Sharon, the disengagement 
was meant to decrease the friction between the Palestinian population 
and the settlers and army personnel who were stationed in the area 
to protect the settlers.”38 Sharon held that there was no Palestinian 
partner with whom Israel could negotiate. Thus initiating the 
withdrawal unilaterally led to the freezing of the peace process. This 
had two implications. First, there was no declaration from any side, nor 
any recognition that the Israeli occupation of Gaza had ceased. In fact, 
the boundaries and border checkpoints, as well as all land, sea and air 
passages in and out of the Gaza Strip remained, and still remain, under 
Israeli control. As a result, Gaza became like a big prison. Second, Israel 
38 Yariv Tsfat and Jonathan Cohen, “The Influence of Presumed Media Influence on Democratic 
Legitimacy: The Case of Gaza Settlers,” Communication Research 32 (2005): 794-821, 796.
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could at any time go back into Gaza. There was no clear commitment 
that the land in Gaza was now definitively Palestinian; this meant that 
the Israelis still regarded the land as part of Israel, and the Palestinians 
as merely a group of people living on it.
The plan dealt with Palestinian areas in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank separately, meaning that different strategic policies were adopted 
for each area. While the plan aimed at gaining international acceptance 
and aid by directing attention towards evacuation of settlements in 
Gaza, it also aimed at gaining time, and at diverting the attention 
of the international community from building the wall, as well as 
strengthening the settler presence in the West Bank and Jerusalem by 
building more settlements. 
Although the Disengagement Plan gave Sharon international 
acceptance and aid, internally he faced considerable criticism from 
within the Likud party. His critics viewed the Plan as contradicting 
the party line, and party members opposed it fiercely. To evacuate 
settlements, and especially in the absence of any peace process, was 
seen as setting a precedent, and many in the Likud Party regarded it 
as illegitimate. Many even accused him of making up the whole idea 
with another purpose in mind. “His opponents argued that the plan 
was a ploy to divert public attention from the criminal investigations 
in which he was embroiled.”39 He was therefore pressured by senior 
Likud politicians and settlers to take the plan to a referendum among 
193,000 registered Likud Party members.40 In May 2004, the majority 
of Likud members rejected it. Nevertheless, Sharon went on to present 
the plan to the Government for approval. Before the vote, he fired two 
ministers in order to secure acceptance for the plan. In June 2004 the 
plan was approved by the Knesset and was put into action in spite of its 
rejection by the Likud party, the public, and the settlers.41 
Objections to the Disengagement Plan did not stop after Knesset 
ratification; it was challenged before the Supreme Court, and a 
legal battle followed. The Supreme Court had an active part in the 
39 Suzie Navot, “The Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza – a Constitutional Perspective,” European 
Public Law 12 (1) (2006): 17-33, 17.
40  Tsfat and Cohen, “Presumed Media Influence,” 796.
41  The Knesset ratified the plan in a vote by a majority of 67 against 45, with 7 abstentions.
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process because every decision related to the Disengagement Plan 
was petitioned. Despite the political character of the plan, the High 
Court stood behind it and defended all its stages: “it confirmed and 
legitimized all of the decisions, and was a full and active partner to the 
Disengagement Plan, defending both its legality and its constitutionality 
at all stages.”42 Three major aspects were tackled by the Court. The first 
concerned the contradiction between the settlement evacuation and 
the Basic Guidelines of the Government. This was overcome by giving 
the Prime Minister the authority to make decisions according to the 
changing needs of state. It was up to Prime Minister Sharon to decide.
President Barak noted that despite the importance of the Guidelines, 
they do not bind the Prime Minister. Changing realities may compel 
changes in the goals and targets. ‘Subordinating the Prime Minister’s 
discretion to the Guidelines means neutralizing his ability to map out 
the Government’s course in its functioning as the executive branch of 
the State, and in accordance with its changing needs.’43
The second aspect concerned the legal status of the lands to be 
evacuated. This was dealt with by considering the status of the lands 
of the whole of Gaza and the West Bank. These lands, according to the 
Supreme Court, had a legal status as lands held under a ‘belligerent 
occupation’, and that meant they were not subject to the rules of 
the State of Israel but rather to the rules of public international law. 
This gave the Disengagement Plan the legality to be accepted and 
executed. This legal point had never before been acknowledged by 
the Israeli state, for example with respect to building settlements in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Settlements under international law 
are a violation of Fourth Geneva Convention and UN Resolutions. The 
authority of international law was brought to the scene only to legalise 
Israel’s strategic plans. The Court thus took the position of legalising 
the Israeli state’s politically motivated strategic planning despite its 
contradiction with Israeli ideological motivation. 
The third aspect the Court considered was violation of what were 
perceived to be the “evacuees’ basic rights”. The Supreme Court ruled 
that although the Disengagement Plan “did violate” the “basic human 
42  Navot, “Israeli Withdrawal,” 19.
43  Ibid., 20.
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rights” of the evacuees, this should not prevent execution of the plan. 
The logic was that since the land was considered under “belligerent 
occupation”, the Israeli evacuees would receive compensation subject 
to the Evacuation-Compensation Law.44 While the plan considered the 
evacuees’ basic rights, there was no recognition at all of the rights 
of the indigenous population, who since 1967 had suffered losses in 
all aspects of their lives due to the existence of the settlements, the 
military occupation, and their ramifications in the years since 1967. 
In the end, the Court decided that it was in the “Greater Good” that they 
approve the plan. The influence of the High Court decision was great, as 
it provided “broad Constitutional protection”45 for the Disengagement 
Plan; in fact, it has been said that, “[t]he Disengagement Plan could 
not have been executed without the legal backing of the Supreme 
Court.”46 In this sense it also set a precedent for possible future 
such evacuations from territories it considered under “belligerent 
occupation” such as the West Bank and the Golan Heights. On this 
basis the High Court legitimized the Disengagement Plan in Israeli law. 
Yet this also revealed a contradictory role of the High Court, in that it 
judged that government policy overrides what it perceives as “human 
rights” of Israelis according to Israeli law, in land under “belligerent 
occupation”. This role of the court fits within the colonial paradigm, 
since the human rights of the indigenous population in these areas are 
excluded altogether from the High Court’s legal considerations.
The evacuation process in itself was much easier and took much less 
time than expected, and was completed in September 2005. All the 
settlements of the Gaza Strip, including 1200 houses, were evacuated 
and demolished. About 50-55,000 soldiers were involved in the 
evacuation process, arranged in six circles inside and outside Gaza. There 
was an unarmed group of soldiers who implemented the evacuation, 
a ring of armed soldiers, and outer circles surrounding the boundaries 
to deal with any emergency, especially settlers coming from outside 
44 Ibid., 22-24: “Summing up, the ruling affirms the claim that the Evacuation-Compensation 
Law violates the right to dignity and the right to property of the Israelis slated for evacuation. 
Nonetheless, against the background of the temporary nature of belligerent occupation 
and provided that the statutorily guaranteed compensation is granted (subject to certain 
changes introduced by the High Court) this violation of rights is constitutional.”
45  Ibid., 33.
46  Ibid., 32.
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Gaza to demonstrate against the evacuation.47 The arrangements were 
therefore well planned and the evacuation process cost $1.7 billion.48 
The scenes of evacuating the settlers were covered by the media and 
were portrayed as traumatic in order to send a message internationally 
that Israel was paying a high price by evacuating the settlements.
When talk of evacuation from Gaza first began, as in the case of Sinai, 
the settlers were confident that it could never be implemented, and 
viewed it as a very unrealistic idea. When the settlers realized that the 
evacuation had become a reality, they were in a state of denial; they 
were pressured to choose how to react, and were pulled between their 
personal interest in accepting relocation and receiving compensation 
on the one hand, and their ideological beliefs on the other. The settlers 
all had to decide what was more important: acting in the group interest 
or in their own individual interest, dealing with the whole problem 
collectively or individually. The settlers were very confused, swinging 
between following their ideological beliefs, denying the whole process, 
considering the compensation they ought to get and the place to 
which they would be relocated, and wondering how to organize their 
protests. The contradiction was how to be loyal to the state, and at 
the same time to disregard what they had grown up with. In short, 
the settlers found themselves in the midst of a political problem, an 
ideological problem, and a psychological problem.
The quick evacuation process implied that although the settlers 
tried to oppose the evacuation, they ended up looking for a better 
quality of life. In a way, they knew that there was no way to stay in 
these areas forever. They could foresee the outcome of their strange 
existence in these areas, in light of the higher growth rate of the 
Palestinian population and the inability of their government to provide 
them with security. There was no other choice but to cooperate with 
disengagement.
The settlers were subject to the Compensation Law approved by the 
Knesset in February 2005. It was said that the compensation would 
amount to about $665 million: $1100 per square meter of built-up land, 
47  Al-Quds Daily Newspaper August 14, 2005 (in Arabic).
48 Tawfiq Al-Madini, Al-Quds Daily newspaper, August 31, 2005 (in Arabic). (The number 
mentioned is according to Government of Israel source).
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and $700 per square meter of unbuilt land.49 It was said that “Families 
who live[d] for more than 25 years [in Gaza] would get $(300,000-
400,000) and temporary housing and other facilities until they decide 
where to live.”50 But until the day of the evacuation, there were no final 
plans or schedules for relocation and compensation. Two years later, 
... there have been many heartbreaking reports about the 
evacuees’ difficulties. The Gush Katif Committee claimed 
49 percent of them are unemployed (the government’s 
employment service, by contrast, reported 25 percent); that 
500 families are experiencing a difficult economic situation; 
that there were ten cases of eating disorders and 12 cases of 
attempted or contemplated suicide...51
Among the evacuees, by two years after the evacuation, “no single 
family ha[d] moved into the permanent housing being prepared by the 
state.”52 The evacuees were therefore discontented and faced many 
difficulties.
The aftermath of the Disengagement Plan
As far as Sharon was concerned, the Disengagement Plan was a 
success because it enabled Israel to continue constructing settlements 
and building the wall in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and physically 
integrating these areas with Israel. The remaining lands of the West 
Bank were being further cantonized, in a way similar to Gaza before 
the Disengagement Plan. The plan, however, was not perceived 
in the same way by other Israeli officials, people, or settlers. This is 
because the plan had to confront the Zionist ideology and undo 30 
years of Israeli Zionist practice in the Gaza Strip. It had to work against 
the will and beliefs of the settlers. The state could not sustain the 
situation it had spent decades working to achieve. It had to evacuate 
areas outside the Green Line and take nothing in return, and with no 
recognition that the occupation in Gaza had ended.53 The plan and 
49  Al-Quds Daily Newspaper August 13, 2005 (in Arabic), 15, 17.
50  David Harris and Philips Fredson, “Painful separation, but…” Al-Quds Daily Newspaper 
August 14, 2005 (in Arabic).
51  Gideon Levy, “Evacuation pampering,” Haaretz, February 10, 2007.
52  Hadar Horesh, “Gov’t agency: Cost of disengaging from Gaza has climbed to NIS 20b.” 
Haaretz, August 8, 2007.
53 Avi Shavit, “A Matter of Opinion – Was the Disengagement a success?” Haaretz magazine 
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its implementation affected internal Israeli politics. Supporters of the 
Likud Party were divided, and the result was that a new party, Kadima, 
was formed involving supporters for Sharon from the Likud and other 
parties. In addition, the plan was a financial burden, as the total cost 
of the disengagement was much higher than expected.54 Above all, 
violence continued to evolve after disengagement, the ‘headache’ of 
Gaza still remained, and rockets continued to be fired on Israeli areas 
even after the evacuation. Sharon, however, did not see the longer 
term consequences of the plan, as his political life ended after he had 
a stroke in 2006 and went into a coma, which he has been in ever since.
This is another case that shows that political/strategic factors 
superseded ideological considerations with regard to dealing with 
the colonized space. It also shows that, had the Zionist project been 
exclusively an ideological one, based on ideological attachment to 
the land, then it would have found other means to maintain hold of 
the Gaza Strip. But the fact that the withdrawal was founded on the 
changing political/strategic needs of the state shows that the main 
focus is on control rather than ideology. 
The decolonization of the land in the Gaza Strip illustrates what can 
happen when colonial control of a territory becomes such a burden 
that it is more convenient to end this form of territorial control rather 
than face the downfall of the whole colonial project on that territory. 
From the Palestinian side, the disengagement was an Israeli need, and 
then to a certain extent a Palestinian attainment. The settlements in 
Gaza were evacuated and demolished; thus, the idea of the settlements 
being a fait accomplit or an immovable reality on the ground was no 
longer valid. The case of Gaza showed that things could be changed, 
even by the people who made these realities in the first place. The 
disengagement affected surrounding areas, as many Israelis began to 
leave settlements and towns adjacent to the Gaza Strip such as Sderot 
and Ashkelon, escaping the rockets being fired on these populated 
Israeli areas.
The advocates of the disengagement claimed it would improve our 
security situation. It is true that from the narrow military aspect the 
July 7, 2006 (Friday: 8-13), 9.
54 Horesh, “Cost of disengaging”. At the beginning of 2007, the treasury estimated that the 
total cost of the disengagement would be NIS 7 billion, including compensation for business 
and infrastructure. However, it was said that the total cost will exceed NIS 12 billion.
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present deployment is more convenient for the IDF, but our overall 
security situation has worsened in the wake of the disengagement. 
There is no saving in manpower or in money, as was promised. There 
is no calm and no stability. There is a serious blow to the civilian 
infrastructure of Sderot and Ashkelon. There is a process of population 
deserting those areas. 55
The inability of the State of Israel to provide security for its citizens, or to 
control the resistance movement in Gaza, led to military re-occupation 
of several areas within the Gaza Strip after the evacuation. Two years 
later Israel decided to declare the Gaza Strip “hostile territory” in 
an attempt to absolve itself from the responsibility for the occupied 
population. This was an attempt to legitimize collective punishment 
of the civilian population of Gaza, as the Israeli cabinet decided to 
increase sanctions on the Gaza Strip. These sanctions included limiting 
the supply of fuel and electricity from Israel to Gaza, the transfer of 
goods through the crossings, and the movement of people to and from 
the Strip. The Israelis also stopped visits to prisoners, and increased 
monitoring of funds.56
The unilateral Disengagement Plan was a phase of an ongoing colonial 
project. There is no Israeli commitment to resolve the conflict; although 
the evacuation took place the colonial-military occupation is still 
there. The space on the ground has been evacuated, but Palestinian 
sovereignty has not been achieved. The form of control has changed 
from living on Gaza’s land to control over Gazan territory. The Israeli 
contraction from Gaza was followed by a strict embargo on all basic 
human essentials, which severely affected the lives of the people of 
Gaza. Israel has control over boundaries, over transfer of goods, over 
sea and water, over the airspace, and over all access to the essentials 
of life. In the first year after the disengagement, “Gaza was cut off from 
the outside world 42% of the time.”57 Israel still holds military control 
over the Gaza Strip and can enter and leave whenever it wants.
The reasons for demolishing the Gaza settlements were similar to 
those behind the demolition of the settlements of Yamit. They can also 
55  Shavit, “A Matter of Opinion,” 1.
56  Barak David, Shlomo Shamir, and Avi Issacharoff, “Cabinet declares Gaza ‘hostile territory’,” 
Haaretz September 20, 2007.
57 Alina Korn, “The Ghettoization of the Palestinians,” in Thinking Palestine, ed. Ronit Lentin 
(London, UK: Zed Books, 2008), 116-130, 117.
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be grouped into three: (a)strategic state security considerations, (b) 
gaining international sympathy by emphasizing the ‘trauma and pain’ 
that Israeli settlers ‘suffered’ to advance the cause of peace,58 and (c) the 
government’s desire to limit the psychological effect on the settlers. The 
settlers eventually had to accept the evacuation. They could not think 
of secretly going back, and could not bear to see Palestinians residing 
in their previous homes. The lands of the evacuated settlements are 
located in different parts of Gaza and are different kinds of land. While 
the Palestinian Authority had several scenarios on how to re-use the 
evacuated spaces, political developments in Gaza led to the inability 
to use them. In the evacuated space of former Nisanit settlement, as 
an example, the basin built by Palestinians for a water reserve is full of 
sewage due to lack of infrastructure. Another example is Neve Dekalim, 
which was located between the Palestinian city of Khan Younis and 
the Mediterranean Sea. The Palestinian Al-Aqsa University opened a 
campus inside the partly damaged buildings of the former Khan Younis 
campus shortly after the Israeli evacuation.59 However, during the War 
on Gaza the University was partly demolished. 
Political dynamics after the evacuation
The continuous deterioration of the daily lives of the people of Gaza 
and the tight embargo on almost everything has left no space for a 
Palestinian revival strategy; thus strategic and spatial planning could 
not be applied. Colonial practices in Gaza and continuous embargoes 
on Gaza have led the people into a situation accurately described by 
Honaida Ghanim: 
 Drawing the line between dieting and starvation becomes a 
political issue, making it crucial to understanding the delicate 
differences between dying and death. The distinctions between 
dying – a process – and death, which intervenes between dying 
and being dead – help us understand that the power used against 
the Palestinians is not about killing them, eliminating them or 
pushing them collectively into their graves. Rather, it is about 
managing them as biological subjects through localizing them in 
the luminal zone between life and death, between dieting and 
58 There had been enormous coverage of the evacuation of Gaza settlements and its 
destruction by the Israeli and other televisions.
59  Decolonizing architecture website. www.decolonizing.ps/site.
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starvation – not really dying but being one step before that, where 
‘a decision on life becomes a decision on death. Biopolitics can turn 
into Thanatopolitics’.60
Palestinians in Gaza theoretically do have control of space and time 
but are void of resources to use them for fulfilling their own perception 
and conception of spaces, since the priority is on simply staying alive. 
Thus the Israeli control has been transformed from a spatial existence 
on the Strip to control of the resources of Gaza.
When Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2005, the Israeli and 
international response was to enforce an economic embargo on the 
Palestinian Authority and people. There were attempts to form a 
national unity government involving Fateh, Hamas, and the other 
political parties, but these failed, and internal conflict emerged 
between Fateh and Hamas. There were several attempts to reconcile 
both parties, but they did not last; the most significant was the Mecca 
agreement, and what followed was armed internal fighting which 
culminated in Fateh leaders fleeing from the Gaza Strip into the West 
Bank in summer of 2006. This has increased the division between 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with two different governments 
governing each area. Essentially, the differences over political 
programs became manifested openly under the pressures and effects 
of the sanctions over Palestinians and the siege over Gaza in particular. 
The international community, “at Israel’s behest, has been making 
three demands of the Hamas government that supposedly justify the 
throttling of Gaza’s economy. The conditions are now well known: 
recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and abiding by previous 
agreements.”61 Israel saw that these sanctions, which include fuel, 
medicine, and food supply, are essential to keep the Palestinians of 
Gaza in poverty and despair which would prevent them from engaging 
in political resistance.62 Despite this, and with the continuation of 
rocket firing, the new situation has increased the Israeli perception of 
60  Honaida Ghanim, “Thanatopolitics: The Case of the Colonial Occupation in Palestine,” in 
Thinking Palestine, ed. Ronit Lentin (London: Zed Books, 2008), 65-81, 77. See G. Agamben, 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
222.
61  Jonathan Cook, Disappearing Palestine: Israel's experiments in human despair (London, 
U.K: Zed Books, 2008), 188.
62  Reinhart, Road Map, 133.
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threat. The inability of Israel to maintain colonial security made it opt 
for a new strategic action. 
In December 2008 Israel 
took military action 
against Gaza. It waged 
an all-out war on Gaza as 
a hostile foreign entity. 
The need for such a 
war revealed that the 
disengagement plan did 
not fulfil its main aims of 
retarding violence and 
of controlling the Gaza 
Strip from behind the wall 
surrounding it. The war 
had a devastating impact 
on the Palestinians; more 
than 1400 people were 
killed while on the Israeli 
side 13 were killed. Thousands of buildings were demolished, including 
houses, schools, hospitals, health centres, agricultural lands and 
greenhouses, farms, and all kinds of infrastructure. In addition to the 
severe embargo on the people of Gaza, the war had further destroyed 
any remaining Palestinian life to reach a condition of living short of 
death. 
Israel, despite inflicting all these causalities on the Palestinian side, did 
not achieve the goals of the war. The war could not stop the launching 
of rockets on Israeli areas. It was hoped by Israel that after this war, the 
people of Gaza would rise up against Hamas, but this did not happen. 
In addition, the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was not found or 
released. “Winning militarily but losing politically”63 is how Israel was 
described after the war. This was because of its international image, 
as a state waging war on people under siege, thus committing war 
crimes. Israeli diplomatic relations were also affected, as during the 
63 Richard Falk, “Winning and losing in Gaza,” The Nation, February 9, 2009, available on 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090209/falk.
Fig. 6 The cost of Security.    
Source: The Economist: 
http://www.economist.com/world/middleeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_
id=15213442
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war Venezuela expelled the Israeli Ambassador,64 Bolivia broke ties with 
Israel, the Turkish Prime Minister suggested expelling Israel from the 
United Nations, the Malaysian Parliament called on the UN to establish 
a special war crimes tribunal,65 and there were demonstrations 
worldwide against the war. Israeli politicians and military generals 
who were involved in the war are now subject to arrest in European 
countries on charges of war crimes, filed by protest groups in those 
countries. This has limited the diplomatic movement of these people, 
including Tzipi Livni, Ehud Barak, Gabi Ashkenazi, and others. On the 
level of academic and cultural exchanges, in several places it has 
become practice not to host Israelis. And in September 2009, a UN 
mission headed by Richard Goldstone released a report accusing the 
Israel Defense Forces of war crimes and recommended bringing those 
responsible to justice.
To conclude the case of the Gaza Strip, it is important to emphasize 
that the Disengagement Plan fits within the colonial paradigm in which 
emphasis is on control rather than holding territory. The territorial 
evacuation from the Gaza Strip was a ground contraction process, 
which restructured colonial control over this area. In addition, the 
outcome of the evacuation from the Gaza Strip shows a contradiction. 
There are more Palestinians being killed in Gaza now than when the 
settlements were there, not fewer, as one would have expected. 
The Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and colonial contraction
Both cases, Sinai and Gaza, represent colonial contractions of one 
colonial project. The main strategic difference between these two 
contractions is that the evacuation of Yamit stemmed from a peace 
treaty with a neighbouring country, while the evacuation of Gaza was a 
unilateral move within an ongoing and unresolved conflict in a colonial 
project. In Sinai the colonial contraction came after a period of no 
more than 14 years of settling the area, and with a peace agreement 
that ended conflict between the two parties. In Gaza, the settlers were 
removed after spending possibly 30 years (meaning that a generation 
64 “Israel weighs expelling Venezuelan diplomats after Chavez dismisses envoys to Caracas,” 
Haaretz, January 7, 2009 (Reuters), available on: www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/
PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=1053454. 
65  Falk, “Winning and losing.”
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of settlers were born and raised in the Gaza settlements), and without 
an end to the conflict. It must have been more self-defeating to 
evacuate the Gaza settlements without an end to the conflict, than the 
evacuation of settlements “half its age” and within a peace agreement. 
While the evacuation from Sinai could be considered a de-colonization 
process as Israel no longer has direct control over these lands, the 
evacuation from the settlements of Gaza Strip is a colonial contraction 
within a phase of an ongoing colonial project in which control is 
restructured within the hands of the Israeli colonial state. This is 
represented by Israeli control of aspects of life within the Gaza Strip 
through the siege it has imposed, and the control it exercises over 
access to and from the Gaza Strip, as well as by military actions such as 
the War on Gaza in 2008/2009. The Gaza Strip after the Israeli colonial 
contraction in 2006 has provided a rare case, with some post-colonial 
characteristics, yet still very much under colonial control. 
Both the evacuations of Sinai and of Gaza stemmed from the strategic 
need of the Israeli government to close a front. In Sinai, it was 
important to ensure security for the whole frontier with Egypt, which 
neutralized the largest Arab country bordering the state of Israel. In 
Gaza it stemmed from a failure to achieve secure lives for Israelis, 
though even after the evacuation from Gaza, this was not achieved. 
Israel had to opt for a new strategic military action and to launch a war 
on Gaza later, in December 2008, and kill and destroy in large parts 
of the Strip. In this war the rocket launches were actually intensified. 
On January 1, 2009, it was reported that “Hamas rockets have struck 
the large southern cities of Be’er Sheva and Ashdod, home of Israel’s 
largest port, for the first time since the militant group broke its cease-
fire with Israel on Dec. 19, [2008]”.66
In both cases of decolonization in Sinai and Gaza, Sharon was involved. 
Despite his continuous role in building settlements since 1967, he 
was the one to implement both withdrawals. However, both were 
attempts to calm one front and to implement strategic military plans 
on another – basically the invasion of Lebanon. While the first war was 
launched in 1982 just one month after Sinai decolonization, the second 
66 “U.S. counter terror expert: Hamas has adopted Hezbollah tactics in Gaza,” Haaretz, 
January 1, 2009, (Associated Press), available at: www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/
PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=1051632.
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war on Lebanon was launched in summer 2006, a year after the Gaza 
evacuation in 2005. One of the intended effects was to portray Israel 
as a peace-making party while using this to cover its military actions 
which followed. It was also important for Israel to convey that its 
withdrawal from Gaza had been done out of strength, not weakness, 
and that Israel was still capable of making war.
After the 1973 war, Israel became more dependent on its superpower 
ally, the United States, which influenced it to end conflict with Egypt 
through a political process. The need to maintain this alliance meant 
that Israel had to give up the Sinai Peninsula. This went against the 
Zionist approach of settling in the colonized space, and against its view 
that the Sinai desert was part of the ideological identity of “returning” 
to the area. Consequently, the Israeli settlements established after 1967 
had to be destroyed. In this sense, considerations other than Zioinist 
ideals implied backtracking to dismantle the Zionist settler existence in 
Sinai. Efforts at planning and control of space were redirected toward 
Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 
this was an attempt to compensate for the inability to deliver and 
maintain a permanent Zionist existence in the Sinai. 
In the case of Israeli colonial contraction from the Gaza Strip, 
maintaining a continuous presence in the Gaza Strip amidst a much 
larger population prepared to resist, seems to have mandated giving 
up the aim of achieving a ‘permanent’ Zionist settler existence in Gaza 
Strip. 
The problem was that Zionism, with its initial ideas of achieving a state 
on “a land without people for a people without land,” held that the 
Palestinians did not exist, while on the ground in Gaza, those engaged 
in the Israeli existence on the land and in the strategic, political, and 
military actions and planning, had continuously to deal with the 
resistance of the Palestinians, who in fact did and do exist, there. If 
Palestinians did not exist, Zionists would not have to both exist and 
resist in the same place. Given that Palestinians do exist, and resisted 
the presence of settlers, these settlers had little choice but to reproach 
the Israeli army for not delivering the “obvious” calm that Zionism 
promised. In this context, one can re-read the Sharon Disengagement 
Plan, which in essence recognized the need to modify a principle 
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of Zionism. The new realization was that there are Palestinians on 
the colonized land and that not all land can be lived in, but all land 
colonized can be controlled by means other than directly living on 
it. Consequently, Sharon formed a new political party based on this 
modified version of Zionism – the Kadima Party, on whose platform he 
won the 2006 elections. Yet on the level of Zionist achievements, it still 
had to be proven that the rest of the territory in Palestine in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem could still be Zionized and a “permanent lived 
Jewish existence” achieved. This explains the extensive Israeli efforts 
made to control all aspects of Palestinian life and impose Israeli settler 
existence in the West Bank, using other means of control such as the 
Separation Wall.
The evacuation from Yamit in 1982 led to an increase in settlement of the 
West Bank and the establishment of settlements in Gaza for the Yamit 
evacuees. The evacuation of settlers from the Gaza settlements led to 
an increase in settlement construction and continued construction of 
the Barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Sharon’s unilateral 
plan was a result of the failure of the military to produce Palestinian 
capitulation. The Separation Wall was another attempt to produce the 
same effect while simultaneously enabling the army to concentrate 
more force on any one location than before. Once the unilateral 
withdrawal was completed and the Palestinians were left in isolated 
concentrations throughout the occupied territory, the Israeli army 
would be released from having to sustain Israeli internal security and 
so be able to focus on other strategic priorities. After evacuating one 
area, the Israelis acted to offset the reduction in the settler population 
by stepping up building of settlements in other places. 
Whether there might be a phase of settlement evacuation in the West 
Bank depends on the evolving strategic critical conditions that could 
overshadow the settling process. If there were a unilateral evacuation 
from the West Bank, the purpose would be to restructure control 
over the West Bank rather than maintain control over the whole of 
the territory. This is why completing the wall was essential in order to 
realize this new matrix of control, with access points for entering and 
exiting at any time. There is still a denial of Palestinian rights.
The dynamics of the two contraction processes are related. The 
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Sinai decolonization which led to a neo-colonial stage affected the 
dynamics of Gaza after Israeli contraction. Since Egypt is subject to 
the conditions of the peace agreement rather than its own political 
and strategic considerations, it does not have full control over the 
terms on which it might open relations with Gaza. In the Palestinian 
struggle for life’s basics, Israel and the US could pressure Egypt to close 
its gates to Palestinians, including the supply of basic goods such as 
food and medicine. The indirect control by Israel and US has reached a 
stage where Egypt was pressured into building a wall beneath ground 
level. This was said to be necessary to prevent essential supplies and 
weapons from reaching Hamas members via underground tunnels 
through Rafah. 
It is important to conclude that Israeli strategic interests and needs 
were the engine that shaped the dynamics of the evacuation processes. 
In the 1970s, the main Israeli strategic interest was to remove Egypt, 
a main Arab power, from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and then to launch 
war on Lebanon. The settler groups who left were compensated. In 
2005 the strategic interest behind the Disengagement Plan was to keep 
Israeli forces needed in waging the war on the northern front, from 
being distracted by the need to protect settlers in Gaza. Consequently, 
the ideological project of settling the “Land of Israel” in the Sinai and 
Gaza was sidelined. This outcome was influenced by the military’s 
assessment of the state’s strategic interests at the time. Consequently, 
one notices that the government, and the individuals within it, were 
more powerful than the settler groups.
It is interesting to note that, of the governments and the group of 
individuals who were involved in Yamit as a whole, it was right wingers, 
known to be more ideologically bound and motivated by the Jewish 
idea of the “Land of Israel” who not only gave up the settlements but 
also demolished them. In fact, the Sinai case showed that Israel would 
do anything, even oppose its people, and even oppose the settlers 
themselves, if it faced a security threat on a state level. Both colonial 
contraction processes became conceivable only when a profound 
strategic advantage was foreseen that would enable achieving other 
strategic objectives. 
As was shown in the two cases of the Egyptian Sinai and the Gaza Strip, 
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changes occurred in the Israeli colonial power. In both cases, different 
kinds of threats could and can alternate the synergy of the ideologically 
motivated approach, the actions to achieve it and the actual existence 
and settling on the colonized space. With regard to Zionism itself, it 
too is affected by unanticipated effects. It is unable to move away 
from its motivations and restrictions and actions to achieve a phase 
of permanency of a settler existence in the area. Instead Israel has 
found itself having to back-track from what it aims to achieve in terms 
of actual existence on the colonized space, to re-modify its goals and 
then to re-draw plans and strategies towards maintaining an existence. 
This dynamic of being unable to uphold the ideological motivation, the 
actions to achieve them, and the gradual permanency of existing on 
the space has resulted in a mesh in which the actual settling phase 
is pulled back as a process. Thus the outcomes of this process are 
stages of temporary settling rather than a permanent existence. In 
other words, a regressive condition in the Zionist project that could be 
repeated in other areas such as the WB were the circumstances of the 
colonial state, the indigenous people, and the international pressure 
to produce such a context. 
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Youssef Courbage: 
Gaza, an Ever Rebellious Demography?
Gaza was presented some decades ago as a case of atypical demography 
in the world, and it still retains many population characteristics that 
have not been fully explored. To explain this demography it is crucial 
to look at the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a conflict 
in which population matters are deeply embedded (Anson 1996; 
Goldsheider 1991). The peculiar nature of the Gazan demography 
raises innumerable questions linked to the political conditions of the 
strip (Roy 1995). Foremost among them is whether the high fertility 
rate is sustainable. A second question is what determines migration of 
the Palestinian population, either within historic Palestine – to other 
parts of Palestine including the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or even 
Israel – or to other countries.
We can begin by looking at Gaza’s demographics without considering 
its immediate geopolitical environment – Israel and the West Bank. 
This is feasible provided we first mention some considerations: 
a. Gaza has been a case apart in the history of Palestine since 1948, 
when the Jewish state wiped out almost all of Palestine, causing 
Palestine almost to vanish from the international legal and political 
scene. On its fragments, two entities were established, one in the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem, that was soon incorporated into the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, and the second in the Gaza Strip, 
which was placed under Egyptian administration, but not annexed by 
Egypt. This strange status would last 19 years, until the war of June 
1967, which saw Gaza and the West Bank “reunified” under the yoke 
of the Israeli army. In 1993, following the Oslo agreement, Gaza, 
together with Jericho, became the first liberated Palestinian area, with 
Israel agreeing to turn over administration and policing to the new 
Palestinian Authority.
b. More than five years ago, in September 2005, Gaza was cleared of 
Israeli settlers (Courbage 2006). Even before this date, the number of 
settlers in Gaza was limited; yet colonization of the land proceeded 
under a series of Israeli governments, both on the political right and on 
the left, taking up some 30% of an area of only 360 km2 (41 km long and 
12 km wide). The foremost (undeclared) objective of withdrawal from 
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Gaza was to boost colonization in the West Bank and East Jerusalem by 
supplying the existing settlements with more than 9,000 newcomers. 
The West Bank remains occupied more than ever. Military checkpoints 
are part of the ordinary landscape. Maybe a different status for Gaza 
was the pre-condition to implement the bantustanization scheme, 
after the South African model, so admired by Ariel Sharon? At any rate, 
this was also a strong argument for differentiation of Gaza from the 
rest of Palestine. In his speech on the Gaza pullout, Sharon insisted 
that the demographic disequilibrium – less than ten thousand Jewish 
settlers facing over a million Palestinians – forced Israel to forsake the 
settlements. Israel therefore paid only a limited price by leaving the 
strip, against a foreseen boom in the settlement of the West Bank and 
Jerusalem (550 thousand settlers, and according to forecasts barely 
concealed by Israel, to reach one million before 2020). “Freed” Gaza is 
nonetheless locked by land, sea and air, creating a Kafkaesque situation: 
life is much harder than in the West Bank, although the West Bank is 
militarily occupied and is in the process of gradually being annexed to 
Israeli settlements. 
c. Gaza is Mediterranean, although deprived by Israel from enjoying 
the richness of the sea. The coastline of the West Bank is ironically the 
Dead Sea. Hence, there might be subtle differences in the mentalities 
of the two parts of Palestine. Regional differences in mentalities may 
impact attitudes and demographic behaviour.
d. The “native” population in Gaza is but a tiny minority. Refugees 
expelled by Israel between 1947 and 1949 and their descendants make 
up 74% of the population of Gaza, compared to 33% in the West Bank 
(Khawaja 2002). This profound difference of origins of the population 
might weigh on demographic conditions.
e. The elections of 2006 that sealed the defeat of Fatah to Hamas, and 
ongoing political developments since that event, may also influence 
the demography, although since these events are recent, it is perhaps 
too soon to tell. These rivalries culminated with the mini-civil war in 
June 2007 and the takeover of Gaza by Hamas. With the passing of 
time, the gap might become structural, with the risk of creating a larger 
political gap between the two Palestinian entities, in addition to the 40 
km physical distance between them. 
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Nevertheless, other considerations encourage us not to detach the 
demographic study of Gaza from the rest of Palestine:
a. Gaza is hardly separable from the Palestinian context. The population 
of the strip does not come from elsewhere, but mainly from the south 
of Palestine, just as the refugees in the West Bank came mainly from the 
north. And the regions are quite close: the whole of historic Palestine 
is only 26,000 km2, which can be travelled from north to south in less 
than three hours. 
b. The occupying power may be tempted to accentuate differences 
between Gaza and the West bank, just as in the case of South Africa 
during apartheid, the white authorities did everything possible 
to highlight the differences and aggravate the rivalries among the 
Homelands (Bantustans). But that is all the more reason why we should 
not do so.
Paucity of data
The national data compiled by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) in Ramallah have become the victim of events, precisely 
because the office is located in Ramallah. With the establishment 
of a dual authority in 2007, the study of the population of Gaza has 
deteriorated. The census of December 2007 was taken in the entire 
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. But only the total 
population size of Gaza has been released: 1,416,542 inhabitants; we 
know nothing about recent demographic, socio-economic and cultural 
features. We must therefore rely on the 1997 census and the more 
recent survey, taken in 2006 (PCBS 2007). In addition civil registration: 
births and deaths, published by the Ministry of Health, are essential 
sources, although there are some inconsistencies between civil 
registration statistics and census and survey figures. 
A universal record of population growth, a tiny territory 
As of the middle of 2010, Gaza has, in its minuscule territory of 360 km2, 
a huge population: 1,600,000 inhabitants, a third (35%) of the total 
population of 4.6 million in the occupied Palestinian territories. The 
population density, about 4 400 inhabitants per km2, is extraordinary. 
Let us think a moment about this figure. When one considers such 
115
countries as Indonesia (especially Java), Bangladesh or Egypt (at least 
the population density on Egypt’s usable land), high population densities 
might be synonymous with misery. However, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, population density does not ipso facto mean poverty. Among 
the richest countries in the world are Monaco (16,235 inhabitants per 
km2), with a high density of billionaires, but also Singapore (6,389), 
Hong Kong (6,700) and the Vatican (2,093), where inhabitants are not 
particularly poor. Hence, the correlation between population density 
and poverty is not obvious. Gaza’s neighbours are also highly densely 
populated: Israel in its 1967 borders (340 inh./km2) and the West Bank 
(480), but Gaza is much more so.
The huge population in this small land is primarily, but not only, the 
outcome of the exodus that preceded and followed the war of 1948. 
Nothing prepared the strip of less than 60,000 inhabitants in 1948 to 
absorb, in few weeks, some 200,000 refugees expelled from what was 
becoming the Jewish State. Setting out from the villages and towns of 
a large region from Jaffa to Beer Sabaa conquered by the Haganah in 
the wake of the war, these refugees could not imagine that they were 
to remain in Gaza for more than a few days or weeks. 
Gaza: a demographic “miracle”? 
The “miracle” for Gaza is to have sustained an incredibly high rate 
of population increase since 1948. Far from returning back to the 
‘indigenous’ Gazan population of 1948, population size moved from 
a quarter of a million to 1.6 million – a more than sixfold increase – 
in only sixty years (1950-2010). The rate of increase (birth rate minus 
death rate plus immigration minus emigration), has been 3.1% per 
year on average. This is the same as in Israel, where it was fuelled by 
immigration, but much higher than in the West Bank, where the rate 
of increase has been 2.0%. Only Jordan, whose demographic changes 
have been largely based on the Palestinian population, had a higher 
4.5% rate of increase (Fig. 1).
Battle of numbers, war of cradles
How do we account for these unusual demographics? Let us start 
with a frequent and well advertised explanation: the numbers of the 
Palestinian population in general and those of Gaza, are wrong. In 2005, 
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two years before the Palestinian census of 2007, Israeli researchers 
close to the Likud and American neocons of the American Enterprise 
Institute questioned the Palestinian demographic data in a widely 
publicized report (Zimmerman et al. 2006). They claimed that the 
figures had been manipulated and exaggerated for political motives. 
Instead of 1.41 million inhabitants in the Gaza strip at this date, the 
report said, the “true” figure was 1.08 million! 23% less. This “battle 
of numbers” is widely debated in Israel and Palestine, a confrontation 
between Palestinians and Israelis but also between rightists and leftists 
in Israel. 
Fertility, unbridled or political?
If Gaza’s population growth is exceptional, it is primarily due to fertility, 
itself exceptional (Khawaja 2003; Khawaja and Randall 2006; Khawaja 
et al. 2009). After the 1967 war, and until recent years, the crude 
birth rate and total fertility rate remained on a high plateau. Between 
1960 and 1970 the birth rate was 53 per thousand in the Palestinian 
territories as a whole, and the total fertility rate was 8 children per 
woman. Only outward migration could slightly alter the level of fertility: 
during years when there was large temporary migration of Palestinian 
men to the Gulf, fertility was slightly lower due to the disruption of the 
marriage market. 
Palestinian fertility has remained atypical, insensitive to critical factors 
such as the high degree of urbanization in the Gaza Strip, the high 
population density, active population dominated by secondary and 
service activities, where child labour is not an asset for the parents, 
contrary to the agricultural sector where children may participate 
in, thus giving a boost to fertility. In Gaza, fertility has always been 
higher than in the West Bank, in spite of the accumulation of inhibiting 
factors. Most important is the high level of school attendance and 
the eradication of illiteracy, which are the keys to the universal 
phenomenon of demographic transition and fertility reduction. High 
level education (preparatory, secondary, university) is more prevalent 
in Gaza than in the West Bank: enrolment rates of 59% against 57% 
for males, 57% against 52% for females. In proportions, there are less 
illiterates in Gaza and more university graduates. Finally the gender 
gap in higher education is lower in Gaza (-2%) than in the West Bank 
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(-6%) (Fig. 2). Though several indicators would predict a lower fertility 
rate in Gaza, the one exception is the female participation rate in the 
economically active population – usually negatively correlated with 
fertility – which has always been lower in Gaza than in the West Bank.
Political factors
The first intifada had fuelled an increase in the already quite high level 
of fertility. Fertility was then regarded by the Palestinian establishment 
and Yasser Arafat as one type of peaceful weapon to fight the 
occupation (Courbage 2005; Fargues 2000; Kanaaneh 2002). This 
was especially the case in Gaza, where the rise in fertility was more 
pronounced. A survey of the Gaza strip in 1989 showed that 43% of 
respondents considered the demographic factor as a key pillar in the 
struggle against occupation. In 1992 a medical doctor specializing in 
sterility problems said when interviewed by Agence France Presse: “I 
help my people to procreate and therefore not disappear under the 
waves of Jewish immigration. Palestinians and Israelis, we are fighting 
a demographic war to the finish” (AFP). Gazans took this motto even 
more seriously than West Bankers (Fig. 3).
Gaza has always been involved in the demographic battle of numbers 
or the war of cradles. Before the second intifada in 2000, the birth 
rate and fertility of Gaza already consistently distinguished themselves 
from those of the West Bank. This is shown in the crude birth rate 
recorded in the vital statistics in Israel, and in the fertility rates 
calculated from three Palestinian population surveys. According to 
Israeli statistics, there was a rise in the crude birth rate in Gaza from 
45 to 56 per thousand between 1986 and 1991. It was later confirmed 
by of the rise in the Total Fertility Rate from 7.73 to 8.76 during the 
same period, according to Palestinian statistics drawn from surveys. 
Fertility increase was more marked in Gaza than in the West Bank. In 
addition, the increase in fertility has been more pronounced among 
more educated women – supposed to be the most politically conscious 
– than among the illiterate and less educated.
The first intifada left Gaza with a TFR of 7.4 children in 1994 (5.6 in 
the West Bank). The years of the Oslo accords, which were also those 
of increased colonization of Palestine, saw a modest decline; on the 
eve of the second intifada in September 2000 the TFR in Gaza was 6.8 
children per woman.
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The fertility effects of the second intifada
The second intifada shook things up in Gaza as in the whole of Israel-
Palestine. In this hyper-pronatalistic context the demographic weapon 
changed hands. Israeli Jewish fertility, not Palestinian fertility, increased 
– a very rare occurrence in a country with high living standards: GDP 
per capita of more than 30,000 USD for Israeli Jews and levels of 
education higher than in Europe. Fertility of Israeli Jews, already high 
at 2.6 children per woman in 2000, grew to 2.9 in 2009 (Central Bureau 
of Statistics 2010) and is about to reach 3 children in 2010 according 
to the current trend, twice the average rate of Europe or of diaspora 
Jews. But more importantly, fertility is particularly high in areas of 
friction: politico-ideological settlements implanted in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem, where it is now close to 5 children per woman 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2010). From the saturated areas of West 
Jerusalem (like Mea Shearim) where the ultra-Orthodox fertility rate is 
around 7.5 children (Friedlander 2002), streams of migrants fuel the 
settlement movement of the West Bank in and around Jerusalem.
Contrariwise, in Israel proper, the fertility of the 1948 Palestinians is 
falling: their birth rate dropped from 38 to 28 per thousand and the 
total fertility rate from 4.3 to 3.5 from 1990 to 2009. In a few years 
it is possible that Israeli Arabs will bear no more children than Israeli 
Jews. Hence, the second intifada dealt a severe blow to fertility in the 
West Bank and Gaza (Figs. 4 and 5). Palestinian demography has been 
reshuffled, but this time downward, unlike what happened during the 
first intifada. Between 1999 and 2006, fertility in the West Bank fell 
from 5.4 to 4.3, that is to say, it fell significantly below that of the Israeli 
settlers in “Judea – Samaria” and East Jerusalem. Statistics from the 
Ministry of Health show an even more marked decrease, with fertility 
rates of about 3.4 at the beginning of the decade. Rebellious Gaza has 
been even more affected, with fertility falling from 6.8 in 1999 to just 
5.4 in 2006 – still a very high rate by world standards, even relative to 
Muslim or Arab countries and even compared to Palestinians in the 
West Bank. But this is a sharp fall since the first intifada.
Obviously, a fertility rate of 5.4 children per woman is still considerable, 
given the abject living conditions in Gaza. But not if one considers that 
children are almost the unique source of comfort, plus a strategic asset 
in the precarious balance of forces in Israel-Palestine. We can almost 
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paraphrase the Israeli filmmaker Amos Gitai in his film Kadosh on the 
ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem. One of his characters states that 
children are the best weapon to fight their enemies (in this case not 
the Palestinians, but the secular Jews). 
But today, things are changing. Demographic rationality is sweeping 
Palestine and Gaza in particular, at the moment when it appears to be 
abandoning Israel. 
Mortality
Fertility is not the only component of the growth of a population. To be 
exhaustive in describing population characteristics, we should mention 
mortality and international migration. “Normal” mortality, somehow 
surprisingly, is rather low in Gaza. Yet, during crisis situations, such as 
the second intifada and Israel’s war against Gaza in December-January 
2008-2009, mortality reached peaks higher than in the West Bank. 
Infant mortality reached 30.7 per thousand in 2002-2006, slightly 
higher than the West Bank’s 25.5 per thousand. Life expectancy at 
birth is around 72 years, higher than in many Arab countries. The 
effectiveness of health care, and the role of NGOs and of UNRWA, are 
responsible for these remarkable achievements. But in addition, there 
is in this family-oriented context a love and desire to protect children, 
and this includes children of both sexes. In Gaza one does not find 
the excess mortality of girls that one does frequently find in macho 
societies where girls are less well treated than boys during their infancy. 
Migration
We too often forget, given Israel’s full lock on the borders of Gaza by 
land, sea and air, and the semi-full lock by the Egyptian side on Rafah, 
that Gaza once was also a land of emigration. After Gulf economies 
exploded with the oil boom in 1975 and until the decline in oil prices a 
decade later, 114,000 Gazans emigrated, most often without returning, 
thanks to the benevolence of the occupation authorities happy to get 
rid of these turbulent youths. The second intifada has also seen slight 
net emigration, but nothing comparable to that of the West Bank, 
where 100,000 departures were reported –with exaggeration – in 
the Israeli press. Actually, a recent survey has shown smaller figures: 
32 000 emigrants and 6 000 returned emigrants in 2005-2009 (PCBS 
2010). 
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Outlook for the future
What future for Gaza? The optimistic scenario would be one where 
a real Arab-Israeli peace would be accompanied by the return of 
Palestinian refugees (or a substantial fraction of them) to their homes. 
For the moment, there is nothing in politics at the local level, nor at 
the level of the international community, that suggests that this will 
happen, that is, that the UN resolution of 1948 will be implemented. 
But if this optimistic scenario did come to pass, population pressure in 
Gaza would likely be relieved through migration. As long as migration 
is excluded, however, population will grow only under the combined 
effects of fertility and mortality.
As everywhere, but even more in this puzzling context, fertility trends 
in Gaza are hard to predict, since it is always difficult to conclusively 
predict the attitudinal and behavioural changes which guide human 
reproduction. However, in view of the fertility decline in Gaza in 1994-
1999 before the second intifada, as well as in 1996-2006, one can 
surmise that the Gazans have renounced high fertility as a political 
tool. The resistance against blockade and occupation seems to be 
taking other forms – maybe more effective – such as the appeal to 
universal consciousness, international tribunals and so on. 
Amira Haas, a journalist for the Israeli daily Haaretz and a renowned 
specialist on Gaza, reported in an interview in Le Monde Diplomatique 
a quote from a Gazan father of four, who said “All what concerns 
us is the care for subsistence, electricity, water, sewage. You end up 
wondering why you brought children into this world “ (Haas 2008; 
emphasis added). This was just before the Israeli war of December 
2008. How will fertility evolve after the disaster? 
Future fertility trends
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of population size in Gaza based on three 
different assumptions about trends in fertility, the main component 
of population growth. The highest projection is based on fertility 
remaining constant at its present level of 5 children per woman. 
Although unlikely in view of previous trends and after the disasters 
of 2008-2009, this prognosis is helpful to forecast the maximal 
envelope of Gaza population in the next forty years, 2010-2050. The 
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second projection makes the more likely assumption that fertility will 
decrease, to reach the replacement level of TFR of 2.1 in 2050 (the 
ideal size of two children per woman); this is the medium prognosis. 
The third projection is based on the assumption that fertility will fall 
more rapidly to 1.7 in 2050, the present level of Lebanon; this is the 
low prognosis.
A cohort-component population projection by age-group and sex is 
then done on the population as it stands in 2010 (the age-pyramid in 
green on Fig. 7). 
From 4 to 6 million inhabitants in 2050
Consider the absurd case that fertility will remain forever at 5 children. 
To say that the population will explode in this case is an understatement. 
The 1.6 million of today will become 6 million in 2050, a multiplication 
by almost 4, an annual growth rate of 3.4%, resulting in a population 
density of 16,400 inhabitants per km2. This is absolutely unthinkable. 
What would be the future if Gaza tends to adopt “modern” patterns 
of reproduction to reach the symbolic threshold of 2.1 children per 
woman in 2050? Even with such an optimistic view, the outcome might 
be disastrous: 4.1 million in 2050, a 2.6 fold increase, a growth rate of 
2.4% per year, reaching a density of 11,400 inhabitants per km2. This 
too would be unsustainable. 
Let us go even further. Suppose that fertility reaches a western European 
level of 1.7 children (say, half the current level of Israeli Jews). In this 
case, there would be 3.9 million inhabitants in Gaza by 2050, with the 
stifling density of 10,800 inhabitants per km2 (Fig. 8).
Among the most serious implications of high population growth is the 
youth bulge, especially if insufficient employment, or none, is provided 
by the national economy or by the state.
Where to find jobs?
High population growth will translate into a tense labour market. The 
number of new entrants, now estimated at 37,000 each year, will 
double to reach 76,000 in 2050 (Fig. 9). However, the likely aging of the 
population will lead an increasing number of Gazans to exit the labor 
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force, although in small numbers. Hence the number of net entrants 
annually will increase – but at a slower pace – from 34,000 presently to 
54,000 in 2050. This is an impressive increase peculiar to Palestine and 
especially to Gaza. In Arab countries, annual numbers of net entrants 
have started to decline in many cases, or will start to do so soon. In 
the Gaza Strip there is much slack in the labour market now, with an 
unemployment rate of 39% in the second quarter of 2010. Every year 
new entrants add to the already high numbers of the unemployed 
or the underemployed, particularly among Gazans ages 20-24, who 
currently suffer 67% unemployment.
The low participation of women in the labour force should also be 
emphasized: women are only 8-10% of the economically active 
population, among the lowest in the world. Recent figures also 
show increasing gender inequity. Although women were already 
marginalized in the labour force, now they tend to be even more so. 
Whereas the number of employed women in the West Bank increased 
from 95,000 to 111,000 between the beginning and the middle of 2010, 
it decreased from 25,000 to 23,000 in Gaza. Out of 443,000 women in 
Gaza aged 15 years and over, only 23,000, or 5.2%, are employed, also 
among the lowest rates in the world. When jobs are rare and pressure 
on employment high, women tend to remain out of the labour force 
for decades. 
Summary and conclusion
In conclusion, although there are many similarities between 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we have pointed to some 
demographic and socio-economic differences which might increase in 
the future:
- The demographic transition is much more advanced in the West 
Bank. 
- The future demographic outlook in terms of population growth and 
densities is less gloomy in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.
- Gazans are slightly more educated than West Bankers, but this does 
not translate into a better standard of living. Quite the opposite.
- Labour market conditions in terms of participation rate and 
unemployment are improving in the West Bank but becoming 
unbearable for the Gazans, especially for youth. 
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- Women’s status in terms of accession to the labour market is much 
worse in Gaza than in the West Bank, especially for young females, 
with 7 persons out of 10 unemployed (twice the rate in the West 
Bank). 
Usually, demographic trends have been among the few reasons for 
optimism in the Arab region. But for Gaza, unfortunately there are 
few glimpses of hope if things remain as they are. Only a drastic 
geographical redistribution might give the population some expectation 
of improvement. But where would Gazan emigrants go? Certainly 
not to an overcrowded Egypt. The Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, 
assuming they regain their former glory, do not want emigrants from 
Gaza stamped (sometimes despite themselves) as Hamas partisans. 
There remains the migration to the West Bank – and even (why 
not?) to Israel. This, however, would require an end to the blockade, 
open borders, liberty of movement, and so forth – in other words, a 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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Asem Khalil: 
The ‘Protection Gap’ and the Palestinian Refugees of 
the Gaza Strip
The concept of a ‘protection gap’ is often used by scholars interested 
in studying the legal status of Palestinian refugees in host countries.1 
To say that such a gap exists for refugees in a host country means that 
international protection mechanisms are missing, and leaves refugees 
subject to domestic laws and policies. 
In this paper, I will first show why this protection gap came into 
existence, then suggest different mechanisms for protecting Palestinian 
refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the effects of the Israeli 
occupation. I will further make suggestions with regard to keeping 
the distinction clear between West Bank and the Gaza Strip when 
dealing with refugee protection. This distinction paves the way for 
my central proposition in this paper, that Gaza poses a challenge to 
international law and to the current international system. UNRWA in 
particular is pushed towards assuming a protection mandate, which it 
was originally deprived from assuming. This shift toward an expanded 
UNRWA mandate is inevitable, but it is not for that reason devoid of 
risks. 
Protection Gap
Many facts, taken together, contributed to creating and widening this 
protection gap. First, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 181 of 
1947 contributed to the original forced displacement of Palestinians, by 
authorizing the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, despite the fact 
that the vast majority of residents of the region were Arab Palestinians. 
Second, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and in 
particular article 1-D) has been interpreted in a way that excludes most 
Palestinian refugees from its protection.2 Third, separate international 
1 For example, Akram (2002), BADIL (2005), and Suleiman (2006), whether they use this term 
or not. 
2 It is often the case that article 1/D of the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees of 
1951 (Refugee Convention) is interpreted in a way that excludes Palestinians based on only 
the first paragraph of that article that states: “D. This Convention shall not apply to persons 
who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” However, 
the second paragraph immediately states that: “When such protection or assistance has 
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agencies have been established for Palestinians (Rempel 2006, 5),3 
and this has consolidated the perception (or perhaps reality) that the 
Palestinian case is exceptional (Kagan 2009). The gap is widened further 
by the continuous refusal of Israel to re-admit Palestinian refugees into 
Israeli territory, beginning with when the state was newly established 
(Elsayed-Ali 2006, 13), and the international community’s inability or 
unwillingness to impose UN resolutions, including the right of return, 
on Israel (Khalil 2009, 5). 
Protecting Refugees under Occupation 
Scholars interested in the legal status of Palestinian refugees distinguish, 
almost instinctively, between those who are in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip on the one hand, and all other refugees on the other. (A further 
distinction is drawn between those who are in the other three areas in 
which UNRWA operates – Lebanon, Jordan and Syria - and those who 
are in the rest of the world). The distinction is not drawn as a result 
of different historical roots of their displacement, nor is it the result 
of different prospects for their futures. Rather, it is the result of being 
subjected to completely different legal regimes. 
ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in 
accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.” 
This means that it is wrong to exclude Palestinians from the protection of the Refugee 
Convention because 1) UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) is not practicing 
its mandate to protect Palestinian refugees because of states’ lack of cooperation; and/
or, 2) because the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has no 
mandate to protect Palestinian refugees; and/or 3) UNRWA is present only in five areas of 
operation, so the protection of the Refugee Convention to Palestinian refugees shall not be 
denied to Palestinian refugees outside those areas; and/or 4) even in those areas where 
UNRWA is present, the Refugee Convention shall apply to those Palestinians who are not 
registered at UNRWA (provided that the concerned states ratify the convention, of course). 
For more, see Khalil 2009, 7, 14.
3 The UNCCP and UNRWA. The UNCCP was established by UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948, with a protection mandate for Palestinian refugees 
but then failed to exercise a significant role. UNRWA, on the other hand, was established 
by UNGA Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, becoming the only international ‘face’ 
of the plight of Palestinian refugees, while its protection function is virtually non-existent 
(Akram, Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a 
Just Solution 2002, 43). Besides, most Palestinian refugees are present in Jordan, Lebanon 
and Syria (besides the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the other two areas of operation of 
UNRWA), countries that did not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention. For more about the 
‘protection gap’, see Khalil 2009, 2-17.
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The fact that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are deemed occupied 
territory means that they are subjected to the provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva convention, something Palestinian refugees present in other 
host countries cannot of course claim (unless in specific circumstances 
of armed conflicts, whether local or international). Besides, Israeli 
authorities – whenever it comes to counting the population and 
regulating their legal status – have not distinguished between those 
who are refugees and those who are not. Neither does the Palestinian 
Authority make such a distinction in its laws and policies. The result is 
that Palestinian refugees of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a legal 
status which is specific to them, and constitutes an obstacle to any 
comparison with their counterparts in other host countries. 
Why Gaza is Special
Less evident is the distinction one needs to draw between West Bank 
on the one side and Gaza Strip on the other. I argue that there is a need 
– at least conceptually and didactically, if not legally or politically – to 
keep in mind the distinction between the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
when it comes to legal protection and to assistance for refugees. At 
least two reasons inform this need. 
Different Legal Regimes
On the one side, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under two 
completely different legal and political regimes from 1948 to 1967. The 
Israeli occupation unified them again in 1967; but this unity was not 
legal, administrative or political, but rather a result of applying parallel 
systems of military rules through declarations and decrees. In other 
words, Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were unified in 
their subjugation to an occupation that was long, discriminatory, racist 
and colonial. They were unified in their similar rightlessness. 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were granted ID numbers 
by the authority in place (Israel, as an occupation authority), giving 
them the option – not the right – of residence in the ‘areas’ that ‘fell’ 
under Israeli control.4 Those were not signs of entitlements to rights. 
4 Israel refers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “areas”, refusing to admit their status 
as occupied territories, as admitted by the international community and the various UN 
resolutions. According to the Israeli official narrative, Israel controls these “areas” because they 
“fell” under its authority as a result of the war, and in the absence of another sovereign state. 
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They were rather grants given by the authority in place as benevolent 
acts, and as a result were subject to the prevailing mood of the Israeli 
military commander or officials, reflecting internal Israeli politics and 
expansionist Zionist policies that excluded Palestinians even from 
being recognized as a people entitled to rights in this land. This regime 
essentially continues today.
The above argument is relevant to keep in mind because it allows us to 
understand how Israel used the pre-1967 division and the subsequent 
maintenance of the legal separation between the two ‘areas’ when 
Israeli occupation took place. This division enabled Israel indeed 
to use military declarations and orders to widen the gap between 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the point that Military 
Order No.16505 codified the separation between Palestinians of Gaza 
and Palestinians by rendering Gazans (having an ID number issued by 
Israeli military commander for Gazans, different from the one issued 
for West Bank Palestinians and for those issued for Palestinians of 
East Jerusalem) foreigners for the purposes of the order and in need 
of legal documentation authorizing any stay in the West Bank. The 
military order consolidated a practice, dating from 1967, of increasing 
separation between the two areas under Israeli control, even under 
different military regimes and civil administrations during the first 
Intifada and Oslo Agreements.6 
The new order subjects Palestinian residents of Gaza, whenever they 
are in the West Bank but cannot prove they have an Israeli-issued 
permit to be there, to the threat of ‘deportation’ back to Gaza. The 
word ‘deportation’ – with the new order deportation became the only 
remaining option to adjust the anomaly of lack of legal documentation 
– is a dangerous word used by some inattentively but that reflects the 
5 On April 13, 2010, Israeli military Order ‘regarding Prevention of Infiltration’ – Order no.1650 
of 2009 – took effect, six months after being signed by the Israeli Commander of the Israeli 
Defense Forces in the ‘Judea and Samaria Area’. The text is in Hebrew. An unofficial translation 
was made available by Hamoked at http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/112301_eng.pdf.
6 The new military order fits within the same Israeli policy of separating the two areas (the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank), thus dealing with Palestinians holding an ID issued by the 
military government of the Gaza Strip differently from those having an ID number issued by 
the military government in the West Bank. Of course such ID numbers are different from ID 
numbers provided to Palestinians of East Jerusalem. For more, see Khalil 2010. 
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idea of the Gaza Strip being a different ‘country’ from the West Bank.7 
Such deportation is still prohibited under international humanitarian 
law, because forced transfer of population is by definition arbitrary 
and does not respond to any urgent need to ensure the security of 
the population or to any immediate military needs of the occupation 
authority. 
Israeli Withdrawal in 2005
There is another reason why I believe we need to keep the distinction 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in mind whenever legal 
protection of Palestinian refugees in Gaza Strip is invoked. That is the 
fact that in the Gaza Strip, since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal in 2005, 
several events have rendered the Gaza Strip sui generis and made legal 
protection even harder to realize – though in no way less urgent. These 
events are the post-2005 agreements related to border control, the 
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, the subsequent intensification of 
the Israeli siege, and Israel’s declaration that Gaza is an “enemy entity”. 
Of course the status of the Gaza Strip under international law since 
2005 was and is the subject of hot debate among specialists in 
international law. I believe, however, that this debate is tempered, 
now that we have seen clear evidence of Gaza’s ongoing subjugation 
to the same occupation regime – although in a slightly different form. 
Such evidence comes from the Israeli invasion in 2008/2009, Israel’s 
continuous control of the territorial borders of Gaza (air, water, and 
land), and the Israeli attacks on solidarity ships that did not acquire 
Israeli approval to enter the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip. Such 
events showed that withdrawal meant nothing in practice but the 
redeployment of Israeli forces, while maintaining the full control of 
borders, keeping all other elements necessary to the qualification of 
that territory as occupied territory.8 
7 I am thankful for this insight offered by Cordula Droege, the ICRC legal advisor, who explained 
that we must distinguish between deportation (transfer of population to a third country) 
and forcible transfer of population that can be applied within the same ‘country’ (remarks 
in a roundtable organized by the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, 
September 20, 2010). Under international law both deportation and forcible transfer of 
population are forbidden, but if the word ‘deportation’ is used to refer to transferring 
population from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, it implies that the Gaza Strip is a ‘third 
country’, which in fact it is not. See report of the session at http://home.birzeit.edu/fmru/
conferences/conferences.htm. 
8 Even when an agreement for the Rafah Crossing was reached in November 2005 (The 
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Gaza as a Challenge
The Gaza Strip poses a particular challenge to the international 
community because Israel fully controls its borders and restricts 
movement of goods and people across those borders, and at the same 
time there is no state authority able and willing to provide assistance 
and protection for Palestinian civilians. In such circumstances, 
Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, their protection and their need 
for assistance, are pushing UNRWA to reshape its mandate, towards 
more protection rather than only assistance and relief. This shift actually 
tends to consolidate UNRWA’s past efforts, much earlier in history, and 
on more than one occasion9, to add to the role defined in its mandate 
the responsibility for protection of refugees. Yet expanding UNRWA’s 
mandate in this way renders it more fragile and vulnerable to attack; 
and such attacks oppose not just the expansion of UNRWA‘s role, but 
the existence of the organization itself, as well as its whole mandate 
and its role in keeping alive the issue of Palestinian refugees. 
The position of UNRWA is rendered even more fragile since the 
global financial crisis. In fact, while depending on international funds, 
UNRWA is facing a serious risk because many countries are decreasing 
their funding due to the economic crisis, while others work to discredit 
the organization and argue for using international funds for refugee 
resettlement programs instead of financing UNRWA.10 
Alarmed voices are much more often being heard. UNRWA’s financial 
crisis will have a disastrous impact on Palestinian refugees in the Gaza 
Strip. The previous argument suggests that a weak UNRWA may lead 
to a humanitarian crisis much deeper and worse than the one we have 
now in the Gaza Strip, as well as worse than we might imagine, with 
consequences that go beyond the Palestinian refugees of the Gaza 
Strip. 
In fact, UNRWA’s role is recognized in avoiding a worse situation, 
Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossings), 
the Palestinian Authority agreed that Israel would monitor the borders via closed-circuit 
television under the supervision of the EU BAM Rafah (an EU police mission for Rafah) (Abu 
Mukh 2006, 21). Such agreement was in practice suspended after Hamas took control of 
Gaza and the departure of the EU police force. 
9 See for example BADIL 2005, 42ff.
10 The decline in aid was felt by refugees in host countries much earlier than that; in fact, 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and Oslo process in general resulted in the 
“skewing of international funds away from the ’outside‘ refugees” (Sayigh 1995, 51).
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and its role in responding to emergency needs is essential (Brynen 
2009, 6). The best way to describe this approach can be summarized 
by a quote from Rex Brynen’s speech on the occasion of the 60th 
anniversary of UNRWA: “happy 60th anniversary, UNRWA. I wish you 
were unnecessary — that issues of refugees and peace had long ago 
been resolved. Until they are, however, the Agency, its staff, and their 
very hard work remain invaluable” (Brynen 2010).
The point this approach stresses is not that UNRWA is not necessary, 
but rather that UNRWA is not enough. The alternative, however, 
will not be to replace UNRWA by UNHCR, but rather to enhance the 
protection role of UNRWA, or to extend the protection mandate of 
UNHCR to Palestinian refugees alongside (not instead of) existing 
agencies dealing with Palestinian refugees. Note, however, that while 
UNHCR seems to be attractive for Palestinians on some issues, it may 
be resisted and rejected for others.11 
11 As Kagan points out: “The attraction for Palestinians is that general refugee policy as 
advocated by UNHCR promotes three things that have been denied them: first, a clear 
recognition of the right to return, along with its complementary rights of property 
restitution; second, a clear goal of finding a durable solution, with particular emphasis on 
repatriation; third, a commitment to fundamental rights in exile until a durable solution can 
be found” (Kagan 2009, 434). Then he adds:
 Yet it is important to recall that pro-Israel writers who are hostile to Palestinian aspirations 
are similarly questioning the wisdom of Palestinian exceptionalism because they believe 
that UNHCR involvement will help minimize the claims of Palestinian refugees. While 
general (i.e. non-Palestinian) refugee policy contains several attractions for Palestinians, it 
also contains some hidden features that might challenge longstanding Palestinian political 
orientations. Two examples illustrate this point. First, established norms of refugee law 
would condemn the militarization of refugee camps which has been a prominent feature 
of Palestinian armed conflict with Israel from the 1950s onwards. General refugee policy 
would thus back condemnation of groups like Hamas, and would call on host governments 
like Lebanon to disarm militant elements in refugee camps. Second, while it is true that 
refugee law generally backs the right of return and the right to property restitution.., 
UNHCR’s approach to durable solutions is ultimately more pragmatic and flexible than many 
Palestinians might like. While UNHCR calls repatriation ‘the solution of choice’ for most 
refugees..., it cautions that ‘there is no hierarchy of durable solutions’ and that resettlement 
and local integration should be considered simultaneously ... What this means in practical 
terms is that UNHCR will look to local integration and third country resettlement when 
repatriation is impossible. UNHCR has indicated a similar flexible or ad hoc approach to 
compromises on property restitution... Thus, while UNHCR policy would back Palestinians 
on the abstract rights to return and restitution, in terms of implementation UNHCR might 
accept Israeli resistance as an immovable fact and turn pragmatically to other options in 
order to not leave refugees in limbo indefinitely. (Kagan 2009, 434; citations omitted).
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Conclusion
UNRWA, this paper concludes, is still a necessary agency. The assistance 
it provides for Palestinian refugees is essential to avoid worst case 
scenarios. What Palestinian refugees always needed, and still do, is 
protection. The fact that they are left outside international protection 
mechanisms for refugees, and the fact that it was left for host countries 
to determine the kind of legal status they enjoy has meant in practice 
leaving them alone without any kind of protection. This is what this 
paper has referred to as a ‘protection gap’. 
Of course the assistance UNRWA provides may be considered as a form 
of protection, but attacks on Palestinian civilians, and in particular on 
residents of refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza, have shown 
that assistance is not enough and that there should be an agency 
responsible for their protection. This agency can be of the host state or 
of an international organization; it doesn’t matter. 
Palestinian refugees of the occupied Palestinian territories have had 
the distinctive character of residing within historical Palestine, under 
Israeli occupation, and being dealt with in the same way as other 
residents of that area. The Gaza Strip in particular is challenging 
the international community, in light of the lack of a sovereign state 
exercising state authority – while Israel continues to maintain control 
over its borders. Gaza is pushing UNRWA to assume a role which is 
not part of its original mandate. Such a role is inevitable, but is not 
devoid of risks for UNRWA as an agency, already fragile because of the 
pressure some countries exert on it, and because of its dependency on 
voluntary financial contributions of states. 
More than six decades after displacement, Palestinian refugees need 
assistance and protection. Their right to return is yet to be realized, and 
statelessness is still a destabilizing factor in the region. International 
aid, even in a time of global financial crisis, needs to be maintained, 
not out of charity but out of responsibility (Saiz 2009, 288). Most 
importantly, in the Palestinian case it is partially the responsibility 
of the international community, which partitioned Palestine, has yet 
to establish a Palestinian state, and still has not enforced the many 
resolutions related to the right of return for Palestinian refugees. 
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Clemens Messerschmid: 
Water in Gaza – Problems & Prospects
“It is almost impossible to believe that the Gaza Strip was ever an oasis. 
But Gaza’s fresh sweet groundwater has been nourishing inhabitants 
for over 3,000 years. It was always the first stop of conquerors leaving 
Egypt for the riches of Syria. Like the Pharaohs before him, Alexander 
the Great sought the cool wells of Gaza at the end of his trek across 
the Sinai desert. Wadi Gaza and Wadi Beit Hanoun, that used to run 
clear with fresh water, now stagnate like cesspits” (Zeitoun 2007b, 5). 
It is often said that the Middle East is the driest area of the world (Fig. 1). 
This characterisation “naturalizes” the water crisis and it overlooks the 
large differences within the region. If we focus on actual withdrawals 
of fresh water we find Gaza and even the relatively wet West Bank at 
the very bottom of the scale – of course due to the severe restrictions 
Israel’s ongoing occupation imposes on the water sectors and hence 
on resource development in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). 
Gaza’s crisis of water quality and quantity
Conditions in Gaza and the West Bank are almost the exact opposites 
of one another. While the West Bank is rich in groundwater, Gaza has 
hardly any appreciable recharge from rain. The West Bank enjoys a 
relative abundance of naturally available and renewable freshwater 
resources (some 750-800 million cubic meters per year (mcm/yr), 
abstracted from the aquifers emerging in the West Bank1); Gaza, in 
contrast, lies in a much drier climate zone. As the isohyetic map (Fig. 
2) shows, the Gaza Strip covers the transition zone between semi-arid 
(>400mm of rain per year) and arid (<200mm/yr) climates. 
In the West Bank access to the locally available groundwater is 
severely restricted by the occupation, while in contrast Gaza suffers 
from too much access and severe over-abstractions from the small 
shallow aquifer. And although groundwater in the West Bank is mostly 
of excellent quality, almost all water in Gaza is contaminated.
In consequence, and on the technical level, while the West Bank 
1 However, about 90% of this flow from wells and springs remains under Israel’s exclusive  
control, imposed illegally by the occupation.
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suffers from a quantitative supply crisis, Gaza is exposed to a severe 
environmental and water quality crisis. And while renewable 
groundwater is a finite resource of low supply elasticity, population 
has grown enormously over the past century, thus diminishing local 
in-situ water availability per capita at a dramatic pace.
Water under the British Mandate and after
“Specified flows”2 in the Gaza district between 1920 and 1943 
were approximately evenly distributed between Jews and non-
Jews: Altogether, some 27mcm of well pumpage are recorded by 
British Mandate Authorities, of which 12 mcm can be attributed to 
Palestinians and 11mcm to Jews (the remaining 10%, or around 
3mcm, can be attributed to “others” – other minorities, such as Druze 
or Tcherkessians – or cannot clearly be attributed to either Jews or 
Palestinians).
It should be noted that Gaza district then was more than three times 
larger than the Gaza Strip today. It reached beyond Isdod (Ashdod) 
in the North and almost to Al-Qubeibeh to the East (see British 
mandate maps - Figs. 3 & 4). Its size changed from 1196km2 in 1931 to 
1111km2 in 1945 due to administrative reforms under the Mandate. 
Thus, if evenly distributed, only some 10mcm/yr of well pumpage 
would fall into the area of today’s Gaza Strip. As map 2 shows, most 
of the wells in the district then were concentrated north of today’s 
Gaza perimeter. According to census data gathered in 1922, 1931 and 
1940, the population density in the district grew from 61.8 persons per 
km2 to 79.1 and 100.3 persons per km2. (Compare this to almost 5000 
persons/km2 today!). 
2 The ‘specified flows’ are British Mandate water measurements, quoted from Messerschmid 
(2008a, 15). These data were compiled according to three data registers which focus on the 
period 1920-1943:
- Water Resources of Palestine (1943), by the Government of Palestine (copied from the UK 
National Archives and set up as Excel files) listing some 2000 water sources over a period 
of 23 years; hereinafter referred to as G.S.I.H.Q. (1943).
- Water Measurements Prior to 1944 (1947), by the Palestine Government, detailing mainly 
hydrological (surface) rather than hydrogeological (groundwater) data from rivers, 
springs, streams and wells. Some 2000 well entries on water level and salinity have been 
set up in Excel; hereinafter referred to as GoP (1947). 
- Geology and Water Resources in Palestine (1947), written by G.S. Blake, the government 
geologist and listing another 277 wells and 230 springs with flows and other data of 
interest, hereinafter referred to as Blake (1947). Of these data points, 72 are saline and 
were excluded, and the rest compiled with G.S.I. H.Q. (1943).
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The map in Fig. 4 shows the historical distribution of wells (and the 
lack of springs) in and around Gaza district.
A letter from the High Commissioner for Palestine in Jerusalem (10 
Dec 1932) documents that wells supplying drinking water reached a 
pumpage of at least 50m3/h (equal to 0.4mcm/yr) and one such well 
supplied 60% of Gaza city. The letter reports the plans to establish one 
additional hand-dug well (19m deep) and two boreholes (25m deep, 
12” diameter) for Gaza City Water Supply. If each of these additional 
wells supplied only 30-40m3/h, Gaza City’s population would have 
been served with a bulk supply of some 90-105 litres per capita per 
day (l/c/d). (High Commissioner 1932, 1).3
It is thus evident that the absolute water stress and the natural water 
resource scarcity in the days before the Nakba was far less than today. 
Gaza district’s population grew from some 72,000 in 1922 to 94,000 in 
1931 and then to 151,000 in 1945 (Fig. 5).4 The turn for the worse in 
Gaza came with the mass expulsion of Palestinians in 1948/49, when 
hundreds of thousands of refugees flooded the small strip. Suddenly 
and overnight, the water supply was barely enough to even satisfy 
biological minimum drinking needs (Fig. 6). As will be shown in the 
following, Palestinians never recovered from this blow.
Under Egyptian rule, thousands5 of wells were drilled, most of them 
for agriculture. 
The transboundary Coastal Aquifer (today shared by Israel, Gaza & Egypt)
The primary water resource in Gaza is groundwater. Surface flows occur 
only occasionally after heavy storms in Wadi Gaza – a portion of which 
is further blocked upstream by Israel. The groundwater-bearing strata 
in Gaza belong to the so-called Coastal Aquifer. This aquifer stretches 
along the Mediterranean coast from Mt. Carmel in the north into 
the Sinai in the South and is thus a classically shared transboundary 
3 The total pumpage from these wells is only 1.1 to 1.4 mcm/yr for an urban and peri-urban 
population of 17,000 and 35,000 respectively (High Commissioner 1932, 1). 
4 The margin of deviation in different population statistics is some 2,000 or <3%.
5 There are 2600 registered agricultural wells (according to PWA 2010) – mostly from the 
Egyptian period – and another 2000 agricultural wells drilled in recent years without any 
registration or governmental supervision.
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watercourse, as defined by customary international water law, such 
as the 1997 UN Convention on Transboundary Water Courses.6 The 
main principle under this international law is called “equitable and 
reasonable share” and is based on a composite of several factors, 
such as hydrological factors (the size and distribution of the resource), 
demographic factors (size of respective populations) and the use 
pattern (past and current use), as well as factors from the wider realm 
of socio-economy like the type of use (for domestic, agricultural or 
industrial supply) and considerations beyond the respective aquifer 
in question (such as the dependency of a state on this source, or 
alternative water sources that a state may have), and of course ‘vital 
human needs’. 
The aquifer, as mentioned above, is mainly pumped by Israel (75%). 
In the years since Oslo II was signed in 1995/96 Israel’s abstractions 
have been between 370 and 523mcm/yr with an arithmetic average 
of 437mcm/yr, while Gaza has an average abstraction rate around 
154mcm (= 25.5% share). A similarly strong contrast emerges if the 
sustainable yields in Israel and Gaza are compared: Gaza has a natural 
recharge of some ~60mcm/yr. More importantly, and as stated before, 
this Coastal Aquifer constitutes the only water source of the Gaza Strip 
itself (especially under conditions of complete separation from the 
West Bank).
Groundwater recharge, abstractions and quality 
The Coastal Aquifer (also called “Coastal Aquifer Basin” – CAB) is a 
shallow aquifer that consists mostly of sand and gravel. The aquifer 
is replenished by direct rainfall infiltrating into the sands. In addition, 
return flows from leaky supply networks, agricultural irrigation flows 
and domestic or industrial sewage play an increasing role in the overall 
water budget of the aquifer. Last, but not least, lateral subsurface 
groundwater inflows from neighbouring aquifers have an important 
impact on both the quantitative and qualitative conditions of its 
groundwater. 
In Israel in most years, total pumpage (466mcm) lies slightly (9%) 
above total recharge (426mcm).
6 The full name is “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly and opened for signature in 1997” herein cited as (UN-GA 1997).
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As Table 1 shows, almost 60% of recharge is from rain and about 30% 
comes from the Shafdan treatment plant, whose treated effluents are 
re-infiltrated in sand beds. The rest of the recharge mainly comes from 
irrigation return flows (7%) and from leakage in water reservoirs (4%), 
which are filled mostly by flood water.7 A part of this flood water stems 
from the upper Wadi Gaza, which Israel intercepts and stores on its 
side of the border. Direct recharge through wells with water from the 
NWC and the Western Aquifer existed in the past (7.1 mcm in 97/98) 
but virtually ceased (0.002% now). Of the total pumpage, 46% goes to 
agriculture,8 and the other half mostly to domestic supply.
UNEP (2009) reports rainfall recharge of 45 mcm/yr inside Gaza 
(equivalent to a rainfall-‘recharge coefficient’ of ~41.4%),9 while 
pumpage is quoted there (UNEP 2009, 55) as 163mcm/yr for the year 
2007.10 PWA (2010, 19) reports over 4600 agricultural wells, 2000 of 
which were drilled without regulation or supervision in past years (PWA 
2010, 11, 19). HWE (2010, 42)11 estimates recharge at 138.8mcm/
yr, with rainfall recharge at 35mcm/yr (Table 1) and abstractions at 
176.6mcm/yr (Table 1), thus calculating an annual deficit of 38mcm/yr 
(deficit = 27% of recharge).12
In Gaza, recharge from rain, lateral groundwater inflow and 
anthropogenic return flows amounts to ~124 mcm/yr (Vengosh 2005, 
7 For the year 2006/07, the Hydrological Service of Israel (HSI 2008, 110) accounted for 
17.05mcm of indirect recharge from reservoirs, of which 13.52 came from floods and storm 
runoff and a mere 3.53mcm from water pumped in the National Water Carrier (NWC).
8 Two-thirds are fresh water from boreholes and the NWC, one-third is from treated effluents 
as in the pump schemes around Shafadan.
9 (300mm/yr*362km2*41.4%=45mcm/yr) The recharge coefficient, in other words, means 
that out of 100 litres of rain falling on a given area, 41 litres infiltrate into the ground and 
replenish the groundwater-bearing aquifer strata beneath the ground.
10 Pumpage in 2007 was an estimated 163mcm/yr with 60-65% agriculture and 35-40% 
domestic and industrial. Quotation: (UNEP 2009, 55 – quoting CMWU 2008). 
11 Table 5-1: Water Balance for Hydrological Year 2008/09. NOTE: The HWE Groundwater 
Protection Plan (HWE 2010, 42) in its Table 5-1 (Water Balance for the Hydrological Year 
2008/09) calculates a total municipal abstraction rate of 94.2mcm/yr. Yet, leakage from 
ailing networks is reported high – between 25% and 30%. If we apply a 25% rate of physical 
losses (24mcm), this results in a net supply of 71mcm/yr. A 30% loss rate (31mcm) would 
result in only 63mcm/yr of net supply.
12 Notes on HWE-calculations with respect to ‘Return Flows’: For the inflowing water, Return 
Flows should refer to only to the actually consumed domestic water only, not to all 
produced water; For the outflowing amounts, network leakage should also be subsumed 
under Return Flows.
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17), while total abstractions amount to more than 150mcm/yr – thus 
creating a total annual deficit of ~31mcm/yr (or 20% of the budget), 
which means that one fifth of all abstractions are not covered by the 
yield of the aquifer. An overview of the above components of the 
Water Balance of Gaza is shown in the schematic flow chart (Fig. 7). 
It should be added that it is not only in Gaza that the aquifer is over-
pumped. The largest depressions of groundwater tables are actually 
found in the vicinity of Rehovot (Fig. 8), near the main population 
centres in Israel, where the abstraction rates are especially high.
A schematic spatial overview of abstraction rates is shown in Fig. 9, 
with the amount pumped indicated by the length of each column for 
two rows each. Fig. 9 also shows that contrary to frequent but wrong 
allegations, Israel does not heavily pump around Gaza in order to 
intercept groundwater flow before it can enter the strip (among other 
reasons due to the aforementioned poor water quality in the South). 
Israel only abstracts ~25mcm/yr in the Southern CAB, but 345mcm/yr in 
the Central and Northern aquifer areas.13 On average, Gaza, with ~176.6 
mcm abstractions, enjoys a share of only one quarter (27%) of total 
abstractions from the aquifer (see Table 6).14 It should be stressed here 
that high salinities in this aquifer are by no means a new phenomenon, 
as the comparison of historical and current salinities in Fig. 11 makes 
clear.15 The map shows for the Central Gaza strip, for example, that 
moderately fresh to slightly brackish water conditions (200-350mg/
l) have given way to strongly brackish and saline conditions (600-
1000mg/l). South of Rafah and East of Deir Al-Balah, a highly saline 
plume is encroaching the strip from SE directions towards the coast 
(dark grey, >1000mg/l Chloride contents) – see Fig. 10. Surprisingly, 
the strongest deterioration of freshness has occurred in the heavily 
pumped Central Israeli Coastal Plain, where formerly fresh water (light 
grey - <200mg/l) is now increasingly brackish to saline (between 200 
and 1000mg/l) - see Fig. 11.
It is important to note here that salinities – contrary to the widespread 
but mistaken narrative – encroach Gaza from two directions: From 
13 This refers to the year 2003/04; source: (HSI 2005, 33).
14  This share refers to the sum of Israeli and Palestinian abstractions, not including additional 
abstractions from the Egyptian part of the aquifer in Sinai.
15 British Mandate groundwater salinity map from 1934/35 and Hydrological Survey of Israel 
data map 2004/05. 
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the Coast, as seawater intrusions, due to groundwater levels dropping 
below sea level; but also, and even more so, from the southeast, in 
other words, from within Israel, where the Coastal Aquifer is naturally 
connected to saline and hypersaline older regional aquifers (of Eocene 
age, “Avedat formation” in Israeli nomenclature) – here as well due to 
the dropping water levels inside Gaza, and thus increasing hydraulic 
gradients towards Gaza. 
The cross-section in Fig. 12 and the map of water levels in Fig. 13 
both show schematically the flow connection with the saline “Avedat” 
aquifer/aquitard of Eocene age inside Israel. 
Sources of pollution and salinity
The large deficit in the water balance leads to a steady drop in water 
levels and thus a steepening of hydraulic gradients, both towards 
the borders of Gaza (both the sea and the eastern border). When 
groundwater levels drop below sea level, seawater intrusions are 
enabled. More importantly, the dropping water levels also increase 
the natural inflows of saline groundwater from the east and southeast. 
Other sources of pollution, besides the salt water intrusions from the 
sea and from the southeast, are mainly due to human activities on the 
ground inside Gaza, such as waste water effluents, solid waste disposal 
and agricultural by-products like fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and 
the like. While the direct rainfall replenishment is of relatively fresh 
water quality, the other flows constitute a stress on the salinity and 
overall quality of the resource. In addition, surface pollution from 
unregulated solid waste deposition and agricultural use of pollutants 
such as fertilizers and pesticides renders the infiltration rain water dirty, 
thus contaminating the unsaturated zone and ultimately – with a delay 
of several (up to ten) years – the groundwater resources themselves. 
Probably the largest sources of pollution finally are large amounts of 
untreated or insufficiently treated waste water infiltrating into the 
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aquifer.16 Mark Buttle, coordinator for the WaSH cluster,17 concluded 
that the “main reason is sewage infiltrating into the ground, while 
agriculture plays [only] a part through fertilizers. Khan Yunis, for 
example, relies entirely on cesspits and isn’t connected to sewers” 
(quoted in Irving 2010, 1). Yet groundwater pollution is not restricted 
to Khan Yunis but ubiquitous throughout the Strip. Mark Buttle adds 
that there also was “a localized pollution problem stemming from the 
storm water lagoon which had a lot of sewage flowing into it for a few 
years” (Irving 2010, 2). In other words, waste water not only enters 
the unprotected (unconfined) dune sand and gravel aquifers with 
ease, in most of the so-called waste water lagoons, percolation into 
the ground is actually systematically enhanced, by boreholes drilled 
into the bottom of the lagoon and right into the aquifer! 
This deeply flawed design is a feature almost unique to the Gaza Strip 
and dates back for many decades in the older lagoons, but is also used 
in the ones built recently. It should be noted that of course, this highly 
problematic approach, despite being given little attention in common 
discussions of the water pollution crisis, has deeper political reasons 
directly linked to the occupation18 and merits further explanation. A 
recent study by UNEP (2009, 32) concludes that water is now so saline 
in Gaza that it could be the end of agriculture there, or at least “a long-
term reduction in agricultural activity.” 
16 There are no exact calculations as to the size of the salt and pollutant contribution from waste 
water. However, model calculations for the chloride mass balance inside Israel suggest that 
the bulk of salts entering the aquifer come from the unsaturated zone, which means from 
the delayed arrival of surface pollutants at the water table. According to calculations by HSI 
(2006, 115/116) for the year 2006/07, of the 137,186 tons of chlorides entering the aquifer, 
78% come through the unsaturated zone (with 10% from rain, 36% from irrigation and 32% 
from the spreading beds of the Shafdan effluents re-infiltration scheme). Only 22% (30,114 
tons) are groundwater inflows from the east. And to the west, despite local seawater 
intrusion, the aquifer shows a slight net loss of 674 tons of chlorides into the sea. In other 
words, surface pollution by far outweighs subsurface entries of salty inflows (seawater and 
lateral groundwater from the east). In Gaza, the relative weight of subsurface salt entries is 
higher than in Israel, but it is still unlikely that they deliver more salt than the agricultural 
and waste water return flows (data from: HSI 2008, 115 ff.).
17 WaSH - Water and Sanitation, Hygiene working group of Palestinian and International NGO’s 
in the oPt.
18 Most of these lagoons were constructed under the occupation and prior to Oslo.
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“Enhanced” pollution
For decades Israel, despite its economic power and full sovereignty over 
its territory, has been dumping raw domestic and industrial sewage into 
the sea, rendering its streams highly polluted, even toxic; as a result 
Israel is considered the worst polluter of the Mediterranean. It was only 
a decade ago that Israel started to step up its efforts to treat domestic 
sewage, and it still has a long way to go. The first modern treatment plant 
for West Jerusalem was opened only in this millennium (2001) and East 
Jerusalem is not even under consideration for its own treatment plant. 
It should be remembered that an Australian athletic team participating 
in the Maccabean Games in 1997 fell into the shallow lower Yarqon 
River when a pedestrian bridge collapsed under them; this resulted in 
serious injuries, not from the fall or inability to swimming, but simply 
because they came into contact with the toxic liquids that make up the 
Yarqon River. Even off the coast, waters are so polluted that Israeli army 
divers have sued the government for compensation, because so many 
of them suffer from cancer and other potentially lethal diseases. Even 
the pride of Israel’s waste water treatment system, Shafdan treatment 
plant near Tel Aviv, not many years ago was dumping the residual 
sludge into the sea. To this day, many streams in Israel carry untreated 
domestic and industrial sewage into the sea.
Not so in Gaza under tight direct occupation since 1967 and a total 
siege since 2007, Not one single modern and sufficiently sized 
treatment plant was erected there during decades of direct, full Israeli 
control. The few existing plants only partially treat the sewage and 
are hopelessly under-sized. Despite the fact that Gazans were given 
neither tools nor assistance in building their much-needed treatment 
facilities and often even were refused permits to construct, in Gaza 
Israel strictly enforces the ban on dumping sewage into the sea. No 
raw wastewater collection pipe or canal is allowed to channel the 
sewage directly to the shore; only unregulated runoff towards the sea 
can be observed (OCHA-CAP 2009, 18).19
This strict and discriminatory ban on marine sewage disposal is 
the reason why the so-called “waste water lagoons” remain the 
19 Some 50-80 million liters per day (~24mcm/yr) of raw or partially treated sewage has been 
released into the sea daily since January 2008 due to the crisis at the wastewater treatment 
plants. 
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main feature of Palestinian waste water disposal. Originally built to 
accelerate groundwater recharge with storm water, “the location 
and design of these ponds was intended to facilitate easy and quick 
recharge. However, whenever the sewage pumps fail, the infiltration 
ponds become convenient dumping grounds for raw sewage. The net 
effect is that raw sewage infiltrates into the groundwater” (UNEP 2009, 
56). In order to enhance this active recharge, a special design was 
invented – perforating the bottom with boreholes dozens of meters 
deep that rapidly channel the waste water into the underground. 
Almost all lagoons in Gaza function in this scandalous way. Hence, 
nearly the entire freight of pollutants is actively “recharged” into the 
shallow unsaturated zone between the ground and the water table, 
sometimes even directly into the groundwater body. More importantly, 
now even new donor-facilitated wastewater lagoons are designed in 
this fashion.20 It is ironic - we have grown so accustomed to this flawed 
approach that a lagoon where the infiltration boreholes have become 
clogged over the years, is labelled as “not functioning properly”.21
BOX 1: A silent tsunami  For decades the old waste water lagoon 
with 3 million cubic metres of sewage has been hanging steeply over 
the city of Beit Lahia (OCHA Aerial photograph, Fig. 14).
In 2006, Palestinian NGOs made urgent pleas to allow pumping 
materials required to bring the level of the lake down into the Strip. 
“With the pleas came a host of consultants to look at the lake.
Invariably the consultants would drive out to the lake, look at its 
saturated sandy levees in astonishment and say, ‘If this thing ever 
bursts it will be a disaster’. And then they, as I did, would drive away” 
(Zeitoun 2007b). In late 2006 a new lagoon was added, but at an 
unfavourable location and with a severe lack of building material. 
After strong rains, this new small lagoon burst on 27 March 2007,
20 It could not be otherwise: if these lagoons had their bottom properly sealed against 
infiltration into the ground, an overflow of the vast structures would be a matter of months, 
if not weeks.
21 NB: To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be emphasised that dumping raw sewage 
into the sea is indeed the second worst option of all. But for a densely crowded stretch of 
land like Gaza, completely sealed off from the outside and depending solely on its scarce 
unprotected groundwater resources, the “infiltration basins” lagoons are clearly the single 
worst option.
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burying the Bedouin community Umm El-Nasser under its stinking 
floods. 250 homes were destroyed, and five people died in the floods 
of sewage, immediately termed “wastewater tsunami” by the press 
(Fig. 15).
At the same time, all sewage had now to be pumped into the old 
lagoon, thus threatening to create an even larger catastrophe. The 
international community came to rescue with an emergency plan: 
Two new lagoons were to be erected near the northern border of 
the strip in order to prevent the main lake form collapsing. The two 
lagoons (Figs. 16a, 16b) were termed “infiltration basins” and indeed 
with a daily pumping capacity of some 6,000m3 and a total storage 
of only 250,000 m3, these lagoons would be filled in another 40 days. 
In other words, in order to only contain the small side stream to the 
new lagoons, 17 such basins would be needed each year to prevent 
them from rapidly empty their contaminating load into the aquifer 
beneath (so far the freshest groundwater zone in Gaza, see Fig. 10).
Thus each lagoon was perforated at its bottom by a series of 
‘infiltration boreholes’ several dozen meters deep that would swallow 
the daily inflow of sewage; in other words: An active and enhanced 
wastewater recharge to the aquifer. The problem is “solved”: A silent 
tsunami of sewage keeps flowing ever since, out of our eyes and our 
minds – until new reports of diseases due to contaminated drinking 
water are making headlines…
“Emergency” for decades 
I remember, in early 1997, one of the first meetings I attended was 
organised by the World Bank dealing with Gaza. The over-abstractions, 
pollution and seawater intrusion into the aquifer were characterised 
as an “emergency state of affairs” and it was stated dryly that under 
“normal circumstances” and in other countries, pumpage would have 
to stop immediately. 
Thirteen years have passed – the problems, of course, being older than 
this time span – and not only has pumpage not been stopped, but 
thousands of private new wells were actually drilled and dug into the 
shallow aquifer.22 A serious lack of even basic control over abstractions 
22 A period of extreme drilling activity started after the war in summer 2006. With the trauma 
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is the rule; we do not even know the approximate number of wells, 
let alone their annual abstraction rates.23 Unsurprisingly, UNEP (2009) 
comes to the conclusion that an immediate halt of abstractions from 
the aquifer is imperative. So if the years before the Second Intifada 
were already marked by emergency conditions, how should the 
current state and latest developments be described? During the 1990s 
plans for future enhanced supply, upgraded and largely expanded 
waste water treatment, and other protection measures were drawn 
up. But by the year 2005, prior to the Israeli disengagement from the 
strip, 5 years of relentless Israeli counter-Intifada had left the strip in 
conditions much worse than ever before. 
The Intifada
Israeli destruction of infrastructure is of course older than the most 
recent aggression in 2008/09: During the Second Intifada the hardest 
hit areas were Rafah and Beit Hanoun in the extreme south and north 
of Gaza. In Rafah, the Israeli military destroyed 36 km of water lines 
and 42 km of waste water lines during its invasions in May 2004.24 An 
estimated 20% of the existing water infrastructure was damaged by 
the Israeli military invasions. At the time, an American employee of 
USAID stationed in Gaza estimated that over 1000 wells had been 
destroyed, damaged, blown up or bulldozed by the Israeli army. 
And yet, even this situation is now remembered as the good old days 
– before Israel cut off Gaza from all supplies and from the rest of 
the world, following the 2006 elections and the ensuing power split 
between Gaza and the West Bank. 
When the Israeli government pulled out its settlers and redeployed 
the army, it left behind a scorched landscape, a raided infrastructure 
of the power plants being bombed by Israel and the wells consequently stopped operating, 
a real frenzy of uncontrolled private drilling broke out. There are only very rough estimates 
of the number of private wells dug in the year before the total siege was imposed over 
Gaza; some assume that more than 5000 wells were drilled by everybody who had the 
funds to do so. Every relatively prosperous homeowner ran to dig his own well, equipped 
with a pump and diesel generator, to “secure” supply during the frequent power (and 
water) cuts. PWA (2010) estimates the number of unregistered agricultural wells at 2000.
23  PWA (2010) can only indirectly derive agricultural consumption estimates by applying an 
average irrigation water duty to all irrigated fields.
24 For example OCHA (2004) reports damage to 15km (out of the 20km) of sewage networks 
in Rafah after incursions in May 2004. For the almost monthly invasions in 2004, see also 
PHG (2005). 
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and a shattered water supply. At the same time, there was much hope. 
Grandiose promises were (once again) made by the international 
community. Billions of donor dollars were pledged in late 2005, none 
of which materialised. This is because Palestinians in Gaza had to be 
punished once again, this time for their fair and democratic elections 
in January 2006 that brought Hamas a landslide victory.
Israel started to identify Gaza as a ‘hostile entity’ – and this time 
was joined by the Western donor states and the Fatah-appointed 
government in Ramallah. In 2007, when Hamas took control over the 
Strip, a total siege and blockade was imposed by Israel, soon joined 
and actively supported by the donors and Abu Mazen’s “legitimate 
government”.
The siege
This siege has proven to be a most effective (and cruel) measure of 
strangulation. No spare parts, no construction materials and no 
equipment for operation and maintenance were allowed to enter this 
small, hermetically sealed patch of land. Any attempt to reconstruct 
after the past devastation, let alone expand and upgrade existing 
infrastructure, collapsed within weeks, with the last pipe, the last 
fitting and the last screw leaving the empty warehouses. Half a year 
into the siege, the strip was already devastated on a new level.
Half a year into the siege, Haaretz correspondent Amira Hass (2008) 
wrote:
“40% of Gazans lack running water” 
Gaza Strip residents Monday moved from worrying about the electricity 
cuts of the previous 40 hours to worrying about a water shortage.
The municipality needs electricity to bring water to homes and the 
houses need it to pump water to the roof tanks. Hence 40 percent of 
Gaza Strip homes - 600,000 people - had no running water Monday, 
the Palestinian Water Authority said. Oxfam International said Monday 
that unless diesel and fuel supplies were resumed immediately, all 
the Strip’s water pumps could stop working by Tuesday. The non-
governmental organization also warned of the sewage system’s 
collapse in the absence of diesel. 
‘Without electric power we can manage somehow, without bread too,’ 
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says a resident of the Nasser neighbourhood in northern Gaza. 
‘It’s cold enough to prevent the food from going bad and we try to open 
the refrigerator as little as possible. The kids grumble but they can learn 
to live without the computer. But without water? We calculate each 
step,’ he says. ‘We don’t put on the gas heaters, because tomorrow 
might be colder. We don’t cook for long. But to consider whether to go 
to the toilet? Whether to wash our face? That is insufferable.’ (Haas 
2008)
By the end of 2007, almost a year before Operation “Cast Lead”, OCHA 
reported, “In the same time, water supply is more dire than ever. Long-
duration cuts in supply are the rule. Average consumption has dropped 
from 97 l/c/d before the second Intifada, to 57.8 l/c/d” (OCHA 2008).
International organisations started warning about an outbreak of 
epidemics, chronic diseases and acute health hazards like blue baby 
syndrome. Failing water and waste water services were identified as 
the number one public health hazard in Gaza.
War: Operation Cast Lead
The Israeli invasion, Operation “Cast Lead”, further devastated the 
little that had remained (see Table 2 below):25 The Goldstone report 
found that “there was a deliberate and systematic policy on the part 
of the Israeli armed forces to target ... water installations” (Goldstone 
2009, 22,217).26 It further concluded that “in the destruction of private 
residential houses, water wells, water tanks, agricultural land and 
greenhouses there was a specific purpose of denying them for their 
sustenance to the population of the Gaza Strip” (Goldstone 2009, 26, 
par.73). At the height of the Israeli military offensive up to one third of 
the Gaza population was left without access to clean water, some for 
ten or more days (El-Jazairi 2008, 14).
UNEP (2009, 83, Table 27) estimates that total environmental damage 
(water, waste water, solid waste and related agricultural sectors) 
amounts to US$ 44 million (Table 3).
In addition to the long term and war damage, OCHA-CAP (2009, 17) 
25 “Before the war, Gaza had 97% supply coverage at 80 litres per capita per day and 64 % 
sewage collection & treatment coverage” (UNEP 2009, 78).
26 Quoted from UN-GA (2009), Clause n.54 and Conclusion n.1026 (Goldstone: 22,217)
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described the general situation in Gaza: “CMWU needs 1,250 tons 
of cement to repair damaged water tanks alone. 10,000 people [still 
remain] without access to running water mains. Access to water for 
the rest of the population is restricted.” Yet the siege on Gaza continues 
relentlessly.
In June OCHA (2010a, 11) reported that imports into Gaza, were 
20% of those during the first half of 2007, before the siege. After the 
Israeli invasion (08/09), 70% of all industrial establishments were 
closed. Power cuts last up to 16 hours per day. Aid dependency now 
is 80%. UNRWA reported that by the beginning of 2010 the number 
of refugees that lived in abject poverty had risen to 300,000. This is 
a threefold increase from 100,000 in the year 2009. As Mark Buttle, 
WaSH coordinator in Gaza, explains, this “indicates people’s coping 
mechanisms are coming to an end. For two or three years people 
have been getting by -- borrowing or selling the odd asset -- but I think 
there’s an indication that people are fundamentally running out of 
coping mechanisms” (Irving 2010). 
The situation after the war
A recent household survey conducted by PHG & UNICEF (2010) shows 
that although 98 per cent of Gaza’s 1.5 million residents are connected 
to the water network, supply is intermittent. Only 48% of households 
have running water four or more days a week. Some places receive no 
running water (like Al Mawasi), or only partially (Khan Younis camp, 
52% of households).27 In other places (Rafah, Ash Shati’ Camp) water 
runs just once a week. However, the majority of the population does 
not use the municipal water supply for drinking. 
Drinking water 
13.1% drink water from the networks, and 4.2% get desalinated water 
supplied by the CMWU through networks or communal filling stations. 
“The vast majority, 82.7 per cent, rely on unregulated private water 
vendors, either with tankers or jerry cans.” The business of private 
vendors has grown into a full-fledged industry, “a whole parallel 
27 “In Al Mawasi no household has running water and in Khan Younis camp 52 per cent do not 
have running water. Al Maghazi camp is the only area where all households have running 
water the majority of the time, four to seven days a week. In some places like Rafah and Ash 
Shati’ Camp it runs just once a week” (PHG 2010, 14). 
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drinking water system from the private sector. There are about 70 
privately-run boreholes in Gaza and each one has its own private 
desalination plant and tanker trucks to deliver the water to people’s 
homes” (Irving 2010, 1).
Water for drinking is a basic right of every human being. According to 
the World Health Organization WHO each person should have daily 
access to 100 litres of clean, affordable and reliable water supply 
(100 l/c/d). The Millennium Development Guideline that deals with 
ensuring sustainability in environmental matters “aims at halving by 
2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation” (Millennium Goal 7, Target 10 – 
UN-MDG 2010, 58). 
In areas like Gaza such well-sounding promises disgrace themselves 
– quality and quantity of supply are not on a slow rise, but dropping 
rapidly. 
The aforementioned 57.8 l/c/d (OCHA 2008) were an average value for 
the year 2008, before the war. A recent household survey (PHG 2010, 
15) revealed that a mere 6% of households can rely on networked 
municipal supply as their source of essential drinking water (Fig. 19). 
In the poorest areas, such as Khan Yunis, up to one third of households 
cannot even rely on municipal supply for purposes, other than drinking 
(see ‘domestic supply’28 sources – Fig. 20). Instead, they depend on 
unregulated and unmonitored private wells or on humanitarian aid 
for this basic commodity (PHG 2010, 17 – Fig. 20). Households that 
are not connected to any water network, have no other resort but to 
either dig for water themselves (in some regions the water level is only 
a few meters below ground level) or to purchase water from private 
tanker “trucks” (photo – Fig. 17, graph – Fig. 19); in some areas, they 
drink from agricultural wells.29
On average, a jerry can of 18 litres of water costs one NIS, or 56 NIS 
per cubic-metre, though this varies by area (photo – Fig. 18). (By 
comparison, a cubic metre of network water costs 0.5 to 1.5 NIS in Gaza, 
28 ‘Domestic’ water here is understood as water for daily household operations, other than 
drinking water, like laundry, cleaning, and so forth.
29 GCI (2008) studied water quality in these private owned and operated tankers and found 
reasons for grave concern about the water quality – mainly due to mishandling in storage 
and transportation of the desalinated brackish water.
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or 4 NIS in Ramallah.) “Such rates are unaffordable for poor households 
– spending up to one-third of their income on water” (Mark Buttle in: 
Irving 2010, 1). Like everywhere in the world, from Bogotá to Lagos, 
the poorest pay the highest water prices – or have to consume water 
unsuitable for drinking. Yet despite being unaffordable for many, even 
this water is not safe: “When produced it’s normally pure,” says Mark 
Buttle, adding that this unregulated system fails during handling and 
transport in private tankers that pump the water into the household 
tanks. “During a delivery run dozens of people might handle the pipe 
– it only takes one not to have washed their hands. 70 percent of 
samples show positive for bacteriological pollution” (Buttle, quoted in 
Irving 2010).
“Rising poverty forced many people to drink water from private and 
agricultural wells that are polluted from farming and wastewater 
seepage. In Al Mawasi, where there is no water network (and only 
58% of households are able to buy water from vendors), 47% say 
agricultural wells are their primary source of drinking water” (PHG 
2010, 14, 15). 
Across Gaza, only 32% of households can afford to use drinking water 
for cooking. “Cooking heightens the concentration of nitrates and other 
salts even further. 44% of respondents said they take daily showers” 
(PHG 2010, 9). 
Water that makes people sick
The over-abstractions and the pollution together create a lethal mix: 
Water-borne diseases have been designated public health hazard No. 
1 in Gaza by the WHO and UN and international NGOs operating in the 
water sector.
A mere 7.5 % of the 129 municipal drinking water supply wells meet 
WHO standards of chloride content (Fig. 21). In the last ten years, the 
salt concentration has risen around 30%. The water in Gaza makes 
people sick (Box 2). The household survey (PHG 2010, 9) concludes 
that on average, due to poor water quality and hygiene practices, 20% 
of households had at least one child under the age of five who had 
been infected with severe diarrhoea in the four weeks prior to the 
survey; locally (Beit Hanoun) this ratio can rise up to 38%.
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Box 2: When water makes people sick: water and waste water 
problems
COHRE, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions wrote in 
January 2008 that: 
• Water-borne diseases resulting from the lack of clean drinking 
water included diarrhoea, hepatitis A, typhoid fever, paratyphoid, 
and gastro enteritis. 
• Water-borne infections resulting from poor sanitary conditions 
included trachoma, conjunctivitis, dysentery, gastro-enteritis and 
hookworm.
• Children are the most vulnerable. In October 2007, the WHO 
reported that compared to the previous year, the number of 
children aged three and under who were diagnosed as having 
diarrhoea at UNRWA health clinics in Gaza had increased by 20%.
• WHO regularly detects alarmingly high nitrate contents from 
sewage and agriculture, for example in October 2007, especially 
in the wells of Gaza city, Jabalia and Khan Younis. 
COHRE reminds us of the fact that according to international law,
“an occupying power is obliged to ensure public health and hygiene 
… The Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Israel, also 
recognizes the right of the child to the highest attainable standard 
of health and states that the provision of clean drinking water is 
necessary to combat disease.) The right to water and sanitation 
is also essential in order to safeguard people from potentially 
fatal diseases such as diarrhoea and cholera. The blockade and 
restrictions on monetary transfers are therefore leading to a violation 
of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.”
Domestic water for cleaning, cooking and personal hygiene 
The reliance on networks or other sources depends largely on the area 
– and hence water quality – of households. On average, 86% generally 
rely on the network for domestic water (Fig. 20) but half are reluctant 
to use this water for cooking due to water quality concerns. In many 
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refugee camps, however, water quality (or availability) is too bad even 
for using water for domestic purposes. In Khan Younis refugee camp 
only 57% source their domestic water from the network; the rest 
depend on aid. In Jabalya only 13% are supplied by the network, 45% 
rely on aid, and the rest on private supply (vendors 29% and wells 13%). 
In areas with hardly any network, such as Al Mawasi, as few as 1.4% of 
households receive domestic water from the municipal network while 
98.7% draw it from private wells (PHG 2010, 17).
Yet, as already mentioned, water quality has long dropped below 
drinking water standards and is steadily declining. After the war, UNEP 
(2009, 61, 62 – Table 16) sampled both private and municipal water 
wells, with a distressing result: Seven of the nine private wells tested, 
and all three municipal wells tested, failed to reach WHO standards 
(especially with respect to chlorides, in some locations). 
A vicious circle
In order to prevent people from drinking water from unregulated 
agricultural wells, controlled networked water would have to be 
brought to their homes. This requires large-scale repairs and local 
expansion of slowly rotting networks. Yet the siege on Gaza prevents 
all such projects from being implemented. No pipes, not even raw 
materials for plastic pipes, are allowed in. Key water project materials 
short-listed by WaSH as priorities are: Water pipes, cement, steel bar, 
aggregates and any sort of fittings, as well as generators, mobile water 
pumps and pump motors. Oxfam staff member Mark Buttle said,
[E]xample: we drew up a clear priority list of things we thought 
we’d need for winter 2009 and started negotiating for those 
in October. We only actually received items from that list in 
March, April and May 2010. … Big sewage and wastewater 
projects cannot progress without materials coming from Israel, 
and we’re talking tens of thousands of tons of cement.30 At 
Oxfam…big projects can’t happen…organizations like Oxfam are 
now having to take an emergency approach to the wastewater 
situation. (Irving 2010) 
Gaza had already run out of pipes in late 2007. Buttle remarked,
30  Each month a handful of trucks are getting through at best, not the many thousands needed.
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At the moment there is one pipe factory in Gaza which is 
producing, but there are knotty problems for aid agencies 
about the legalities of buying pipes when you are unsure if the 
raw materials entered Gaza through the tunnels. It’s a not a 
simple problem (Irving 2010).31 
This is the way Western donor states, and even NGOs, comply with 
the total siege on Gaza. The siege on Gaza is not only imposed by an 
Israeli government known for its contempt for international law. It is 
supported and deepened by the actions (and inactivity) of Western 
democracies, NGOs and the rival Palestinian authority in Ramallah 
(Ravid 2010).
For ten years, Gaza has seen nothing but destruction in waves ever 
more accelerating and intensifying, while at the same time, supplies of 
even the most basic materials for repairs are denied entry. It is against 
this background that Mark Buttle described the 2008/09 Military 
invasion with its “deliberate and systematic policy… to target… water 
installations” (Goldstone 2009, 22, 217)32 in seemingly euphemistic 
terms:
But even this is only the tip of the iceberg. A lot of problems 
now (such as decrepit pipes) are not due to Israel’s invasion in 
winter 2008-09 (“Operation Cast Lead”). They’re down to the 
overall deterioration of things over time (Irving 2010).
The water and sanitation situation today, almost 20 months after the 
war, shall be illustrated by two examples: the chronic fuel shortage and 
the blocking of trucks entering the strip (WaSH 2010d, 1): 
a) Fuel
Lack of fuel results in
- 12-18 hours of continuous power cut-off per day; In addition, the 
current low voltage is inadequate to run CMWU water facilities. 
Thus 170 wells and 40 sewage pump stations are affected, as well 
as 4 wastewater treatment plants and 5 water desalination units.
31  In Gaza, 45% of all water leaks into the ground.
32  Quoted from UN-GA (2009), Clause n.54 and Conclusion n.1026 (Goldstone 2009, 22, 217).
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- severe impediments on water supply and production: 25 water 
wells without standby power generators only operate when power 
is available. 
- a 43% drop in water production and the interruption of pressurized 
water in the network. Most affected are those living in elevated 
areas and in residential towers. 
- 50% of Gazans having access to water once a week only (6-8 hours). 
- a 50% drop of production in the desalination units supplying 
drinking water. Residents of southern and central Gaza now are 
forced to purchase drinking water from the private vendors or from 
agricultural wells (at up to 40NIS/m3) causing a serious health risk. 
- sewage pump stations operating 12 to 24 hours per day and 
overflowing into the infiltration lagoons. Pump station No. B7 – 
which usually pumps ~40% of all Gaza City wastewater – now is at 
risk of total collapse. 
- rising wastewater levels: the North Gaza treatment plant was 
forced to use the emergency latch (to prevent another Umm Nasser 
sewage flood) relieving raw sewage into the sea. Bathing along the 
shoreline, one of the few recreational activities available in Gaza, 
constitutes a great health risk. 
Under current conditions, no risk mitigating response is feasible – WaSH 
dryly states: “No real changes in fuel supply. At present, no specific 
support is given to CMWU except for UNRWA’s one-time provision 
of 100m3.” (WaSH 2010d) A one-time delivery of 100m3 of fuel in a 
month, entering a strip with 1.5 million inhabitants is worth reporting!33
And on July 16, 2010, OCHA (2010b, 10) adds that “Industrial fuel 
imports for the Gaza power plant continued to decline for the seventh 
consecutive month to now only 3.6 million litres per month (Fig. 22) and 
thus reached the lowest levels recorded since December 2008.” This 
represents “27 percent of the amount of fuel required to operate the 
plant at full capacity. The Gaza Power Plant was forced to completely 
shut down for five days, triggering power cuts of 12-16 hours per day.” 
(OCHA 2010b). 
33 Distributed evenly, these 100m3/month for Gaza are equivalent to 2 millilitres per person 
per day.
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This situation continued for the fourth consecutive year and throughout 
the summer:34
b) Trucks
The fuel crisis as well as the general crisis in Gaza is of course the result 
of trucks with supplies being prevented from entering the strip due 
to the Israeli siege on Gaza. And thus Gaza is probably the only place 
in the world where the exact number of trucks crossing the border is 
counted meticulously and makes daily headlines. 
During the first five months of 2010, overall construction material 
imports (humanitarian and commercial) were 388 trucks or 1% the 
amount prior to the blockade (then 7,400 per month).
Exports of flowers and strawberries (in the 12 months from April 2009 
until April 2010) amounted to 118 trucks. This is 0.9% of their previous 
level. OCHA (2010c, 11) states that “the continued ban on exports has 
been one of the key reasons for the collapse of the private sector.”  
Water and sanitation here are not the exception: According to OCHA 
(2010d), the number of all trucks with humanitarian goods in the year 
2010 (January to September) was close to zero: All in all, 233 trucks with 
humanitarian construction materials and only 19 trucks with hygiene 
and cleaning supplies entered Gaza, equivalent to 0.91 and 0.08 trucks 
per day on average, respectively. In the 3 months since the “easing” of 
the siege, from June to August 2010, only two humanitarian trucks for 
hygiene and cleaning supplies entered Gaza.
The WaSH Cluster specifically counts the trucks for Water, Sanitation 
and Health. Table 4 shows that in June, July and August 2010, and since 
Israel announced the “easing” of the siege in June 2010, a total of 64.5 
trucks with emergency WaSH materials could enter the strip (44.5, 
excluding chlorine deliveries). In 2010, 20 WaSH trucks per month on 
average entered Gaza, or 10.6 trucks excluding chlorine supplies. 
Three generations…
In July, OCHA (2010a, 8) reports: “Karni Crossing was built and equipped 
to handle over 750 truckloads a day. However, it remains limited to 
34  8-12 hours daily power cuts; 40% of population get water once a week (6-8 hrs) - without 
power, the water cannot be pumped to the roof water tanks (WASH 2010b, 1).
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only one conveyor belt used for the transfer of grains and construction 
gravel - the main elements of the crossing remain closed (‘security 
concerns’). In Karni, UNRWA, for example, could transfer only 30 
truckloads of gravel per week (in average 4.2 trucks per day) through 
this one conveyer belt. At this pace, it would take approximately 15 
years to bring in the 24,000 truckloads of aggregate needed to carry 
out 26 frozen UNRWA projects, and about 75 years to bring in the 
aggregates needed to implement the whole UNRWA reconstruction 
plan for Gaza.” 
Controlled Items - The Easing of the Siege
Following the attack on the international Gaza aid flotilla, in which 9 
unarmed civilians were killed by Israeli troops, world attention once 
again turned to Gaza. Israel was under pressure and promised in June 
2010 to ease restrictions on the entry of goods. But there was not very 
much pressure, as all sides hastened to agree that they do not seek a 
fundamental change in policy.
The so-called “easing” consisted of a shift “from a list of permitted 
items to a list of banned items” (issued on 5 July 2010) such as military 
and dual use items which remain prohibited or restricted. 
Dual-use items are specified in two separate lists, one list of 15 categories 
of general items, including fertilizers, glass fibre-based raw materials, 
drilling equipment, vessels and water disinfectants, and another list 
of 19 types of construction materials (to be limited to projects under 
international supervision), including cement, aggregates (gravel), 
prepared concrete, concrete blocks, steel elements, asphalt, sealing 
materials, and construction vehicles, and so on (OCHA 2010b, 8). 
JUNE 
“The announced ‘easing’ of the blockade (crossing Kerem Shalom)… 
however, is not reflected in the number of trucks carrying WASH 
materials. The WASH sector is currently awaiting entry of materials 
for 37 emergency projects, worth over 85 million USD. UNDP reports 
that the construction of water tanks is on hold due to unavailability of 
construction material” (WaSH 2010e, 2).
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JULY 
As reported by OCHA’s Humanitarian Monitor,
Imports of construction materials remain restricted. Under the 
new measures, such materials are considered ‘dual use’ items, 
and are only allowed for projects approved by the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and supervised by international organizations. 
As a result, no change is expected in the private sector’s ability 
to address housing needs, which have increased since the 
imposition of the blockade, and exacerbated by the destruction 
of homes during the ‘Cast Lead’ offensive. 
This month [July 2010], Israeli authorities approved a total 
of 31 new construction projects, including eleven to be 
administered by the UN. These include eight new schools, and 
classroom additions at two existing schools, and two health 
clinics. However, the approved projects are only a small part of 
what is needed: the value of the approved UN projects (USD 15 
million) is only 1.4 percent of the total value of the proposed 
programme of work for the UN in Gaza (USD 1.05 billion). 
(OCHA 2010a, 7, 8)
The new Israeli policy, it turns out, is not so new after all. The “easing” 
in principle should not be confused with real changes on the ground – 
real trucks passing the land entry points to Gaza. 
So far, approvals have only been given in principle, and follow-
up negotiations are required for approval of the detailed list of 
items, and to establish the entry schedule. (8)
Nearly 22% of the items would be considered as ‘dual use’ while there 
seems to be unclear guidance on the remaining 10% items including 
the materials for ‘water production’ and chemicals for water treatment 
(WaSH 2010c, 3). 
A detailed operational guideline with categorisation of the controlled 
and dual use items is immediately required for facilitating entry of 
essential materials to address the urgent humanitarian WASH needs in 
Gaza.” (WaSH 2010c, 3). However, as Mark Buttle points out, 
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“When there is no publicized list of what is allowed in and what 
isn’t, one has to ask, how can you possibly monitor a change 
in it? Projects never actually get any written response from 
COGAT, to say: ‘we have now agreed that this can enter’. There 
are quite clearly two levels of authorization, a political ‘yes’ and 
a security ‘yes’...Even if we can get a very clear political “yes” 
from COGAT,35 the security clearance from Shin Bet delays it 
several months, easily. (Irving 2010)
AUGUST 
“Although the vast majority of the WASH materials awaiting entry into 
Gaza in warehouses around Kerem Shalom or Ashdod are clearly not 
mentioned on the restricted list, access is still limited.” (WaSH 2010e, 2)
Three months later, a first balance can be drawn, and it is devastating. 
While water is counted by the litre, fuel imports indispensable for 
operating WaSH facilities are counted by the millilitres: 
“Fortunately fuel supplies have increased for the past two months (July, 
August 2010)”, rejoices the WaSH cluster meeting of 19 August 2010, 
“with together 488 m3 of fuel entering for UNRWA and CMWU” (WaSH 
2010e, 1). For a population of 1.5 million over 60 days, the amount 
under this ‘fortunate increase’ is equivalent to an average of about 5 
millilitres per person daily. 
“limited evidence for improved access…”
The most important emergency supplies are still being left to rot in the 
warehouses outside Gaza (in Ashkelon, Kerem Shalom, …).” Although, 
over two thirds of the WaSH items that remain in warehouses are 
not listed as controlled items (in need of a special permit) and should 
therefore present no entry problem, only 16%36 entered since 20th June, 
while an additional 28% received an informal approval” (WaSH 2010b, 
2). 
Gradually, carefully and discreetly 
The Haaretz article “Abbas to Obama: I’m against lifting the Gaza naval 
35 COGAT - the Israeli government organization which controls the entry of materials to Gaza. 
36 This is less than 11% of the entire stock in warehouses, which in turn is only a fraction of all 
supplies short-listed.
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blockade” reported in 2010 that “Palestinian Authority President 
Mahmoud Abbas is opposed to lifting the naval blockade of the Gaza 
Strip… Senior Israeli officials and European diplomats say there is 
agreement that policy on the blockade should be altered, but this 
should be done carefully and discretely.” The article added, “One of 
the points that Abbas raised is that the naval blockade imposed by 
Israel on the Strip should not be lifted at this stage. … Egypt … also 
opposes the lifting of the naval blockade. … Abbas told Obama that 
actions easing the blockage should be done with care and undertaken 
gradually” (Ravid 2010).
As requested by Abu Mazen, the Israeli easing is being done with 
utmost care, discreetly and very gradually, indeed… 
Myths and Solutions
Box 3 discusses common misconceptions about the water situation in 
Gaza. 
Box 3: Common misunderstandings about the water scarcity in 
Gaza
1. … It’s the climate – obviously, with annual rainfall between 
200 and 400 mm Gaza belongs to the semiarid climate zone. It 
should not be overlooked however that in former times Gaza was 
esteemed for its high-quality water resources and regarded as an 
oasis. The climate did not change over the last thousand years, 
but the number of inhabitants began to explode with the mass 
expulsions from Israel in 1948.
2. … It’s Israel, by intercepting the ground water flow in the 
shared Coastal aquifer around Gaza The fact is, however: One of 
the few things, one cannot accuse Israel of, is that it had drilled and 
was pumping wells particularly in the areas upstream and around 
Gaza. The bulk of well withdrawals from the shared Coastal aquifer 
takes place way further north, in the densely populated centre of 
the coastal plain around Tel Aviv (between Rehovot and Netanya). 
But according to international law, Israel as the upstream riparian 
in the shared groundwater flow system is clearly responsible for 
an “equitable and reasonable” allocation of resources. It would 
therefore have to supply Gaza with considerably more water. 
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3. … It’s the over-abstractions, which lead to sea water intrusion 
- however most of Gaza’s current salt input stems from natural 
lateral ground water inflow from Israel amounting to 37mcm/yr 
and with the bulk of it being contaminated by a very high natural 
salt content. The salt input through seawater intrusion in the 
areas where the water level has dropped below sea level due to 
long-term over-pumping is of course very worrying; but it pales 
compared to the risen salt inflows from the SE (see map). This fact 
usually is ignored. Also in Israel the Coastal aquifer is drastically 
over-pumped and the salt front already reaches more than one 
kilometre deep into the hinterland. However, in Israel, the effect of 
this mismanagement is less dramatic since Israel still is bestowed 
with sufficient hinterland and thus can relocate its degrading wells 
into fresher areas.
4… It’s the overpopulation - Gaza simply cannot be self-sufficient 
- this of course is true and cannot be over-emphasized: With 1.4mio 
population on 310km2 land (without the Israeli cordon sanitaire) 
Gaza is one of the most densely populated spots on Earth, as if 
the total Arab population was crowded in the UAE or the world’s 
population in Libya... However: Who would for example demand 
of an equally “over-populated” area such as Manhattan / New York 
that it supplies itself “self-sufficiently” and only from within its own 
city perimeter! Even Beer Sheva, with its climate comparable to 
Gaza and providing of much more hinterland and catchment area 
is supplied from Israel’s rainy north. In the meantime Israel has 
actually developed over-capacities in the south, which for technical 
reasons it cannot pump to the north. Therefore Gaza will have to be 
supplied from within Israel in the short and in the long run. 
5… Gaza can only be helped by large scale sea water desalination 
- however, this ‘solution’ is misleading, not only because it is 
entirely un-ecological and unaffordable for Gaza’s impoverished 
population. A cubic meter of normal drinking water from Mekorot 
in Israel costs 2, 86 NIS (incl. VAT) pumped as bulk supply to the 
entrance of Gaza. The cheapest desalinated sea water is to be 
had only for approximately 4 NIS. And in Gaza the pure raw water 
production within the plant (Az-Zuweida) at present costs over 6 
NIS per cubic meter - if there was any electricity, spare parts and 
raw material available... The net pumping costs at the shallow 
wells in Gaza (transport also not included here) amount to merely
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0,5 NIS/m3. For several years now, Israel advertises desalination as 
the new wonder drug for the chronic water conflict - obviously out 
of its interest not to share any of its existing fresh water use with 
the Palestinian co-riparians. Unfortunately, for pragmatic-political 
reasons more and more donor states start advocating this unfair 
and wasteful option, because they consider the simple alternative 
as politically not “enforceable” or “unrealistic”: to pressure Israel 
to at least partly sell some of its surplus in the south to Gaza. 
It has been shown that the state of water emergency in Gaza has its 
origin not only in the natural climatic scarcity of water, but also in the 
political situation (the ongoing occupation and the siege on Gaza) 
that leaves no room for alternatives. Last but not least, all problems 
are deepened and accelerated by the fact of the extremely dense 
population of the Strip. So the question arises: Is there any hope of 
resolving Gaza’s water problems? If yes, how can these problems 
be addressed? To answer such questions, we must take the political 
climate into consideration. Without an end to the total siege and 
without getting rid of the occupation, a permanent solution is not 
possible. But what are the technical aspects of such an answer?
Waste water reuse, water transfer from the West Bank, and desalination: 
Will they work?
Usually, three suggestions are made on the technical level. First, 
waste water can be treated properly and then reused as an additional 
resource. Second, fresh water can be transferred from the West Bank 
to the Strip on a large scale. And finally, seawater can be desalinated. 
Let us discuss each of these three approaches.
1. Waste water treatment. 
This is not only a chance to gain additional usable water; it is also 
imperative to prevent further contamination and degradation of 
the aquifer. But are we speaking of large quantities? If the actual 
net consumption of water lies below 60 l/c/d this results in a total 
consumption of <30 mcm/yr. If 75% of this water were captured by 
sewage networks, we already would have to consider this a success. 
Israel currently takes pride in the large amount of effluents it reuses 
– not for drinking purposes but for irrigation; but the total amount of 
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reused water in Israel is around 360mcm/yr, some 16% of the total, 
and around 40% of municipal consumption.37 Applied to Gaza, even 
if we unrealistically assume the same economic and administrational 
potential as in Israel, this would result in less than 9 mcm/yr (6% of 
total current abstractions). It therefore appears obvious that waste 
water reuse
a)  cannot solve the drinking water crisis (due to the poor quality of 
effluents)
b)  cannot, and will never be able to, constitute a major component of 
overall supplies
c)  can only be an optimization of, and an addition to, existing 
agricultural supplies
2. Fresh water transfer from the West Bank. 
This option has been studied and discussed in depth, albeit mainly 
before the second Intifada: The current disconnection of the two 
territories and the prospects for the near future make such discussions 
somewhat utopian for the time being. However, what if the two areas 
of the occupied territories became one integral political unit? Would it 
not be a good idea to channel some of the relatively abundant water 
in the West Bank to the dry Gaza Strip? Has not Israel successfully 
transferred water from the Upper Jordan River to the Negev?38 The 
answer is no. The West Bank as a whole enjoys a relative abundance 
of water, over 600mm of annual rain in most of the main population 
centres in the highlands. However, the southern West Bank naturally 
is the driest place of all the highlands and most areas are rather semi-
arid (400mm/yr of rainfall). More importantly, and due to the political 
climate, the southern West Bank around Hebron is by far the most 
water-deprived area (except for Al-Ghor). Since Oslo, a handful of new 
37  Currently, around 730mcm of fresh blue water from wells, springs and Lake Tiberias are 
produced annually, in addition to some 140 mcm of desalinated seawater. Israel wants 
to step up its desalination to some 700mcm/yr in the future, thus doubling its already 
wasteful domestic and municipal consumption.
38 This is not the place to discuss the “desert bloom” myth in depth. It is enough to state that 
the large scale basin transfer of illegally appropriated Jordan river water is far from being 
a success story, economically, ecologically and in terms of sustainable water management 
– not even to speak of the political dimension.
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wells have been drilled in the Eastern Aquifer. These wells thus lie on 
the far side of the mountain ridge from Gaza and pump from very deep 
water levels (between +200m and sea level).39 The total yield of these 
few wells is so low that water production per capita has been in a 
steady decline since Oslo. Moreover, in the decades since 1967, Israel 
did not allow the Palestinians to drill even a single new additional well 
under their own control in the entire Western basin.40 Therefore, only 
a political solution granting Palestinian water rights in the West Bank 
aquifers will permit even discussing this technical option. Even then, 
Hebron has no surplus to share with other regions, and transmission 
costs would be astronomically high.41 
3. Seawater desalination. 
There seems to be a consensus among most experts as to the most 
favourable long-term solution that would overcome the chronic 
malaise:
- In its conclusions the ‘Groundwater Protection Plan for 
the Coastal Aquifer of Gaza’ recommends Element #9: “RO 
Seawater Desalination Plants” (HWE 2010, 121).42
- “CMWU emphasised that the key for resolution to Gaza water 
problems lies in sea-water desalination and that phased 
production would help in ensuring supply of clean, safe drinking 
water to Gazan population without burdening the aquifers” 
(WaSH 2010e, 2). 
- UNEP (2009) recommends: “Alternative sources of water should 
be developed and used to allow the coastal aquifer to rest. The 
only method that can produce water in adequate quantities is 
seawater desalination.” (UNEP 2010, 71) – see Table 5.
One billion dollars, almost two thirds of the costs for the UNEP’s 
suggested long-term action and rehabilitation plan, is the cost of 
39 The water has to be pumped up a thousand meters to cross the Hebron mountains.
40 There are only four small and old wells (Fawwar wells n.1c and n.3, Samu’ n.1 and Rihiyeh 
well) with a combined pumpage as low as 1 – 1.3mcm/yr.
41 This concerns both the initial investments costs for infrastructure in the order of hundreds 
of millions of dollars and the permanent operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, 
especially for the enormous pumping heads.
42 RO = Reverse Osmosis desalination technology. 
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desalination plants alone (see Table 5); sums that an impoverished 
strip of land such Gaza can hardly afford… 
In past years, seawater desalination plants have slowly become a 
major option in the technical discourse about increased supplies for 
Gaza. Especially since the summer war in 2006, when Israel bombed 
the power plants of Gaza and left the Strip for weeks without operating 
wells, there has been a change of opinion among the general public 
and those in the water sector. More and more, one hears that “only 
seawater desalination plants would make us independent from Israel.” 
This, however, is a stark misunderstanding. To the contrary, desalination 
plants with their sophisticated and sensitive technology are far more 
vulnerable and dependent on steady, reliable supplies of spare parts 
and raw materials (chemicals) for their operation. While the currently 
operating simple old mechanical pumps can be repaired locally and 
– in the worst case – be kept running with ‘spit and wire’, high-tech 
installations such as modern large-scale reverse osmosis desalination 
plants would make the Gazan water sector utterly dependent on 
uninterrupted inflows not only of sophisticated tools, spare parts and 
other supplies, but also of expertise. More importantly, desalination 
plants have a huge hunger for energy. Each desalination plant currently 
built in Israel is complemented by a new power plant only to supply 
the energy its operation demands. The Ashkelon plant has energy 
needs on the order of a whole city of 50,000 inhabitants!43 It should 
be obvious that this option leaves Palestinians even more dependent 
on uninterrupted energy supplies or fuel imports than ever before!44 
It should also be mentioned here that desalination for Gaza is also 
Israel’s preferred option and Israel in the past has tried to blackmail 
Gaza precisely under this option (see Box 3, Desalination blackmail). 
Finally, it goes without saying that large-scale desalination of seawater 
is such an expensive venue that it is prohibitive for almost all nations 
43 It is precisely for this energy demand that “Israel, in contrast [to the European Union], has 
no plans to reduce greenhouse gases. The best it can do - according to the Environmental 
Protection Ministry - is to reduce the growth rate of such gases in the coming decades. 
Expected growth according to a business-as usual scenario (without taking action to 
reduce gases) is 63 percent in two decades (Rinat 2008).
44 Israel has no qualms with energy supplies – the Tamar and Leviathan offshore gas fields off 
the coast of Haifa belong to the largest findings worldwide last year! It should also not be 
a surprise that the current desal-hype in Israel is driven by “the even narrower interests of 
private-sector companies [like the gas station and petroleum chains of Paz and Delek!] that 
stand to make windfall profits from rapidly expanded desalination” (Bromberg 2008).
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on earth, except for the energy rich states (without alternatives) in the 
Gulf – and recently, Israel. But even in Israel, the high real costs of this 
technology are painfully felt, and provoke debate about the cost of 
publicly supplied water.
BOX 4: Desalination blackmail
Before 2006, Gaza wanted to buy water from Israel and Israel signalled 
consent to supply water to the Strip. However, Israel wanted Gaza 
to pay the full cost of desalinated water from the Ashkelon plant 
although the water from the plant is fed into the National Water 
Carrier and thus mixed with ordinary blue water, which is very low cost. 
It should be noted that Israel is supplying its own Israeli customers 
at the regular price of blue water, regardless whether this water is 
blue water or desalinated seawater. The Palestinian side still did not 
call off the deal but wanted assurances that it would indeed receive 
desalinated water for this high price. In other words, the Palestinian 
negotiators wanted to make sure that Gaza would not be subsidizing 
the Israeli water sector. Palestinians therefore demanded exact water 
quality data to differentiate between natural water and desalinated 
water, which is poor in essential minerals. At this point, Israel refused 
to cooperate because this would have exposed the fact that, indeed, 
one day blue water is pumped and another day desalinated water. The 
deal was called off since it is hardly defensible that the impoverished 
Gaza Strip should subsidize the Israeli desalination adventures and 
their politically motivated lack of transparency about the source of 
the water it sells.
Hence none of the three alleged technical options offers a viable and 
realistic alternative for filling Gaza’s need for a larger, sustainable water 
supply.
i. Wastewater reuse can only add an increment to irrigation 
supplies.
ii. Transfer of fresh water from the Southern West Bank – a utopia 
at the current state of segregation - would require sufficient 
reserves under Palestinian control and even then comes at 
prohibitive costs. 
iii. Seawater desalination would leave Gaza more dependent 
on power supply from Israel than ever, again at prohibitive 
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economic45 and environmental costs and at a painful political 
price (see below). 
The political dimension of the shared resource
One aspect of the technical options has not been discussed – which is 
the political dimension of all these approaches. It has become a bad 
habit in the highly funded and donor-driven water sector since Oslo, 
that technical solutions are continually suggested at the expense of the 
political rights of Palestinians. All the above solutions have in common 
that they not only try to circumvent Israel’s responsibility as the 
occupying power under international law to guarantee sufficient water 
supply to the population under its control, but also deal with Gaza as 
if it were a viable independent state, owner of its own resources and 
a fully satisfied riparian to the shared Coastal aquifer. This however, is 
not the case.
As was detailed above, the coastal fresh water yield that Palestinians 
control in the Gaza strip is only a small fraction (5-7%) of its current 
abstractions. In addition, the Gaza Strip has only a 12% share of the 
total freshwater yield of the basin (Table 6). 
However, under international law, Gaza as a riparian to the CAB legally 
has the right to a much larger share of this common resource of about 
280 mcm of freshwater per year!46 It should be prohibited to undertake 
any action that would undermine the Palestinian standing in future 
negotiations. To the contrary – all current interim approaches should 
bear in mind the ultimate interest in securing all Palestinian water 
rights. All interim actions should not only promote and strengthen the 
starting position for water negotiations, but also strive to improve the 
Palestinian position. 
45 The Az-Zuweidah plant (in Deir Al-Balah), financed by Austria in 2003, is the only existing 
seawater desalination plant in the strip, with a nominal capacity of 1000m3/day. Currently, 
however, it works a maximum of 8 hours per day, which raises the net production costs to 
around US$ 2.5/m3. If amortisation costs of US$ 1/m3 are added, the water price shoots up 
to some 10NIS/m3.
46 The exact amount of legal “equitable and reasonable share” is not defined unequivocally in 
the general guidelines of the 1997 UN Convention on Transboundary Water Courses. To some 
extent, and unfortunately, given the balance of power, it remains a matter of negotiation 
and agreement in future peace talks. From a political point of view, it is therefore even more 
important to raise the stakes and the bargaining power before such negotiations by promoting 
public discussion and international understanding of Palestinians’ just water rights.
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It is clear that Israel tries to use every opportunity to create facts on the 
ground and undermine the Palestinian negotiating position. Artificially 
restricting oneself to a purely technical discussion of remedies to 
the water crisis is in itself a political approach – one that strengthens 
the status quo and directly undermines the chance for fundamental 
change in the political map. Most western government donor agencies 
prefer to consider technical solutions for a purely political problem.47 
All political approaches are dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, 
counterproductive, if not aggressive and even extremist.
In general, the weaker side in a conflict cannot afford to ignore the 
political dimension of the problems; it has to broaden and intensify 
the general call for justice and for enforcement of rights. Conversely, 
the stronger side has the wind at its back. It can afford to call for so-
called ‘practical’, opportunistic and pragmatic solutions, since they all 
tend to strengthen or cement the status quo. 
“As in most cases of power asymmetry, politically motivated positions 
that are based on maintaining the (unfair) status quo, are considered 
natural and technical in nature, while even very technical positions 
contesting and challenging the status quo will end up being discarded 
as politically aggressive, extremist and – of course – politically 
unrealistic.” (Messerschmid 2007, 361) 
Desalination for Israel is an ideal tool to obscure the consequences 
of the occupation and its own long-standing hydro-apartheid. The sea 
is – at least theoretically – a practically infinite resource. In the new 
Israeli discourse, Palestinians “no longer need their water rights” on 
the existing renewable blue water resources. Israel thus constantly 
alters the discourse on water rights by putting out yet another 
“generous offer” to desalinate for the Palestinians and deliver this 
water to the West Bank (and/or to Gaza). Investing billions48 in large-
47  Compare the recent “success” of the quartet envoy Tony Blair, to facilitate “more open 
borders” to the strip – thus facilitating the import of such ground-breaking supplies as 
“towels and matraces.” 
48 “In Israel […] the desalting industry is expected to grow 140 percent over the next decade, 
with a capital investment of $56 billion by 2015” (according to L. Brezosky, quoted in: 
Sanders 2009) – If we assume 750mcm of additional annual water from desalination in 
Israel, the US$ 56 billion breaks down to an investment of US$75 for each additional cubic-
metre annually. This is roughly one hundred times the capital investment cost of developing 
conventional groundwater.
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scale desalination plants not only constitutes an unbearable burden on 
Gaza’s virtually nonexistent economy – it reduces Gaza’s prospects to 
successfully negotiate a larger share in the coastal aquifer’s freshwater 
potential.49
The only answer to the crisis: Equitable share = transfer from Israel
As has already been mentioned, the demand for an equitable and 
reasonable share in transboundary water resources stands at the centre 
of Palestinian water interests and negotiating positions. It is enshrined 
in the UN Watercourses Convention50 as well as under customary 
international law.51 Many different options of reallocating shared 
water resources between Israel and the Palestinians are imaginable. 
But in most such options, Israel would have to deliver water to the 
Strip from within Israel. This water could come directly from physical 
water resources within the Coastal aquifer or from other sources, such 
as other aquifers, the national Water Carrier, surface water, the Jordan 
River, marginal52 water or even the sea. But in any case it would have 
to be allocated as a “fresh water apportionment” from the shared 
fresh resources. The issue of cost is a matter for negotiation. One of 
the many realistic options for negotiation would be for Israel to keep 
its exclusive abstractions from the Upper Jordan river, but compensate 
Palestinians downstream with their “equitable and reasonable share” 
– whether in the West Bank, or in Gaza or divided between the two. 
A similar approach could be followed for each shared aquifer and 
for other shared surface water or marginal resources. In every such 
49 No exact figures on such share are available. In fact, there is an almost complete absence 
of any discourse quantifying such vital amounts. As a very rough first approximation, such 
demands could lie somewhere between 100 and 150mcm/yr, a three- to five-fold growth 
in available freshwater resources for Gaza. Any such discussion of Gaza’s share will have to 
be embedded in the overall equations of sharing water between Israel and all Palestinian 
territories, including all shared resources, the Mountain aquifer and the Jordan River.
50 “The UN Watercourses Convention calls for 'equitable and reasonable' utilisation of 
transboundary resources. Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal and Sweden, have all signed up to this, while Slovenia, France and the UK 
are considering doing so. (8+3)” Zeitoun (2008).
51 This means that these provisions are applicable whether states have ratified the treaty or 
not.
52 The term “marginal water” in Israel usually is associated with the non-conventional water 
resources, such as brackish water (usually desalinated at much lower costs than sea water), 
collected storm-water, treated waste water effluents, etc.
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scenario, Gaza – physically, not politically! – would become a large-
scale recipient of water from Israel, but not as a favour or as a purely 
commercial client, but in fulfilment of its political water rights.
The important practical implication of such an overall approach would 
be that every water deal with Israel (even if purely commercial) would 
become an important milestone and practical step towards a historic 
deal over water rights. Once Israel is established as the side supplying 
Gaza, this will start to work towards, not away from, a resolution 
that secures Gaza’s “equitable and reasonable share.” Once Israel 
has factored Gaza supplies into its own engineering and managerial 
equations of water supply and infrastructure, such a deal becomes 
an asset, rather than an obstacle to a just solution – provided (!) 
Palestinians don’t get tired in the meantime of insisting on their water 
rights and promoting international understanding and support for 
such an endeavour. Practically, an established and functioning supply 
line, network and supply mechanism acts as an incentive to continue 
along this path and “only” to negotiate over the political terms and 
legal implications of such supply.
It is worth mentioning that currently Israel has a water surplus in the 
South, due not only to the new desalination plant in Ashkelon but also 
to the existing large-scale supply infrastructure of the National Water 
Carrier that reaches from the upper Jordan River until down to Mizpeh 
Ramon in the midst of the Negev. As a matter of fact, Israel’s water 
engineers have long regretted the shortsighted design of this carrier, 
planned in the 1950s and opened in 1964 – which at the time was 
only envisaged as pumping water from north to south. For many years, 
Israel has preferred to pump water from the allegedly “dry” Negev 
towards the thirstiest region in the central coastal plain, where most of 
its population resides and where use of local water resources has been 
overstretched for many decades. In other words, there is currently a 
water surplus in the South, right at the doorstep to the Gaza Strip. 
Hence it is financially by far the most feasible option to channel this 
surplus to Gaza. Mekorot bulk water supply in Israel (and in the West 
Bank) comes at 2.863 NIS/m3 (including the Value Added Tax or VAT 
– WBWD: 2010).53 Inside Gaza, municipalities have consumer end 
53 2.468 NIS/m3 excluding VAT, according to the West Bank Water Department Water Bills 
from Mekorot-Water Co. Ltd. through the Civil Administration (Bet El 2010) – (WBWD 
2010).
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prices for piped network supply between 0.5 and 2 NIS/m3. This is a 
considerable difference in price. However, it is still much cheaper than 
the current practice of purchasing “desalinated” brackish water from 
private flying water tankers at a cost of 1 NIS per ‘gallon’,54 50NIS/m3 
(see Fig. 18).
For the time being, or for the interim period, it would also be much 
cheaper to have international donors pay the difference in price 
between Mekorot and local network water prices. This has the 
additional political advantage that donors would be encouraged to 
support a long-term solution under which it is mainly the price of this 
water that is negotiated, rather than promoting the unfeasible options 
of Gazan desalination or West Bank water transfer.
Among many Palestinian water professionals, as well as in the rather 
embryonic public discourse on this matter, frequently used arguments 
against the proposed supply from within Israel are as follows: 
“Why should we depend on Israel?” 
It is of course true that Gaza would be dependent on Israeli supply, 
as much as the West Bank already is, (see Fig. 23), in both water 
and electrical power supply.55 There is also no doubt that currently, 
the supplied villages in the West Bank cannot rely on Israeli delivery 
during every summer. This, however, is technically mainly due to 
the fact that they share the same (finite) network with settlers, and 
settler consumption doubles each summer (compared to the winter 
months), thus drying out the villages down the line. The deal with 
Gaza, technically, would be of a different nature – where Gaza would 
directly tap into the above-mentioned surplus of water in the south. 
“Surely we cannot depend on Israel and make ourselves hostage to 
Israeli collective punishment at will?” 
True as well, collective punishment of villages in the West Bank by 
reducing water supply has happened in the past (during the second 
Intifada), does happen and is likely to continue in the future, although 
54 Not the Anglo-Saxon volumetric unit, but the Arabic word for a canister of about 20 litres.
55 The West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority, already IS the single largest customer for 
water as well as for electricity, and so also the single most important customer and source 
of income of these institutions.
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as the exception rather than the rule.56 
However, it should not be underestimated: If an internationally 
brokered (sponsored) interim agreement with Israel could be struck 
to secure a certain amount of regular water supply – and as long as 
Palestinians do not violate this agreement by not paying their bills – it 
will not be all that easy for Israel to one-sidedly cancel or violate this 
interim economic arrangement for such a vital and basic resource as 
drinking water!
Another argument goes like this: 
“Gaza has to become independent from Israel. Gaza should be self-
sufficient in water supply.”
Most of the proponents fail to answer how exactly Gaza WILL become 
independent from Israel – other than desalinating or importing 
from the West Bank. From a technical, hydrological, economic and 
developmental point of view, such a standpoint looks rather delusional 
than realistic. To state it as clearly as possible: Gaza is not self-sufficient 
in water supply, cannot be, and will never be! It is as simple as that. 
Gaza cannot, and will never, supply itself with sufficient clean water, 
by itself. Gaza is the most crowded and deeply impoverished place on 
earth where water is a desperately scarce per-capita resource. 
To illustrate this situation, a surprising metaphor should be introduced 
here:
Gaza is New York, Gaza is Manhattan!
Not only does Gaza resemble Manhattan in size. More importantly, 
almost any densely populated city on the planet depends on outside 
supplies. To tell Gazans to become self-sufficient in water supply is like 
telling the average New Yorker in Manhattan, “Go and drill in Central 
Park, build rainwater harvesting cisterns under the Empire State 
Building or otherwise desalinate all the rest of the water you need.”
New York City brings its water from far away, the Catskill/Delaware and 
the Croton watersheds (see Fig. 24). Their approximate distance is 125 
56 Official statistics on overall supply to the West Bank show an almost steady increase in annual 
amounts during the past decade and a half, and also during the worst years of the Intifada.
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miles (200km) – similar to the distance as the crow flies from the Gaza 
Strip to Lake Huleh.
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Tables 
Table 1: CAB Water budget for Gaza and Israel (inflows and outflows) 
Item Israel Gaza 3 SUM
Recharge from rain 1 247 5 35 282
Artificial recharge
Artificial recharge from wells 0.01 5
54.2 3 231
Artificial recharge from reservoirs 17 5
Artificial recharge, treated sewage 129 5
Agricultural return flows 31 5
Lateral (vertical) groundwater inflow - 36.4 36
Seawater intrusions 3 5 20 23
Total Recharge 426 146 572
Municipal supply 243 5 94.2 7 337
Agricultural supply 200 5 80.4 280
Gross outflows to Sea 23 6 2 4 25
Pumpage/outflows 466 2 176.6 643
Over-abstractions (mcm/yr) 39 31 70
Over-abstractions (%) 9% 21% 30%
NOTE: All Israeli figures (except long-term average rainfall recharge) 
refer to the year 2006/07 (HSI 2008).
SOURCES: Refers to the years 1971-2007; average since Oslo (1995-
2007): 437mcm/yr; Gaza values for 2008/09 are from HWE (2010); 
CAMP (2000); Vengosh et al. (2005, 4); assumed and A. Ya’qoubi – oral 
communication; (HSI 2008, 107-110); calc. after HSI (2008, 107-110); 
and PWA (2010, 8, 10). 
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Table 2 Damage to the water and sanitation network
Items damaged during Operation ‘Cast 
Lead’
Itemized amounts 
Wells (damaged or destroyed) 11
Reservoirs 4
Water pipes 19.3 km 
Sewage pipes 2.4 km
Waste water network & pump stations 
(locations)
4
Electrical network (many) -
Household water connections 6,090 (840 households)
House roof tanks 37,700 (5,200 households) 
Other water tanks 2,355
Population lacking sufficient supply Number of persons
One month after cease-fire 150,000
Three months after cease-fire 30,000
18 months after cease-fire 3,000 1
SOURCES: UNEP (2009, 78) and FAO (2009), quoted after: (UNEP 2009, 
81, 86).
OCHA-CAP (2009, 17) reports 30km of damaged water network and 
6,000 households with destroyed house roof tanks.57
The costs only for a short term emergency water supply,58 2 litres 
water in drinking water quality per day (at US$ 20/m3) and 100 litres in 
domestic water quality (US$ 2/m3), sums to US$ 3 million.
57 EWASH fact sheet No. 1. 
58 150,000 people for one month and 40,000 people over 200 days (UNEP 2009, 79, Box 4).
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Table 3 Environmental costs of damage directly linked to the escalation 
of hostilities in December 2008 and January 2009 
Damage and Repair Costs Cost Subtotal
Damage to water & sanitation networks 
(T24)
6.17
10
Sewage damage to groundwater (T25) 3.83
Crops loss, land contamination (T26) 11.72
34Rubble clean-up 17.50
Restore solid waste system 4.80
S U M 44 million USD
SOURCE: UNEP (2009, 83, Table 27) 
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Table 4 Itemized list of trucks with emergency and priority WaSH 
materials entering Gaza in summer 2010 
Month
Chlorine
Trucks
Other trucks of WaSH materials (itemized)
SUM
WaSH-
trucks
Dec 11
7 gravel
+ 3.5 plastic pipes and fittings
21.5
Jan 12
1 equipment and fittings for infiltration basin 
and pump station (PWA)
+ 3 pipes and fittings (ICRC)
16
Feb 9 none 9
Mar 15 2.5 gravel (UNRWA) 17.5
Apr 8
6 nine generators and spare parts
+ 3.5 water containers 
+ 0.5 forklift
36.5
May 9
25 trucks with utility vehicles for CMWU (after 
3 years of negotiation) 
14
June 7
25 Plastic pipes 
+ 4 water tankers (UNICEF) 
36
July 7
1 PVC pipes and computers 
+ 1 with six UNICEF desalination generators 
+ 1 truck with test kits and hygiene material 
10
August 6
7 ICRC material for Rafah treatment plant
+ 2 high capacity storm drainage pumps for 
PHA (half year negotiations) 
+ 0.5 operational maintenance spare parts 
+ 1 mechanical and electrical repair and 
refurbishment 
+ 1 water treatment chemicals for CMWU & 
UNICEF 
+ 1 remaining chemicals for desalination at 
Rafah & Bani Suhila wells (since 2009)
18.5
Source: Compiled from WaSH Cluster oPt Monthly Situation Reports 
(Nos.19-26), that is, WaSH (2010b, 2010c, 2010d).
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Table 5 Long-term action plan (20 years) for the environmental sector 
and respective costs
# Damaged Sector Action
Investment + 
operation and 
maintenance 
costs
Sub-
total
[million 
USD]
1 Coastal Aquifer
Seawater Desalination 
plants (build & operate)
400 + 600 1000
2
Groundwater 
pollution
Clean-up / stop sewage 
ponds
10
502
Clean-up / restore 
infiltration ponds
2
Efficient irrigation systems -
New sewage treatment 
plants (build & operate) 
265 + 200
Temporary wastewater 
offshore disposal
25
3 Land degradation
Decommission landfills 20
83
New solid waste facilities 
(build & operate)
23 + 40
4 Wadi Gaza Clean up, rehabilitate 5 5
5
Governance in 
decline
New EQA building 10
47
Training staff 1
Groundwater monitoring 
(build & operate)
5 + 20
Marine monitoring (build 
& operate)
1 + 10
S U M 1,637 million USD
SOURCE: UNEP (2009, 84: Table 28). 
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Table 6 Recharge figures for the Coastal aquifer (Gaza and Israel)
Gaza 
Strip
[mcm/yr]
Israel
[mcm/yr]
CAB
[mcm/yr]
Gaza 
share
[%]
Freshwater recharge 
from rain
35 246.5 281.5 12%
Total recharge 
(sweet and brackish)
124 442.7 566.7 22%
SOURCE: (Table 1)
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Jean-Baptiste Humbert: 
Archaeology and Heritage in Gaza
We shall first describe archeological activities carried out in the Gaza 
Strip since 1995, and then reflect on the more general and sometimes 
problematic concept of cultural heritage.
The administrative phase
Following the Madrid negotiations and after the conclusion of the 
Oslo accords, the French ministry of foreign affairs, beginning in 1994, 
asked the French consulate general in Jerusalem to work out Franco-
Palestinian agreements in various fields. The French consulate then 
asked the French Biblical and Field training in Jerusalem (École biblique 
et archéologique de Jérusalem) to organize cooperative ventures with 
the brand new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the field of 
archaeology. 
Other European countries were very interested in archaeological 
cooperation in Palestine. It seemed then that there were a variety of 
urgent needs. At the outset, one had to help an administration in the 
course of establishing itself. At this point, an association was created, 
rapidly and almost spontaneously, bringing together the Young 
European Archaeologists of Jerusalem. Its first (and only!) meeting took 
place in the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, when forty or so 
participants elected a president, the Assyriologist Marcel Sigrist, then 
director of the École Biblique and well connected in English-speaking 
quarters. The participants proposed numerous projects which did not 
always take into account social and administrative realities pertaining 
to the unfolding political entity. More than half the projects concerned 
Jericho, whose proximity to Jerusalem offered logistical advantages. 
Jericho also had the exceptional site of Hisham’s Palace, making it 
possible to participate in the symbolic valorization of an Omayyad and 
Arab monument, which honored Palestine. 
It was also evident that half of the Young Archaeologists were relatively 
young researchers who had been attracted by Israel, but had failed to 
find the hoped-for permanent commitment there. Palestine seemed 
like very promising territory. Yet almost none of the projects were 
followed up. During this pioneering time, the PNA took months to 
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develop the administrative organs needed for the functioning of a 
state. An Antiquities Department was created quite rapidly, a mere 
department in the ministry of tourism, as in Jordan. Many people 
would have preferred to work within the framework of the universities 
rather than of tourism. Those responsible for this department had good 
reason to believe that foreign participation, both rapid and massive, 
in various archaeological sectors, would have drowned and stifled the 
responsible empowerment of new Palestinian actors.
The École Biblique opted to work in the Gaza Strip because of its 
wish not to interfere in the projects of the Young Archaeologists, who 
were only planning to work in the West Bank. An accord was signed 
by French Consul General Jean de Gliniasty and Palestinian Minister 
of Tourism and Antiquities Elias Freij to set up a Franco-Palestinian 
mission of archaeological cooperation in Gaza. The French consulate 
called on the École Biblique to move forward in this cooperation by 
establishing its modalities and interventions. The French ministry had 
promised to underwrite the mission on two specific conditions. One 
was that the financing would only concern archaeological digs, as a 
result of which, during their ten years of activities, all actors in the 
Franco-Palestinian cooperation project worked on a virtually voluntary 
basis. The second condition was that the interventions should help 
first and foremost in training local personnel in the skills needed in 
archaeological exploration and in all the operations leading to the 
scientific publication of results. A complementary training program 
was promised, by way of training programs in France for Palestinian 
students and participants who showed professional promise. A budget 
was submitted to the French ministry, which turned the file over to its 
consultative commission for exploration abroad, which in turn offered 
10 000 € in 1995 and 7 000 € for the following years. 
An agreement was signed between Mr. Abdallah Hijazi, deputy 
minister for Gaza of the Palestinian Department of Antiquities, and the 
director of the École Biblique, to open a site (which also served for 
field training) and inaugurate the various digs, give expert advice on 
demand, offer advice and support the separate work of the antiquities 
department. Mohammad Mo’ain Sadeq, Director of Antiquities in 
Gaza, was appointed co-director of the cooperation mission on the 
Palestinian side, and Jean-Baptiste Humbert (author of the present 
190
article) on the French side. Mr. Sadeq chose the site of Blakhiyah for 
the site-school. Situated in the middle of the city of Gaza, next to Shati 
(Beach) refugee camp, it had recently been dug up to install a large 
collector for waste water. The site/school was thus opened in June 
1995 to save what could be saved.
The activities of the local antiquities service
Despite the ongoing building boom and limited budgets, archaeology 
in Gaza had moved along vigorously before 2001. The local antiquities 
department had been rather dynamic in what was, it must be 
recognized, the limited framework of rescue operations. The Roman 
cemetery of Mukheitim was dug up, exposing a hundred tombs rich 
in furnishings. In the same sector, an ecclesiastical site paved with 
mosaics was subject to intensive rescue. The little Byzantine sanctuary 
of Abassan al-Kebir, partly discovered by the Egyptians before 1967, 
was cleaned out, totally exposed, and then covered. A Byzantine 
chapel was dug up at Abu Barakeh (in Deir al-Balah) and the Palestinian 
antiquities workers, trained at the Arles museum, restored its mosaics. 
At Tell Ruqeish, preliminary tests were carried out on residential 
constructions.
The Gaza antiquities team invested its principal energies and means 
in the Byzantine site of Umm al-Amer situated within the municipality 
of Nusayrat. For several years, an entirely Palestinian team, large and 
well managed, undertook to expose a site which had been uncovered 
by Israeli antiquities personnel, whose activities were interrupted in 
1994 by the establishment of the PNA. The results of this work have 
been spectacular, and the site was chosen by the Gaza government 
in 2010 for complete restoration intended for pedagogical purposes, 
most notably teaching respect for archaeological sites and encouraging 
young people to become conscious of their history. 
The Franco-Palestinian mission was a cooperative one
The mission had started on a fragile basis: the budget was severely 
limited, and our aims were not necessarily those of the Palestinian 
partners. Exploratory UNESCO missions on the visible sites of the West 
Bank and Gaza had estimated at several million euros the cost of each 
restoration in situ. The Gaza antiquities department thus hoped for 
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massive and spectacular interventions. UNESCO’s initiatives were, 
however, independent of those of the French cooperation mission. 
UNESCO projects included projected cost estimates, and were then 
offered to powerful international institutions. The two parties had to 
adapt to this reality and modify the mode of intervention, based on 
both the commitments defined by the French government and the 
expectation of the department of antiquities: additional training of 
personnel through a common activity coupled with the hope of further 
discoveries and scientific advances. 
The rescue of a very important archaeological site will serve to illustrate 
the modalities of our cooperation. Mr. Sadeq had shown that a major site 
turned out to be Anthedon in ancient Palestine, mentioned by several 
historical sources. Its advantage was that it enjoyed full visibility in the 
heart of the large modern city of Gaza, in a popular neighborhood. 
The mission thus concentrated all its resources on the site-school of 
Blakhiah-Anthedon. The first five-year plan, 1995-1999, exposed the 
displacement, beginning in the 8th century BC, of economic activities 
of the old tell (under the city of Gaza) towards the coast, destroyed by 
the neo-Babylonian conquest of the early 6th century BC. Phoenician 
and Greek sea trade brought about the reconstruction of the port, 
with intensive Mediterranean exchanges, towards the end of the 6th 
century. The second five-year plan was launched in 2003. A preventive 
dig by the Gaza antiquities department had gotten in the way of a low-
cost housing construction project inland from the coast, and this led to 
the abandonment of the project. The work had, however, found ruins 
from the late 3rd century BC. A long project carried out by the French 
cooperation mission then exposed an aristocratic neighborhood 
remarkably preserved under the sand, followed by a monumental 
construction – walls and town gate; and finally a series of large Roman 
houses buried under the advancing dune. The plan was interrupted in 
2005 because of political instability.
Logistical support was provided to two sites operated by Gaza 
antiquities. Local archaeologists had opened a large Byzantine 
ecclesiastic complex on the site of Muhkeitim, next to Jabalia refugee 
camp. Work was carried out in the framework of the cooperation 
mission financed by the French government. Five hundred square 
meters of mosaics were restored in 1999 under the guidance of the 
Arles museum and Provence antiquities services, then restored once 
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again in 2005 by the same organism, after a tank had crossed the site, 
damaging the pavements. 
In 2003 the antiquities department requested that the cooperation 
mission work on the Byzantine site of Umm al-Amr, in order to make 
tests needed to interpret the vestiges covering one hectare, to draw 
their plan, and to ask the Arles museum to restore the pavement. 
The scientific publication regarding these two sites was based on 
Franco-Palestinian cooperation, with the Palestinian ministry as the 
lead partner. In 1998, the cooperation mission had demonstrated the 
urgency of saving Tell Sakan near the end of Wadi Ghazzeh. Plans for 
a new neighborhood or town were uncontrollably crossing a large 
surface of archaeological remains. An immediate intervention was 
necessary in order to arrest the building planned for the site. The 
mission then obtained the participation in 1999 of the National Center 
for Scientific Research (CNRS, Paris) intended to carry out tests at Tell 
Sakan under the joint direction of Mr. Sadeq and P. de Miroschidji 
(CNRS). The presence of 1500 year-old archaeological treasures was 
confirmed by work carried out in 2000. Other international missions 
participated from time to time. A British team (Louise Clark, London 
University) carried out a short exploration at Muarraqah on an Egyptian 
New Empire installation. Peter Fisher of the University of Stockholm 
undertook stratigraphic studies at Late Bronze levels in Tell al-Ajjul. 
To whom does Gaza’s heritage belong? What are its elements?
Although on the whole these efforts must be judged as positive, they 
are only a fraction of what needs to be done. A variety of factors are 
responsible for this. The first is the lack of funds and the very weak 
mobilization of international research. The media have devoted 
themselves to presenting a negative picture of Gaza, with strictly 
political motivations. The economic, social and political embargo in 
place since 2007 has interrupted social and cultural projects which 
were absolutely necessary. The result today is a significant one, since 
cultural dimensions are nearly wiped out, and sometimes interpreted 
as derivations of the western world, or at the very least exogenous 
forces. The cultural heritage of Gaza is present, available but lacking 
form. Its roots are deep, complex and obliterated. For this reason, it is 
important to ponder the idea of the Gazan patrimony. 
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What did we Europeans come to do in Gaza? We came for the single 
purpose of accompanying a recently established Antiquities Department 
which was confronting, from the outset, a heavy burden, that of raising 
Gaza, in the realm of archaeology and history, to an international level 
in the Mediterranean context. Once again, this cooperation did bear 
fruit, unexpected fruit even, in terms of its importance and quality. 
While these goals were achieved, the process was interrupted by 
futile Western policies in the Middle East. Our goal was not, however, 
always well understood. It was claimed that we had come to search 
for our own roots, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, in the Orient. We had to 
convince our interlocutors that it was perhaps the opposite, because 
the civilizations of the Orient, so ancient and so strong, preceded us 
by thousands of years. We came to bear witness to our debt and our 
respect for the Orient. 
Who are the Gazans? Where do they come from? If the question is 
asked of Gaza refugees, more than half the population, they will answer: 
from Jaffa or Majdal. Nothing historical is suggested. In fact, these are 
two major archaeological sites: Yafa and Askalan. The locals are from 
Gaza, which was once the capital of a powerful principality. In the 4th-
3rd century BC, when Jerusalem was vegetating in its own ruins, Gaza 
was rich with international commerce, and became the equivalent of 
Alexandria by adopting the models of the Greek aristocracy. Significant 
culture and Greek lifestyle led to a radical rejection on the part of the 
mountain people who made their choices in a very violent manner, in 
the form of Maccabean resistance against the Seleucid Greeks. On the 
one hand, this long history has been appropriated as constitutive of 
the Israeli nation, which claims the monopoly on, as well as the control 
of, archaeology. On the other hand, for the Palestinians, in the strict 
circle of cultural heritage, the link to antiquity seems to be broken. 
The fashion of roots is alive today, for reasons of identity, which 
are active everywhere. Gazans can today choose their ancestors: 
Canaanites or Philistines. There is surely a direct connection to the 
Canaanites. Archaeology offers proof with the Bronze Age sites of 
the greatest importance: Tell Skan, Tell Ajjul, Tell Zurob. Ancient Gaza 
actually goes beyond its modern limits, encompassing the sites of Tell 
Hesy, Tell Shariyah, Tell Far’ah, Tell Jammah, all of which are major ones. 
Students from Gaza have told me that they are proud to be Philistines, 
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without denying possible Greek roots. The problem is, of course, that 
the prestigious Arab roots are weakened. The best accepted thesis is 
descent from neither Canaanites nor Greeks, but from Arabs. From 
which Arabs? Nomads, Muslims? The two approaches tend to be 
combined, although these are two different ancestries. The nomadic 
sources are generally rejected because they are considered less 
noble, in favor of an exclusive Hijazi (commercial oases) or Yemenite 
(Southern Arabian kingdoms) origin. One then has to explain the fact 
that in the 12th-11th century BC, while a number of Mediterraneans 
arrived in Gaza, they did not expel native Gazans. They were accepted 
and they intermingled. The Gazan origin was stronger and absorbed 
the newcomers. The immigrants adopted the local Semitic pantheon, 
and the few fragments of known inscriptions are engraved on a local 
Phoenician monument which is just as Semitic. The basis of the Gazan 
population has been Canaanite since the Middle Bronze period (20th 
century BC) as is the rest of Palestine. This base was then enriched by a 
Mediterranean contribution. Gaza is a port, whose inhabitants always 
frequented foreigners arriving from the sea. The Philistine episode is 
only a passage and Tell Harubeh, lying under the old city of Gaza, is 
the potential source of an archaeological and historical illustration, a 
veritable key to the identity of coastal Palestine. Harubeh, the capital 
of the Philistines and a major Tell, is probably the largest in historical 
Palestine, with its 500 meters in diameter. People in Gaza should take 
an interest in this.
On the other hand, the descent from nomads is not devoid of accuracy. 
The opposition between nomads and sedentary peoples is traditional 
and radical. Gaza Bedouins are from elsewhere. But Gaza was always 
a contact point for Naqab and southern Transjordanian nomads, 
especially for reasons of trade, and because these regions were 
strategic areas, successively, for Egyptians and Asians. Open to the 
west, Gaza was the window of the Arab world on the Mediterranean, 
which remained Arab, but subject to Greek, Hellenistic, and then 
Roman influence. The corridor between the sea and Arabia is the 
contact point, via Petra, for the oases of northern Arabia and thus on 
the road to the Arab endpoint on the Indian Ocean. The Arab peninsular 
road had a strong impact on all of the south of Palestine, particularly 
Gaza. Greek and Latin historians named “Arabs” the populations of 
the regions bordered by arid zones, based on the word Arab used by 
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the sedentary folk to describe the people of tents. The historians of 
antiquity ignored, but perhaps suspected, the existence of the cities 
and developed civilizations of southern Arabia. Therefore, the nomads 
are not simply nomads. The cultures of Arabia, as exceptional as they 
may have been, had achieved a high degree of civilization, and a very 
open one at that The south of Palestine and Arabia have always been 
closely linked.
The Greek historian Polybius speaks of the “king of the Arabs” with 
whom one needs to be at peace in order to pass through to Egypt. In 
a variety of conflicts, the “Arabs” assisted the Gazans. One can speak 
of intermarriage between them over thousands of years. The heritage 
of Gaza is Canaanite with Arab and Greek intermixtures. Later, the 
Muslim contribution was to give it the strong and specific character it 
possesses today.
A polymorphous heritage
The most general definition of the idea of heritage is that which is 
foundational in history, in histories, and in the natural cultural attributes 
of a people. It is valid for a family and for a society, and it is valid for a 
people. There is undeniably a national heritage, and it is essential in the 
process of identity formation. Gaza, like the rest of Palestine, is going 
though a serious identity crisis. It has survived others. Once a crisis is 
overcome, it takes a longer or shorter time to reshape one’s identity 
and reformulate one’s heritage. Heritage is always polymorphous as 
it is constantly evolving. Its reformulation cleans, forgets, excludes; 
it empties to make room for acquisitions. Heritage is not a readied 
patrimony, it is a complex elaboration of that which the process of 
identity formation needs.
Archaeology in Gaza seems unnecessary at first sight. It seems as foreign 
as the shade cast by the trees of the garden next door. Nonetheless 
archaeology plunges into the deepest roots of contemporary society. 
Its goal is to describe ancient societies more than to collect precious 
objects as displayed in museums. Beyond what humans have created 
and built, it displays the genius of those who preceded us over long 
stages, but in a specified territory which confers upon it its own genius. 
Heritage is the chair upon which one sits in order to speak. Patrimony 
accepts admixtures, while remaining tied to a specific territory. The 
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notion of world heritage as promoted nowadays by UNESCO tends to 
weaken its density and its usefulness. The process of globalization, 
which aspires to become the good conscience and the conservatory 
of a universal vocation, results in a cultural dilution of regions. On 
the other hand, it may provoke regionalist reactions and encourage 
particularism. World heritage makes no sense in Gaza when local 
heritage becomes fragile. The proposition of placing certain sites in 
Gaza on the world heritage list has created a great deal of sympathy 
locally, more for its potential for international recognition than for the 
weight of history it reflects. 
What is, today, the content of Gazan archaeological heritage ? It 
lies in fragments without continuity, like a puzzle that needs to be 
reconstituted, pieces destroyed or thrown away, sold or stolen. Did it 
emerge from local history and from a territory that was built up over 
a long time and transmitted by the fathers? But Gaza is bipolar. There 
are the people originally from Gaza and the refugees. For the latter, 
belonging to a territory is marked by an interruption: their heritage 
lies elsewhere and is inaccessible. With lost space, time is suspended. 
The territory has been borrowed: the past has no import because 
it serves no purpose. The construction of an identity is carried out 
essentially on the basis of history in the making, that which is lived 
through successive crises. It is written in a place called elsewhere. Its 
structure is social, political and ideological, in the noble sense of the 
term. Justification for heritage is ordered by the short- and medium 
term future. Patrimonial heritage has been voided of content. It has 
been condensed in a new foundational element, the Nakba, and that 
which preceded it has been emptied. The interruption is filled in by the 
resistance effort.
In this way, the creation anew of a framework for life replaces heritage. 
If the past is lost, only the future remains open. Heritage, that which is 
rooted in a ‘before’, is of no use, it is an intellectual luxury for peacetime. 
At the margins of a heritage which is now virtual, identity is declining, 
reformulated in its religious, cultural and political dimensions.
What can be the content of native Gazans’ heritage, given that they 
are still in their territory? Archaeology provokes interest, without 
eliciting more than surprise and curiosity regarding the value in money 
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of discoveries. The Antiquities Department is part of a ministry, the 
object of press communiqués and sometimes of pedagogical forays 
under the aegis of NGOs or European missions. Archaeology is a foreign 
discipline, a western luxury, an esthetic practice, often perceived as a 
vaguely neo-colonialist interference. 
A too distant past is uninhabitable. There is nothing “Arab” there. 
Islam is so dense, so dynamic that for many people Islam and Arab are 
synonymous. Pre-Islamic cultures are conceived as exogenous, traces 
left behind by successive controlling forces coming from elsewhere. 
Iron, Greek, Roman, Byzantine cultures are only accepted at the edges 
of Palestinian heritage. If there is a credible and efficacious past it is 
usually steeped in the Muslim world, since religions possess the truth 
of history, of the moment and of time.
Archaeological heritage? But archaeology is often bothersome. 
In the process of rapid urban development, of territorial use and 
the progressive disappearance of the countryside, the protection 
of archaeological sites imposes constraints. Such protection is 
unwelcome. It is lived as being contrary to the needed development 
of municipalities, the obverse of modernity, especially when a site 
which is highly interesting from the historical point of view is less than 
spectacular. The future, yes, and archaeology, yes, at least when it is 
not bothersome. 
Conclusion
One should not, however, be pessimistic, balanced as we are between 
impotence and impatience. One is sometimes tempted to surrender to 
them when the road is cut by a concrete wall. Efforts being undertaken 
by certain forces to cause Palestinian society to implode limit the 
normal movements of popular culture. Speaking of the notion of 
heritage, one says culture. Culture is that which remains of a society 
which thinks and acts. The conflict in which the Palestinians are caught 
up brings about a specific culture of conflict. Culture is not the luxury 
of a country at peace. It seeks out its sources today in Palestine in the 
reaction to the tensions of the conflict. It is essentially a response to 
the political, social and psychological deficit. Because of the conditions 
of its elaboration, it is modern. It is to be found, therefore, in the forms 
of contemporary expression. Literature, especially poetry, and cinema, 
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reframe a social re-reading and seek the keys to events. Painting 
takes off in unexpected fashion because of its possibilities of psychic 
expression. It is not descriptive but often political, finding its inspiration 
almost exclusively in the traditional imaginary. It demonstrates the 
attachment of society to a present which is simultaneously formulated 
as a timeless, unformulated past. It is one of the spaces where the 
notion of heritage best expresses itself. Palestine now has some musical 
and choral groups that still only affect the elite. One must take into 
account the Arab sensibility, which is in general foreign to classical or 
romantic styles. On the other hand, popular music is gaining in quality 
and in diversity, without undergoing the diluting impact of a large and 
commercially oriented Anglo-American repertory.
All of these achievements are of good quality, and form part of new 
artistic and aesthetic fields. They guarantee a place for Palestine in the 
cultural effervescence related to globalization, precisely because of 
the crisis and the country’s enclosure. The influences coming from the 
west are limited by an oriental, popular, strong tradition. It undeniably 
accompanies a political culture of solidarity and diversity. 
The process is underway. It needs to gain the force required to tie 
Palestinian popular culture with that which is academic and cultivated. 
Numerous institutions have been created over the past fifteen years 
in the areas of saving and protecting the countryside and architecture 
of towns and villages. The universities educate their students who 
will pass this sensibility on to the population as a whole. Faculties are 
opening up more and more to the teaching of history and archaeology. 
Students educated in the west return with technical skills which they 
disseminate throughout the country.
Architecture will inevitably impose itself as a national treasure. Today, 
archaeology is no longer just a contributor of museum pieces, but 
rather the scientific consideration of places and disused objects. It has 
joined the present. One day the archaeology of villages destroyed in 
1948 will be explored. Archaeology must from now on be seen as the 
memory of human industry. The interaction between past and present 
is the key to heritage.
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Bashir Al-Zoughbi and Raed Bader: 
Conference Proceedings 
The Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies at Birzeit 
University organized an international academic conference entitled 
‘Gaza – Palestine – Out of the Margins’ on 1-2 October 2010. This is a 
summary of the major arguments of the speakers. 
The Gaza Strip is unique both geographically and demographically, 
being a densely populated narrow coastal strip, a majority of whose 
residents are Palestinian refugees living in camps. The Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are still recognized as 
occupied territories under customary international law and thus are 
an area to which the Fourth Geneva Convention continues to apply. It 
was the aim of this conference to spell out that Gaza must be brought 
out of the liminal state in which it exists as a result of the blockade, the 
siege and the political separation. Indeed, Gaza has recently won the 
sympathy of world public opinion and enjoyed widespread expressions 
of international solidarity, in particular after the Israeli assault of 2008-
2009. 
Against All Odds 
In the keynote address, Mr. Filippo Grandi, UNRWA’s Commissioner-
General, described the impact of the closure of Gaza’s borders and the 
consequent suffering, pointing out that over sixty percent of Gazans live 
below the poverty line, some forty percent are unemployed, and eighty 
percent rely on food handouts. He described UNRWA’s investment in 
refugees in ways that enable them to develop their potential in spite 
of the constraints imposed by exile and conflict, such as its primary 
education programme. He emphasized the international community’s 
responsibility for refugees, who, as humans without the protection of 
a state, require the protection of international law and legal norms. He 
also stressed two core issues. The first is the need for reconciliation 
among Palestinians; the second is the need to include the resolution of 
the refugee question in any final peace settlement. 
Impact of External Actors
In the next session, ‘Practices of occupation’, Dr. Maha Samman 
Mansour talked about ‘Israeli colonial contraction: The cases of the 
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Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip’. She first examined the conditions 
in which Israeli colonial contraction took place, highlighting differences 
between Israeli actions in the Sinai in the 1970s and in Gaza recently, 
with respect to both their form and the duration of colonial contraction. 
Withdrawal from the Sinai resulted from a peace treaty with Egypt 
preceded by a costly war in 1973, while in contrast the dismantling 
of settlements in Gaza was a unilateral move within an ongoing and 
unresolved conflict within a colonial project. She singled out three 
primary reasons for evacuating and demolishing the Yamit and Gaza 
settlements: strategic state security, psychological considerations 
regarding the settlers, and the desire for international sympathy for 
the sacrifice Israel was making to achieve peace. Regarding the Gazan 
case of unilateral colonial contraction, she said that Israel disengaged 
in large part because it was becoming too costly to provide security to 
the settlers, in the midst of a growing Palestinian population prepared 
to resist Israeli occupation of the land. 
Dr. Helga Tawil-Souri’s research concerned ‘The Hi-Tech Enclosure 
of Gaza’. Her key question was how to use the concept and practice 
of enclosure in comparative terms, and how this practice, discourse 
and concept function. In this regard she analyzed the role of the 
Israeli state regime/apparatus in relation to other spatial ‘players’ or 
‘forces’, and issues such as globalization, migration, neo-liberalism, as 
well as legal, economic, and demographic changes at the expense of 
Palestinians and specifically Gazans. She added that digitally, enclosure 
takes place thanks to the privatization of knowledge and information, 
while digital enclosure raises the issues of asymmetrical access to 
information resources, databases, and processing power. She gave 
several examples of the digital enclosure of Gaza, including among 
others telecommunications, internet and television. 
At the end of the session, Professor Julie Peteet talked about ‘A 
Fortress Country and a Gated Enclave: Locating the Palestinian Margin’ 
where she noted that placing Gaza on the margins of Palestine implies 
the existence of a center. She discussed events that affected Gaza 
over past years, from continued occupation, through the siege, the 
military assaults, and most recently the attack on the flotilla. She 
then proceeded to analyze the connection between Israel’s security 
technologies and the separation. Finally, she examined the ways these 
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interconnected policies have resulted in Israel’s construing itself as a 
gated or fortressed country. Walls and fences indicate the unwillingness 
to settle grievances while inflicting punishment and managing mobility 
through containment and incarceration.
The war and siege on Gaza is, Dr. Peteet pointed out, not simply about the 
creation of a disciplinary enclave, but also about subjugation through 
body regulation and punishment, evidenced by arbitrary regulations on 
the entrance and exit of goods and products. At this point the concept 
of abandonment becomes relevant, and needs to be triangulated with 
those of control and discipline. When Israel disengagee from Gaza and 
then tightened the siege, this made Gaza ‘a zone of abandonment’. 
The spaces of abandonment include, among others, refugee camps, 
asylums, leprosy colonies and prisons. Refugee camps are thus transit 
points between former citizenship and national reconstitution through 
resettlement or repatriation. She concluded that closure, siege and 
enclavization mark the will to fragment Palestine, and signal an era in 
which there no longer remain either centers or margins.
International Law and Outlaws
In the third Session entitled ‘International Law and Outlaws’, Dr. Yasser 
Amouri gave an overview of the ‘Legal dimensions of the Goldstone 
report,’ focused on the legality or illegality of actions carried out by 
Israeli forces during the Israeli military attack in 2008-2009. Most of 
the Goldstone report’s findings were that grave breaches occurred, 
and amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Dr. Amouri 
described the attacks, as documented in the Goldstone report, against 
basic civilian life in Gaza, including destruction of the industrial 
infrastructure and means of food production by an air strike on the 
flour mill on January 9, 2009. In addition, Israeli forces attacked water 
facilities, sewage treatment plants and housing. The Goldstone report 
asserted that the attacks were contrary to the rules of customary 
international humanitarian law, that is, indiscriminate attacks, and that 
Israeli forces did not distinguish between civilians and combatants, or 
between civilian objects and military objectives. Finally, the report 
affirmed the disproportionate nature of the attacks. 
Dr. Asem Khalil’s research focused on “The ‘Protection Gap’ and the 
Palestinian Refugees of Gaza Strip”. He emphasized the conceptual and 
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didactical, rather than the legal or political, need to note the distinction 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip when it comes to legal protection 
and assistance for refugees. He demonstrated how Israel used the pre-
1967 geographical division to widen the gap between Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip through its system of military orders 
and declarations, giving the specific example of Military Order No 1650 
issued in 2010. The other issue is related to possible legal and political 
consequences of Israeli withdrawal in 2005 and the Hamas takeover of 
Gaza Strip in 2007. He concluded that the situation in the Gaza Strip is 
particularly challenging to the international community, and the need 
of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip for protection and assistance 
is pushing UNRWA to reshape its mandate to include providing such 
protection. 
A Land Diminished
In her keynote address on the second day, Dr. Sara Roy talked about 
‘A Land Diminished: Reflections on Gaza’s Landscape.’ She described 
how the people of Gaza struggle today, facing a situation far more 
devastating than before: an inability to visualize a future for their 
children that departs from the damaging reality they must currently 
endure. She made it clear that the injustice of the occupation, and the 
inability of Palestinians to defend themselves against it, had affected 
her deeply. She further examined the two themes she consistently 
encounters regarding Gaza. 
The first theme was Israel’s wish to rid itself of any responsibility for the 
territory, while maintaining absolute control; the second was Israel’s 
desire to give up settlements in Gaza for full and internationally (i.e, 
American) sanctioned control of the West Bank, thereby precluding 
the creation of a Palestinian state. She said that Israel has achieved 
these ends. Unlike the West Bank, which has effectively been subdued 
by Israeli policies of land expropriation, settler expansion, territorial 
cantonization, and other forms of military control, she said, Gaza has 
continued to resist defiantly. In her concluding thoughts, she questioned 
why, in the continued absence of a political resolution to the conflict, 
occupation must be the default position. Why must Gaza be pauperized 
and the West Bank cantonized and annexed, and Palestinians treated 
as a humanitarian problem rather than as a people with political and 
national rights entitled to self-determination?
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The Human Geography of Gaza
In the fifth session, entitled ‘The human geography of Gaza’, Dr. Youssef 
Courbage spoke on ‘Gaza, an ever rebellious demography.’ He showed 
that Gaza has a very atypical demography which should not only be 
described, but also explained, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, since demography is deeply embedded in this conflict. 
Advancing his argument, he emphasized that Gaza is hardly separable 
from the Palestinian context, as the population of the Strip does not 
come from elsewhere, but mainly from the south of Palestine, while 
the refugees in the West Bank came mainly from the north. He added 
that having a huge population in this small area is primarily, but not 
solely, the outcome of the exodus that preceded and followed the war 
of 1948. 
He further indicated that Palestinian fertility patterns remained 
atypical. Ordinarily fertility should be declining in a region such as the 
Gaza Strip that is almost entirely urban, with high population density, 
and an economy focused not on agriculture but on secondary and 
service activities. Between 1999 and 2006, fertility in the West Bank 
decreased from 5.4 to 4.3 children per woman, that is to say, to a 
level significantly lower than that of the Israeli settlers in the occupied 
territory. Rebellious Gaza, as he describes it, experienced an even 
larger fall in fertility, from 6.8 in 1999 to 5.4 in 2006. He concluded 
that the optimistic scenario for Gaza’s future is a real Arab-Israeli peace 
accompanied by the return of Palestinian refugees (or a substantial 
fraction of them) to their homes. 
Mr. Clemens Messerschmid talked about ‘Bitter Water – Reality and 
Illusions in Water Policy for Gaza’. He started by comparing conditions 
in the West Bank, which is rich in groundwater of excellent quality but 
largely under Israeli control, with conditions in Gaza, which has hardly 
any appreciable recharge from rain and a water supply that is almost 
entirely contaminated. The coastal aquifer constitutes the only source 
of water directly available to the Gaza Strip itself, given its total, forced 
separation from the West Bank. Decreasing water levels increase 
the natural inflows of saline groundwater and the largest source of 
pollution resides in the large amounts of untreated or insufficiently 
treated wastewater infiltrating into the aquifer. The 1967 occupation, 
compounded by the total siege in place since 2007, has prevented the 
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building of a single modern and sufficiently sized wastewater treatment 
plant, so pollution has increased. In exploring solutions, he said that 
local and international experts urge wastewater treatment, transfers 
from the West Bank aquifer, and most of all, desalination. In reality, 
he said, wastewater treatment will only meet a very small percentage 
of needs; transfer from the West Bank is politically and physically 
unrealistic (Israel will prevent it; the Hebron area itself faces a water 
shortage); and desalination, a hugely expensive project, subjects Gaza 
to constant Israeli blackmail through the threat to destroy plants or to 
withhold the energy, inputs, or expertise needed to run them. The only 
solution, he concluded, is one whereby legal pressure and economic 
incentives bring about equitable water sharing by way of transfers 
from Israel.
At the end of the session, Dr. Niveen Abu Rmeileh, on behalf of the 
Institute of Community and Public Health at Birzeit University, presented 
a paper on ‘Quality of life, distress, suffering and human insecurity – 
It’s the siege more than the war’. The major objective of the collective 
research was to investigate the main consequences of the Israeli attack 
on the Gaza Strip in terms of injury, disability, destruction of homes, 
and displacement, and the consequences of these violations for the 
quality of life, measured by asking affected inhabitants to response to 
questions about health and distress. She provided an in-depth analysis 
of the effects of war in the form of displacement, destruction and 
damage to real property. The large majority of reported food aid came 
from UNRWA (69%), followed by international organizations (18%). The 
study evaluated the extent of the attack’s negative effect on the quality 
of life of adults in the general population, and the resultant lingering 
high levels of reported distress, human insecurity, and social suffering. 
The siege, she concluded, remains the main obstacle to improvement 
of the living conditions and quality of life of the population, and is a 
priority for action.
Archaeological treasures 
In the sixth session entitled ‘Archaeological Treasures’, Jean Baptiste 
Humbert, from the Ecole Biblique et Archeologique de Jerusalem, 
talked about recent Hellenistic discoveries in Gaza City. He said it 
was important to talk about Gaza’s archaeology and the effects of 
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its cultural heritage when talking about the actual situation in Gaza. 
Before talking about archaeological discoveries, he described the 
difficulties archaeologists face within the political context, especially 
after the rise of the Hamas de facto government in Gaza. He doubted 
the existence of a current strategy or even an understanding of the 
concept of cultural heritage. Excavation in Gaza faced particular 
difficulties after the closure of the Department of Antiquities in Gaza, 
which had supervised the excavation until 2006. 
He showed slides of recent discoveries showing that Gaza was active 
commercially as early as the eighth century BC. These discoveries 
contradict the literature that claims Gaza and other cities on the 
Mediterranean basin were irrelevant at that time. He further highlighted 
the importance of Gaza, comparing it to Pompeii in the same period, 
with similar sorts of archaeological discoveries (baths, mosaics, houses, 
walls, columns, streets, and aristocratic neighborhoods). He argued 
that the people of Gaza were the ones who built these structures and 
hosted the Greeks. Among the pitchers and jars discovered there are 
ones of their own making and for domestic use, with inscriptions in a 
Semitic language, and not Greek, strongly suggesting that they were, 
in fact, made in Gaza.
Political Fragmentation
In the seventh session entitled ‘Palestinian political agency in Gaza’, 
Dr. Helga Baumgarten talked about ‘Democratic transformation in 
Gaza? A first balance sheet of the Hamas government, 2006-2010.’ 
Her key inquiry regarded the fate of Palestinian voters’ great hopes 
for democratic transformation after the elections of 2006. Under 
present conditions in the occupied territories, she argued, democratic 
transformation cannot be achieved due to the non-enjoyment 
of full sovereignty. She then carefully examined developments in 
Gaza spanning the post-electoral period: the first Haniyeh (Hamas) 
government of 2006, the National Unity government of February 2007, 
and finally the so-called “dismissed” government since June 2007.
Khalil Shikaki, on the other hand, said in his intervention ‘Between 
separation and unification – is reconciliation viable?’ that the end of the 
political separation of Gaza from the rest of the Palestinian territories 
is not the solution to marginalization of Gaza. True, marginalization 
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has been deepened because of the separation, but he said separation 
is not the only cause. He emphasized that there are other factors of 
marginalization which Gaza is witnessing, including high population 
density, and Gaza’s military entity. Moreover, he argues that the 
five main parties influencing the situation today are Hamas, Fatah, 
Egypt, Israel and the United States. He further added that settling 
the Palestinian internal crisis is linked with a settlement of the issue 
of the Iranian nuclear program, or with initiating a peace process 
between Israel and Syria. He concluded by stating that the matter is 
also interlinked with the growing prominence of the pro-reconciliation 
groups on both the Fatah and the Hamas side.
Sociological Change 
In the eighth session entitled ‘Real life in Gaza’, Dr. Khaled Safi 
presented his paper, “Five years of life under siege: continuity and 
transformations of social and cultural rights.” He highlighted social and 
cultural changes in the Gaza Strip under siege as a result of two external 
factors: the occupation and the siege imposed on the Strip, factors that 
in turn generated a dual lifestyle and a return of the extended family 
pattern. The internal factors include endeavors to Islamize society and 
politicize religious appearance, as well as the divisions in households, 
families, and clans as a result of conflicting political affiliations. Dr. 
Safi further observed changes in women’s economic, but not social, 
situation, which shows that these changes are forced by harsh living 
conditions. He also pondered changes in those political elites who 
came from refugee and poor households. He went on to discuss the 
cultural changes manifested in transforming a cultural elite into a 
religious one, and the spread of a culture of migration among youth 
due to degradation of economic conditions and personal freedoms 
and rights. 
Dr. Abaher Sakka offered his “Sociological analysis of the Palestinian 
society in the Gaza Strip.” The purpose of his talk was to present a 
sociological reading of Palestinian society in Gaza and the birth of 
Palestinian nationalism and the mechanisms for preparing fertile 
ground for the birth of the Palestinian entity. In his paper Dr. Sakka 
presented the particularity of the legal status of Gaza Strip, especially 
while it was under Egyptian rule until 1967. With the Israeli occupation, 
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the Strip had been transformed into an example of the most severe type 
of colonialism, as it pushed both the social and the economic sectors 
out of balance. In the second section of the paper, he talked about 
the reproduction of social conservatism through the mechanisms of 
production of institutionalized colonial speech and through internal 
mechanisms, concluding that Palestinian nationalism is fragile like 
any other nationalism, and hyperbolizing the scene of the Egyptian 
influence on the Strip, and many other conclusions.
Ms. Dalal Bajes and Mr. Hasan Obaid presented jointly on “Gaza 
between the victim’s role and effectiveness in the Palestinian 
situation: public diplomacy as a model.” The definition of the victim 
was influenced by social scientists from various fields, and hence this 
concept developed into a broader one, that of colonialism, which 
competes with the victim’s role to attract the sympathy of the modern 
world. This competition propelled the resistance to take up the issue 
of what labels and terminologies would best win hearts and minds. 
They argued that public diplomacy is an excellent option for the 
Palestinian people who yearn to convey a true image to the world. 
They also noted that the Freedom Flotilla represented a kind of public 
diplomacy, and was successful in getting media coverage, so that the 
world saw pictures that it otherwise might not have seen. Finally, the 
speakers discussed the role of civil society institutions in Palestinian 
public diplomacy, because according to them, civil society are far from 
the official policies of the state. 
Mr. Hamdi Shaqqoura presented on “The rule of law and accountability 
as the basis for peace,” on the continuing escalation of crimes 
committed by the Israeli occupation and the violation of human rights 
norms, most notably the recent aggression and the siege. He then 
tackled the internal division which led to the violation of human rights 
in both the West Bank and Gaza, which in turn led to unprecedented 
degradation in the national situation. Mr. Shaqqoura worried that the 
restoration of normal life and reconstruction of Gaza are not possible 
due to the ongoing blockade, which affects education, travel and other 
various aspects of life. He concluded that ending the degradation is 
possible only with the intervention of the international community to 
protect Palestinian civilians.
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Did we Forget Gaza?
Dr. Raed Bader concluded the program by questioning , ‘If Gaza is 
a forgotten place in Palestine?’ He noted that the conference title 
was not intended to convey that the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute 
of International Studies at Birzeit University sought any kind of 
provocation whatsoever, but , as intended, the title did raise several 
questions from the audience and did make clear the need to redefine 
the concepts used throughout the two-day conference, including legal, 
political, social and other concepts. He also pointed out that, though 
conference sessions focused mainly on Gaza, they also directly or 
indirectly discussed the issue of Palestinian refugees living in refugee 
camps. Finally, Dr. Bader said that the eagerness for knowledge and 
information on Gaza shows that Gaza is not marginalized.
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Mehrene Larudee: 
Concluding Remarks
We may think of speakers at the conference “Gaza – Palestine: Out of 
the Margins” as having called attention to three ways in which Gaza, 
and Palestine as a whole, have been pushed to the margins. The first 
and most central is physical marginalization, broadly defined to include 
not only boundaries, barriers, and rules requiring permits for people 
to cross those boundaries and barriers, but also the requirement for 
permits to build anything in the West Bank’s Area C; Israel’s restrictions 
on Palestinian exports and imports; and myriad other stringent rules 
about where Palestinians may reside, what they may produce, how 
much water they are permitted to abstract from the West Bank 
aquifers, and so on. Physical marginalization also refers to the impact 
of contaminated drinking water on the physical health of Gazans, and 
on the variety of crops Gaza can grow. It includes destruction of the 
economy, through demolition and strangulation, to the point that well 
over a third of Gazans are deprived of regular employment and income.
The second kind of marginalization is marginalization from 
consciousness. For part of the world’s population, especially those 
in the richest countries who have no direct ethnic or religious link 
with the region, Palestinians are at best on the margins of their 
thoughts, at worst are condemned as “terrorists”. This marginalization 
of Palestinians comes in part from massive disinformation about 
Palestine disseminated by the most widely available news sources or 
talk shows, in part because of lack of easy access to competing news 
sources like Al Jazeera, or the unfounded conviction that such sources 
are untrustworthy. We are talking, of course, about North America, 
and to some extent also Europe – those areas whose governments 
play the biggest roles in maintaining the status quo and protecting the 
Israeli government from the full consequences of its actions. 
The third is marginalization from conscience: the creation and 
perpetuation of a status quo in which numerous and repeated violations 
of Palestinians’ human rights go uninvestigated, unprosecuted, and 
unpunished. Even those who are dimly aware of the injustices often 
do nothing to remedy them, convincing themselves that the situation 
is too complex, or too morally ambiguous, for them to take action, or 
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as UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi put it in his overall 
keynote address, perhaps simply regarding the situation as a “lost 
cause”. Grandi also said some people harbor an image of Gaza as a 
“forlorn and dangerous place” that leads them to think of it as “a place 
beyond salvation” and one that therefore does not merit our urgent 
action. 
Keynote speaker Sara Roy echoed this theme, citing the fears of her 
Gazan friends about the “deepening unwillingness” to repair Gaza, and 
the tendency to regard it as “unworthy of redress and rehabilitation.” 
This is what is meant by marginalization from conscience: consignment 
of Gaza, and to some extent also of Palestine, to a mental holding pen 
in which righting wrongs and repairing damage are postponed for the 
indefinite future. Marginalization in conscience has gone hand in hand 
with marginalization in law. As Asem Khalil’s presentation points out, 
practices have evolved that leave ambiguity about who is responsible 
for enforcing the rights of refugees, and how. As a result of all these 
factors, for at least part of the world, conscience about Palestine dwells 
in a no-man’s-land, a kind of black hole. Even if people are dimly aware 
that there is something wrong in the conditions Palestinians face, they 
hang back from doing anything to demand that these conditions be 
remedied.
And yet, on the other hand, much of the non-European, non-North-
American world is acutely aware of Palestine’s situation and deeply 
sympathetic to and supportive of Palestinian rights. For a very large 
part of the world’s population, perhaps roughly coincident with Al 
Jazeera’s viewing audience, Gaza and the whole of Palestine are in the 
very center of both consciousness and conscience. They are seen as the 
quintessential example of the practices of colonization and subjugation. 
If anything, the conscience of this part of the world’s population is 
acutely and painfully aware of injustices there, and of these injustices 
as evidence of who wields power in the world, and how they wield it. 
Each year all but a handful of UN member countries vote for the annual 
UN General Assembly resolution condemning the occupation and the 
settlements, and yet the occupation continues and the settlements 
grow. Al Jazeera has played an enormous and welcome role in keeping 
the world informed; but until recently it has, for example, been almost 
entirely excluded from the United States, except for a few tiny regions 
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and some expensive special satellite packages, and except for online 
access, of which relatively few take advantage. Yet this can change, 
and is changing: during the Egyptian uprising, hits on its web site rose 
twenty-five-fold, with 60% of the increased traffic coming from the 
U.S (Hennessy-Fiske 2011). Even the U.S. Secretary of State called Al 
Jazeera “real news”, comparing it favorably with what passes for news 
in the U.S.
Marginalization: why? how?
Why is Gaza in the margins? Why is Palestine in the margins? What 
has been the intent behind which, and method by which, all three 
forms of marginalization have been promoted? Speakers addressed 
this question to a limited extent, but much more could be said on 
these topics. Again, we begin with physical marginalization. Speakers 
explained how, along various dimensions, marginalization has been 
a deliberate, planned process. Sara Roy described the “systematic 
incapacitation of Gaza’s economy” by Israel; Helga Tawil-Souri told 
us how, at the time the Oslo Agreement transferred much of the 
responsibility for telecommunications to the West Bank, limitations 
imposed by Israel made it impossible to build a truly independent 
Palestinian network, by forbidding the West Bank from importing the 
necessary equipment; instead, it continued to be necessary to route 
transmissions through equipment outside the borders of the West 
Bank and Gaza, and outside of Palestinian control. 
Maha Samman reaches back into history for another answer to the 
question of “why?” as she explored the only two circumstances under 
which Israel ever decided to evacuate any Jewish settlements from 
territory it had occupied. Evacuation of settlements in the Sinai and, 
much later, evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip, she says, 
were both strategic choices designed to consolidate gains in other 
places. The loss of settlements was part of a larger plan to achieve an 
overall net gain – from the Israeli standpoint, a kind of retreat from 
marginalization in marginal regions in order to advance marginalization 
of Palestinians in central regions.
Clemens Messerschmid offers a complex view of the marginalization 
of water supplies to both Gaza and the West Bank. In Gaza, the limited 
quantity of water is an important issue, but the hazardous quality 
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is equally so, with contaminants mostly far exceeding World Health 
Organization standards. While Messerschmid disputes prevailing 
accounts of exactly what causes the problems, he even more 
adamantly disputes the most touted prescriptions for solving these 
problems. He argues, for example, that desalination is not a preferable 
solution, and certainly not one that will increase Gaza’s self-sufficiency 
or independence; it will only replace dependence on water with 
dependence on electrical power supply. Instead, he argues, the root 
cause is inequitable sharing of West Bank water, and the solution is 
to transport water to Gaza from other locations such as Lake Huleh, 
and to comply with existing international conventions on sharing of 
international watercourses.
Julie Peteet takes a somewhat different view: that in a certain sense 
Gaza is not marginal, despite the fact that it is often seen that way. 
Among other things, she observes, citing Naomi Klein, that Gaza offers 
to the military goods and services industry in Israel – which makes up 
a rather large portion of the economy – a testing ground for security 
technologies. These include checkpoints, walls, and ID cards with 
biometric information, to name only a few, all of which allows Israeli 
firms to market themselves as experts in combating “terrorism”. It is in 
this sense, at least, that she says Gaza is quite central, and not marginal 
at all. But we might look at this in another way: the testing of weapons 
and of methods of subjugation and control on Palestinians is one 
explanation for physical marginalization: Palestinians are physically 
mistreated – marginalized – in part in order to fulfill their central role 
as inputs into Israel’s military goods and services industry.
The presentation by Dr. Yasser Amouri, though not included in this 
volume, crucially summarized the content of the Goldstone report 
(the report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict), reminding us, for example, of the destruction of 1500 
factories and some agricultural production operations. Quite simply, 
Israel destroyed several of the few remaining major food-producing 
enterprises in operation in Gaza, both industrial and agricultural. 
An entire chicken/egg farm was systematically crushed – both the 
animals and the coops in which they were housed. When we consider 
the causes of this marginalization of Gaza by wiping out much of its 
productive capacity, and by implication its secure access to nutritious 
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food, we are reminded of Dov Weisglass’s statement almost a year 
before Operation Cast Lead that Gazans would be “put on a diet”.
The marginalization of the Gazan economy also has included cutting 
the 20-nautical-mile offshore fishing grounds to an absurd 3-nautical-
mile limit, and so reducing to almost nothing the fish protein that 
Gazans can supply for themselves. Enforcement of this limit by the 
Israeli navy is violent and sometimes deadly, as documented on the 
web site fishingunderfire.org. Marginalization of the economy has also 
meant a siege that has allowed bread but not flour, clothes but not 
fabric, to enter the Gazan economy, with the result that Gaza has been 
prevented from restarting its industry. 
As Youssef Courbage notes, Gaza has long been exceptional in its very 
high fertility rate, higher than the West Bank, which he suggests is in 
part politically driven by Gaza’s marginalization. A fertility rate that was 
close to eight children per woman rose to nearly nine with the First 
Intifada, and was still about seven by the year 2000. During the Second 
Intifada, in contrast, fertility in Gaza fell just as it did in the West Bank, 
and yet projections based on a continuing moderate decline in fertility 
in Gaza still imply very high population density in the coming decades, 
unless there is considerable emigration. The marginalization of Gaza 
must therefore end, because the population of Gaza cannot continue 
to be indefinitely bottled up inside it.
Out of the margins of consciousness
Of course, the IALIIS conference could not directly end the physical 
marginalization of Gaza, or for that matter of Palestine as a whole, 
but it did help to combat marginalization from consciousness. It is a 
constant struggle to keep Palestinians in the public mind, because a 
wide swath of the major media, at least in the United States, shy away 
from these topics and particularly from interviewing Palestinians, or 
even those who support their rights. And these topics rarely are raised 
in election campaigns, even in countries like the US that give large 
grants in military aid to Israel each year. 
The process of marginalizing Palestinians from consciousness has been 
largely quite deliberate and conscious. Journalists and TV cameramen 
have been shot at in the West Bank and Gaza, and sometimes killed, 
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as was Fadel Shana, Reuters cameraman shot dead in Gaza April 16, 
2008, by Israeli soldiers, despite wearing a flak jacket marked “Press” 
and getting out of a car marked “TV” and operating a TV camera on 
a tripod. British cameraman James Miller was an earlier casualty of 
the same practices. In Operation Cast Lead, foreign journalists were 
excluded altogether from Gaza and reduced to viewing the action from 
the Israeli side of the border. Yet even this backfired – Palestinians and 
some few foreigners already inside Gaza were able to use cameras, 
including cell-phone cameras, to capture some of the worst attacks, 
and these told the world a story of white phosphorus, and of attacks 
on UNRWA schools and on a UN warehouse. 
Strictly speaking, it is not so much that Palestinians, and Gazans in 
particular, are completely ignored as that they are often portrayed in 
one context: as criminals, not as victims, and certainly not as ordinary 
people with the full range of human thoughts and emotions. The U.S.-
based organization If Americans Knew has carefully documented how 
deaths of Palestinian children are reported differently, and much less 
prominently or fully, than deaths of Israeli children in U.S. newspapers. 
This includes using anti-Palestinian media watch organizations, such 
as the misnamed honestreporting.com or CAMERA (Committee for 
Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America) to intimidate any news or 
information program that dares to show Palestinians in a positive light. 
For example, when a young Jewish American woman, Anna Baltzer, 
and prominent Palestinian political figure Mustafa Barghouti appeared 
together on Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show in October 2009, Stewart 
was apparently flooded with hostile messages from these groups; 
defenders of Palestinian human rights did counter with numerous 
messages of praise for the remarkably mild comments that the two 
of them made on the program. Even so, such episodes have a chilling 
effect on other journalists.
Through all these means, Palestinians in Gaza, and in the whole 
of Palestine, are pushed to the margins both physically and in our 
consciousness, and it is a constant battle to pull them out of the 
margins. Indeed, the political division between the West Bank and 
Gaza has also tended to marginalize Gaza even among Palestinians, 
even within the whole of Palestine. This conference was meant in part 
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also to overcome the marginalization of Gaza within a Palestine that is 
itself marginalized. 
We are grateful to those who have produced books and videos in 
English that keep Gaza, and Palestine as a whole, in the public mind of 
the English-speaking world. For Gaza, two key books in English are Sara 
Roy’s The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (2001; 
somewhat dated now) and Amira Hass’s Drinking the Sea at Gaza 
(2000). A third is political scientist Norman Finkelstein’s recent book 
‘This Time We Went Too Far (2009)’, offering a meticulous dissection 
and rebuttal of Israel’s claims regarding its own motives in attacking 
Gaza, and the justification for its actions in international law. And in 
January 2011 a new edition of The Goldstone Report was published, 
with analysis and excerpts from testimony of victims.
There are excellent video resources on Gaza as well. James Longley’s 
extraordinary film, now about nine years old – The Gaza Strip – is still 
remarkably relevant. Very recently, UNRWA is producing and posting a 
series of short videos, Peace Starts Here, that give glimpses of Gazans 
living their lives and trying to move forward despite enormous setbacks.
Out of the margins of conscience
Ending the physical marginalization of Gaza, and of Palestine as a 
whole, requires, among other things, ending their marginalization 
in consciousness and conscience among the majority populations of 
North America and Europe – not only among the rest of the world. 
Paradoxically, hope lies partly in a kind of dialectical process, one that 
in a way is rooted in Gandhian philosophy and strategy. Each time 
large-scale grave wrongs are done to Palestinians, the most shocking 
aspects of them become international news; the ignorant begin to shed 
their ignorance, and those who have stood immobilized by conflicting 
sentiments begin to act on their consciences. This happened in a 
relatively small way in 2002-2003 with so-called Operation Defensive 
Shield – the Israeli incursion into the West Bank, the widespread 
destruction of public buildings and infrastructure, and the imposition 
of drastic curfews for months at a time. It happened in a much bigger 
way during Operation Cast Lead, December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009, 
the Israeli attack that catapulted Gaza into public awareness even in 
North America and Europe, because it was so profoundly one-sided 
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and disproportionate, and because all over the United States and 
elsewhere, groups publicly protested and called the world’s attention 
to it. Local protests across the United States sometimes made the front 
pages of local newspapers, even when they did not make national 
news. New groups opposed to the Israeli occupation formed; existing 
groups saw their email lists balloon by tens of thousands of members, 
and many people were jarred out of their former tendency to merely 
stand and watch.
A second event was the release in fall 2009 of the UN’s Goldstone 
Commission report, which renewed awareness of the brutality of the 
attack on Gaza. The debate over it occupied the public mind for several 
months, and a key interview with Judge Goldstone on Bill Moyers’ 
weekly show spread awareness of the issue.
Third, the flotilla of May 2010 seeking to break the siege of Gaza caught 
the world’s attention, and then the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara, 
the biggest ship in the flotilla, killing nine, provoked outrage and 
pushed yet more people into awareness of the Palestinian situation.
In some ways it is marginalization from conscience that is the most 
difficult to fight. When we look at events that long preceded Operation 
Cast Lead, it is startling to realize how many efforts have been made to 
promote investigation of violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law, particularly those by Israel, and how relatively little 
forward motion there has been. For example, the June 28, 2006 Israeli 
missile attack on the main electrical power generating plant, which 
destroyed much of its capacity, caused B’tselem (the Israeli Center for 
Information on Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) to write,
The effects of the attack are apparent in all areas of life. As 
a result of the lack of electricity, the level of medical services 
provided by clinics and hospitals has declined significantly; 
most of the urban population receive only two or three hours 
of water a day; the sewage system is on the verge of collapse; 
many inhabitants’ mobility has been severely restricted as a 
result of non-functioning elevators; and the lack of refrigeration 
has exposed many to the danger of food-poisoning. Small 
businesses reliant on a regular power supply have been badly 
affected. The hardship involved in living without a steady 
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flow of electricity is exacerbated by the deep economic crisis 
afflicting the Gaza Strip.1
B’Tselem pointed out that attacking a civilian facility is a crime under 
international humanitarian law, and called for the Israeli government to 
pay to restore the power plant to full capacity and take other measures 
designed to make amends for its action. These would have included 
restoring a provision in Israeli law that would have allowed persons 
and institutions damaged as a consequence of the bombing to sue 
the state for compensation; opening a criminal investigation against 
those who decided on the bombing and carried it out; and adopting 
a government resolution declaring that the IDF is forbidden from 
attacking civilians and civilian objects. Yet none of these was done; 
and this inaction in the face of clear violations of international law has 
been repeated over and over again.
The fact that the Goldstone report was actually produced was a 
milestone in bringing Gaza out of the margins of conscience. But so 
was the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice in 2004 
that the security barrier was illegally being built inside the West Bank, 
on Palestinian territory – and that decision has yet to be reflected in 
action. Indeed, even decisions by Israel’s High Court that a particular 
section of the Wall should be moved are sometimes interminably 
delayed in implementation.
The conscience rebels when national leaders express indignation at 
acts by the Gaddafi regime in Libya, demanding international sanctions, 
investigation, and prosecutions – and yet these leaders seem oblivious 
to the fact that Israeli acts virtually identical in character took place 
during Operation Cast Lead – parallels that cry out for parallel action.
Ultimately, what Palestinians want is a normal life, with all the rights 
and freedoms they are guaranteed under international law, and 
recognition not of their “plight” but of their contribution to enriching 
international life with their writings, intellectual endeavors, music, 
dance, productive innovations, economic activities, and all the 
embellishments of a full and active life. They look forward to a life in 
which the rich heritage of remarkable archaeological finds that Jean-
Baptiste Humbert describes in his contribution to this volume are able 
1 “Act of Vengeance: Israel's Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and its Effects,” http://www.
btselem.org/english/publications/summaries/200609_act_of_vengeance.asp
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to opened up to the public without fear of damage from tank treads 
or a shortage of funds or will to properly protect and display them. 
They envision a future in which conversation about Gaza, and about 
Palestine as a whole, is about their intellectual, industrial, agricultural, 
educational and cultural achievements, their sports victories, and their 
flourishing tourist industry, not about their misery, their oppression, 
and the uncertainty of their future. We hope this conference, and the 
publication of this volume, have brought that time one day closer.
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Annex II: Figures of Maha Samman Mansour’s article
Figure 1 Israeli Settlements in Sinai1
1- Yamit 6- Ogda 11- Dikla 16- Neviot
2- Talmei Yosef 7- Sufa (Saccot) 12- Haruvit 17- Di- Zahav
3- Pri’el 8- Holit 13- Sinai 18- Ophira
4- Merkaz 
Avshalom
9- Sadot 14- Yam
5- Netiv 
Ha’asara
10- Nir 
Avraham
15- Kadesch 
Barnea
 
1  Map redrawn from Ann Lesch, “Israeli Settlements,” 31-32.
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Figure 2 Table of Sinai Settlements. 
Name Date 
Founded
Location Type
Original 
landowners
1 Yamit
1973; first 
settlers in 
1975
Pithat Rafiah: on coast 7km. 
south of Rafah town
Urban Settlement; 
plan was for 1500 
units (6000 people) 
by 1980
Bedouin lands: 
most evicted 
1971-73
2
Talmei 
Yosef
1977 Pithat Rafiah: near Yamit
Moshav; Farmers' 
Union (Haihud 
Hahaklai)
Bedouin lands, 
including  
almond groves
3 Pri'el 1977 Pithat Rafiah Moshav Bedouin Lands
4
Merkaz 
Avshalom
1977
Pithat Rafiah, junction of 
Gaza - Sinai highway
Rural center
Adjoins area where 
the Bedouin were 
settled
5
Netiv 
Ha'asara
1973
Pithat Rafiah: 7km. South 
of Rafiah, on south side of 
highway
Moshav
Bedouin lands, 
including a school 
and cement houses 
(demolished)
6 Ogda 1975 Pithat Rafiah: 1km. South of 
Netiv Ha'asara
Moshav Bedouin lands
7
Sufa 
(Succot)
1974
Pithat Rafiah: between Yamit 
and main highway (First 
kibbutz in Pithat Rafiah)
Nahal until Jan. 
1977, then Labour 
kibbutz. 
Bedouin lands; 
almond and peach 
groves uprooted in 
1974-75
8 Holit 1977
Pithat rafiah: on highway east 
of Sufa, north of Sadot
Nahal; later became 
a Moshav
Bedouin lands
9 Sadot June 1971 
Pithat Rafiah: just west of 
Netiv Ha'asara 
Labour Moshav (first 
Moshav in Pithat 
Rafiah)
Bedouin lands
10
Nir 
Avraham
1977
Pithat Rafiah: 1km. south of 
Sadot; adjoins Ogda
Moshav Bedouin lands
11 Dikla Feb. 1969
Pithat Rafiah: 11km. South 
of Rafiah, on coastal side of 
highway
Nahal until March 
1971, then Herut 
Moshav
Site of a former 
Egyptian desert 
development 
company
12 Haruvit Dec. 1975
Sinai coast: 18 km. southwest 
of Dikla
Herut Nahal  
13 Sinai 1968
Sinai coast: 12km. southwest 
Harvuit; (site moved from 
southwest of El-Arish in 
1974)
Nahal became 
civilian Moshav in 
1977 on completion 
of construction of 
permanent site 
Part expropriated 
from El-Arish 
former site was 
an Egyptian 
government 
plantation
14 Yam Oct. 1967
Sinai coast: Lake Bardawil, 70 
km. south-west of El Arish, 
near Bir al-Abed
Nahal till May 1973, 
then Labour kibbutz
Egyptian fishing 
site
15
Kadesh 
Barnea
Planned in 
1977
Sinai: Oasis near the 1967 
border
Naha Bedouin Oasis
16 Neviot Feb. 1971
Gulf of Aqaba: coast road, 60 
km. south of Eilat
Moshav Nuweibeh Oasis
17 Di-Zahav Sep. 1971
Gulf of Aqaba: coast road, 60 
km. south of Neviot
Moshav
Ghahab, at mouth 
of Wadi Nasib
18 Ophira 1970
Gulf of Aqaba: Sharm al-
Sheikh
Urban Settlement  
SOURCE: Lesch, “Israeli Settlements,” 37-38. Table is rewritten to 
reflect a past existence.
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Annex III: Figures of Youssef Courbage’s article
Figure 1 The long-term rate of population growth (%) in Gaza and 
neighbouring countries 1950-2010
Y axis: Rate of increase (percent)
SOURCE: Author’s calculation using data from PCBS; UNPD 2009; PRB 
2010. 
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Figure 2 Higher levels of education in Gaza than in the West Bank, 
lower gender gap, 2006
Y axis: Low = Percent of group that has at most an elementary school 
education
High = Percent of group that has more than an elementary school 
education
SOURCE: Author’s calculation using data from PCBS (2007), 45-46, 
Tables 2.6, 2.7.
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Figure 3 A higher intifada effect on fertility in Gaza than in the West 
Bank?
Y-axis: Total fertility rate (children per woman)
X axis: Year
Source: PCBS
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Figure 4 Age specific fertility rates in Gaza and the West Bank, 1994 
and 2006
Y axis: Age specific fertility rate (births per thousand women in age 
group)
X axis: Age
Source: PCBS 2007, Table 3.5, page 59
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Figure 5 Total Fertility Rate in Gaza and the West Bank, 1994 and 2006
Y axis: Total fertility rate
Source: PCBS
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Figure 6 Three different assumptions about fertility trends in Gaza, 
2010-2050
Y axis: Total Fertility Rate
Source: PCBS
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Figure 7 The population age and sex structure in Gaza, 2010 and 2050, 
based on Figure 6 medium assumption.
Y axis: Age 
X axis: Thousands of persons: Males (right), Females (left)
Source: PCBS
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Figure 8 The ineluctability of high population growth in Gaza 2010-
2050
Y axis: Population (thousands)
SOURCE: Author’s calculation; see Figure 6 for definitions of Constant, 
Medium, and Low assumptions.  
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Figure 9 The labour market in Gaza: entries, exits, net entries
Y axis: Thousands of persons
 
Source: PCBS
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Annex IV: Figures of Clemens Messerschmid
Figure 1 The driest place on earth… 1
Per-capita freshwater withdrawals in the MENA region. 
Note: Brackish water use in Gaza not included
SOURCE: modified after: <http://earthtrends.wri.org > with data for 
the oPt: PWA (2009). 
 
1  Figures for the West Bank & Gaza Strip are added to the original “earthtrends” graph (after 
PWA 2009) – excluding brackish water production.
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Figure 2 Isohyets in Palestine/Israel
 SOURCE: EXACT (1998, 4), Vengosh et al (2005, 13) 1
1 Compiled from several sources: For Israel/Palestine: modified based on EXACT (1998, 4). 
For Gaza: Vengosh et al. (2005, 13 and Fig. 1A – page 2).
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Figure 3 Total recorded flows by district in 1943 & Jewish Land 
holdings in 1929, 1936.
(2%percent of 1168mcm are equivalent to ~ 27mcm/yr) –
Source: Messerschmid (2008a, 10)
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Figure 4 Well distribution in Palestine (1943).
SOURCE: Messerschmid (2008b, 9, Annex III).
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Figure 5 Growth of irrigation & population (linear trend) under the 
British Mandate
SOURCE: Based on Messerschmid (2008a, 13, Annex VIII).
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Figure 6 Overall Palestinian and Israeli (Jewish) blue-water 
consumption and Palestinian per-capita consumption (domestic & 
agricultural) in columns
SOURCE: Messerschmid (2010, 4)
Note: Palestinian consumption before 1948 refers to all Palestinians; 
after 1949 it refers to the oPt. Israeli/Jewish consumption refers to 
Jews before 1948, and to all Israeli citizens after 1949.
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Figure 7 Gaza water balance
SOURCE: Vengosh et al (2005, 4); HWE (2010, 42); PWA (2010, 8, 10) 
and CAMP (2000). Data from PWA, 2000; modified with data according 
to Vengosh (2005, 4); HWE, (2010, 42), PWA (2010, 8,10).
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Figure 8 Water level fluctuations in the Israeli part of the Coastal 
Aquifer (below sea level in red)
SOURCE: (HSI 2006, 79, 2008, 69)
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Figure 9 CAB pumpage (per two rows of cells) in Gaza & Israel
SOURCE: HSI (2005, 96).
Note: The amounts shown in the bars refer each to two West-East rows 
of cells on the ground (and in the map). The Israeli management system 
of the Coastal Aquifer Basin (CAB) subdivides the entire area into rows 
of cells running West to East and columns running North to South (HIS 
2008, 61) – altogether 16 rows of 4 cells each, in total 64 cells.
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Figure 10 Chloride and boron levels in and around Gaza
SOURCE: Vengosh et al. (2005, 3).
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Figure 11 Coastal aquifer salinity – 1934/35 and 70 years later, 
2004/05
Source: Messerschmid et al. (2009, 9, 21, 22, AnnexIII), modified after: 
G.S.I. H.Q. (1934, 128) & HSI (2006, by-map - Chloride levels).2
2  3G.S.I. H.Q. (1943, 128) and HSI (2006, by-maps: Cl-level map ‘Mapat Rikuz Chlorid’   
(hebr.). See also Messerschmid et al. (2009, 9, 21, 22 – Chloride map).
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Figure 12 Cross section through the Gaza strip (Coastal and adjacent 
aquifers)
245
Figure 13 Water levels in the S Coastal aquifer – contact with saline 
‘Avedat group
SOURCE: Vengosh et al. (2005, 2).
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Figure 14 Map of N Gaza strip – Beit Lahiya waste water lagoon
Source: OCHA (2007b)
Old Beit Lahiya Sewage Lake (3mcm, 3km long, 25m deep), Old 
emergency lagoon (constructed in Sep ’06, collapsed 31 Mar ’07) 
(centre)flooded Bedouin community Umm El-Nasser (light grey in the 
middle),relocated two new “infiltration basins” (‘new lagoons’) 1.5 km 
North, built in summer 2007.
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Figure 15 Um El-Nasser 27 March 2007
Source: Messerschmid (2008c, 48).
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Figure 16a,b New wastewater lagoons in Gaza SOURCE: Bardawil 
(2007, 6, 12).
SOURCE: Bardawil (2007, 6, 12).
Note: The presentation states:
Aim: “Resume a normal operation of the wastewater system”
Methods: “Constructing a disposal pipeline to the identified infiltration 
area”
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Figure 17 One horsepower water tanker - Gaza style, 2007 
(Photo – Laura Brav, Médécins sans Frontières) Source: Messerschmid 
(2008c, 48). 
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Figure 18 The alternative: Israeli mineral water or “gallon” with 
desalinated groundwater (Gaza, October 2007)
SOURCE: Photo by author (Gaza, 2007).
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Figure 19 Primary source of drinking water 
SOURCE: PHG (2010, 15).
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Figure 20 Primary source of domestic water
SOURCE: PHG (2010, 17).
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Figure 21 Chloride content in municipal wells of Gaza (above WHO 
level of 250mg/l)
SOURCE: Yaqubi (2006, 6). 
Figure 22 Industrial fuel imports
SOURCE: OCHA (2010b, 11).
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Figure 23 Annual Mekorot supplies to Palestinians in the West Bank 
(mcm/yr)
SOURCE: Excel-file with data after: IWA (2009, 35).
255
Figure 24 Gaza – Manhattan (200km distance to Lake Huleh)
SOURCE: modified after: DEP (2009, 19, Figure 2.1)
